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West Europe Report



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16 April 1984

WEST EUROPE REPORT

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POLL SHOWS ONE IN FOUR ANTICIPATES NUCLEAR WAR

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 13 Feb 84 p 6

/Article by Asger Schultz: "One Respondent Out of Four Believes We Will Have a Nuclear War" /

/Text / The preservation of world peace or, at any rate, the prevention of a crucial confrontation between the two big power blocs has become the most important question in all international politics. More or less popular movements concern themselves with the preservation of peace, and the influence they are able to exert in regard to arrangements having to do with security policy is not inconsiderable--in the Western world, at any rate.

That is also the case in Denmark, and in view of that background the Gallup Institute asked the population how probable it was that there will be a nuclear war.

A representative segment of the adult population consisting of approximately 1,000 respondents was asked the following question:

"Do you believe that there will ever be a nuclear war or do you believe that the deterrent force of nuclear weapons is so strong that no one would dare begin to use nuclear weapons?"

The following is the answer to that question, divided up according to various population groups:

	There Will Be a Nuclear War	Too Strong a Deterrent	Do Not Know	Total
	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
Total	25	58	17	100
Men	23	63	14	100
Women	27	53	20	100
Age Groups:				
15-24	30	56	14	100
25-39	30	55	15	100
40-59	19	65	16	100
60 and above	21	55	24	100
Amount of Education:				
Elementary School	24	58	18	100
Intermediate or Secondary School University students, H Fs /expansion unknown/, university graduates	34	54	12	100
Those to the right of the Social Democratic Party	15	68	17	100
Social Democratic Party members	25	57	18	100
Those to the left of the Social Democratic Party	54	36	10	100
Are you for or against Danish membership in NATO?				
For	17	69	14	100
Against	48	36	16	100
Do Not Know	23	48	29	100

Every fourth individual (25 percent) says he believes there will be a nuclear war. And almost half of these people believe that a way can result from a mistake. One cannot tell how seriously the people believe that assertion, but if they really believe it seriously that is a frightening prospect. Therefore a supplementary question as to whether the respondents believed that a nuclear war would come during their own lifetimes was asked. Half of them thought so, and that can be interpreted as meaning that people take the fear of war seriously to some extent.

As can be seen, the fear of war is more pronounced among women than among men, and that also is reflected in the fact that women are, and **have** been, more committed to the peace movement and demonstrations for peace than men.

It can also be perceived that fairly young and young people are more concerned than older ones and that the best educated people are more concerned than others.

However, the biggest difference is to be found in connection with the respondents' political backgrounds. It is striking to observe that an absolute majority--more than every second individual (54 percent--among

the voters who actually are leftist-oriented believes that there will be a war, while more than two-thirds of the nonsocialist voters (68 percent) believe the opposite. A down-to-earth belief that a nuclear war will probably take place--however hard it may be to arrive at such an assessment--can, in fact, not be a political question. Therefore a feeling of fear of a war is also a matter of political temperament to a great extent.

One can see differences that are almost as great when one breaks down the answers according to the respondents' attitudes toward Danish membership in NATO. The picture is just as clear here. To summarize the situation, opponents of NATO membership believe that there will be a war and advocates of membership do not.

However, it is clear that there is a very strong correlation between an individual's political affiliation and his attitude toward NATO, and consequently the responses have been broken down by political affiliation and attitude toward NATO in the following table.

	There Will Be a Nuclear War	Too Strong a Deterrent	Do Not Know	Total
	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
To the right of the Social Democratic Party:				
For NATO	13	74	13	100
Against NATO	34	43	23	100
Social Democratic Party Members:				
For NATO	21	63	16	100
Against NATO	34	45	21	100
To the left of the Social Democratic Party:				
For NATO	11	73	16	100
Against NATO	66	26	8	100

It is apparent from the table that, irrespective of political affiliation, it is true that advocates of Danish membership in NATO feel considerably less fear of a war than opponents of membership.

It can also be seen that, when only supporters of NATO are taken into consideration, political affiliation is not of very much importance, and it is only when only opponents of NATO are taken into consideration that it can be seen that those who actually are leftist-oriented react with a pronounced fear of war.

Therefore it is concluded from this poll that NATO membership contributes strongly to mitigation of the fear of war and that fear of war for reasons

that are not apparent from the survey is concentrated very heavily among the voters who are actually leftist-oriented, while the pattern of the Social Democratic voters' attitudes corresponds, in broad outline, to that of the nonsocialists.

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CSO: 3613/96

DEBATE INTENSIFIES OVER SECURITY COUNCIL FUNDS TO PEACE GROUPS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 12 Feb 84 p 6

/Article by Michael Ehrenreich: "Harsh Criticism of the SNU--Fierce Debate on the Criteria for the SNU's Allocation of Financial Means for Educational Work Regarding Foreign Policy and Disarmament Policy"

/Text/ Peter Duetoft, the national chairman of the Center Democratic Party, made a sharp attack on the informational work of the government's Security and Disarmament Policy Committee--the SNU--yesterday.

"The committee's information policy during recent years has been entirely wrong because the SNU gives money to projects that we actually are not acquainted with," Peter Duetoft said at a meeting that was held for the purpose of debating the providing of education and information in the field of security and disarmament policy. The meeting had been arranged by the SNU.

The SNU was set up by the government, and its function is to follow and discuss the security-policy situation. The committee is also supposed to contribute to the performing of research and the providing of information in that field. The national chairman of the Center Democratic Party stated that the committee is engaged in promoting an emotionally charged debate on security policy, and he called for unbiased educational work.

"The SNU ought to use its grants for its own educational activities, and then various grass-roots movements would have to take care of procuring financial means for their recruitment campaigns themselves," Peter Duetoft said.

Balance

Gert Petersen, the chairman of the Socialist People's Party, referred to the fact that the present security-policy majority transferred the amount of 2 million kroner from the Defense Welfare and Informational Service to the SNU a year ago.

"That happened because the committee had demonstrated balance in its informational activities up until then. But that same majority is in a position to take the money back if the balance is disturbed," Gert Petersen said, disagreeing with what Peter Duetoft said.

"What would have happened to the program of enlightenment of the population in Denmark when it was started if high standards and virtue had been demanded? It would have gone out of existence before it got started," the chairman of the Social People's Party said.

The foreign policy spokesman of the Social Democratic Party, Lasse Budtz, stated that the "disagreed entirely" with Gert Petersen on the way the latter viewed the balance as perceived by the political majority, saying:

"The SNU should not speak for a political majority that exists at any particular time or for whatever government is in office at any particular time. The committee should contribute to the process of describing all the existing points of view regarding security policy and the consequences of various attitudes on security policy." Furthermore, Lasse Budtz directed a vehement attack against the Magasinet radio program for a broadcast on Friday evening.

"The program described the consequences of Andropov's death, including a statement that Arne Treholt (editor's note: who now has been exposed as a Norwegian spy for the KGB) was the cause of an alteration of Norwegian security policy. People say that he was either completely ignorant, which simply emphasizes the need for the SNU's educational activities, or that he was a deliberate liar. Either possibility is very dangerous," Lasse Budtz says.

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JORGENSEN PUSHES NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE AT NORDIC CCUNCIL MEETING

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 28 Feb 84 p 6

/Article by 'me/dax': "The Northern Countries Are in the Lead With Their Demand for a Nuclear-Free Zone"/

/Text/ The leader of the Danish delegation to the Nordic Council's 32nd session in Stockholm, Anker Jorgensen (Social Democratic Party), called upon the Nordic countries to lead the way with a demand for a nuclear-weapons free zone--not just in Scandinavia, but also down through Europe on both sides of the line that divides the East from the West today.

In so doing, the chairman of the Social Democratic Party was repeating the message of peace and relaxation of tension that he pronounced recently at a big conference in Athens. And, in issuing that call, Anker Jorgensen did not intend to reject the possibility that the Nordic Council--in contrast with what has taken place up to the present--will enter into a program of closer cooperation in regard to questions concerning security policy and foreign policy in the future, too.

"After all, it is clear that the individual Scandinavian countries have committed themselves in different ways where defense policy is concerned," Anker Jorgensen says. That fact must be taken into consideration as an essential factor. But the world does not stand still, and if the race between the East and the West in the area of nuclear weapons continues the world will become more and more insecure."

Simultaneously, Anker Jorgensen stated that a Scandinavian initiative on nuclear-weapons free zones--and concentration on getting the great powers to guarantee those zones--could be a factor in beginning to apply pressure for peace and detente in other parts of Europe.

At present, Anker Jorgensen is taking part, along with other Scandinavian politicians, in a discussion concerning a nuclear-weapons free zone in Scandinavia. The discussion was arranged by the LSU (National Council of Swedish Youth Organizations).

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LEADING LEFTISTS IN SDP FORM NEW PEACE GROUP

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 26 Feb 84 p 9

/Article by Kirsten Lauritzen: "Ritt Bjerregaard and a Group of Friends Backing a New Peace Foundation"/

/Text/ The Social Democratic politician's participation will attract political attention to the background of the party's threats to create problems for the government in the area of defense and security policy.

A large number of prominent Danes have created a new peace organization. It is the "Group of Friends of the Peace Foundation." It is made up of Civil Engineer Niels Munk Plum, Deputy Chairperson of the Social Democratic Folketing group Ritt Bjerregaard (Social Democratic Party), President Ove Nathan of the University of Copenhagen, Chairman Hardy Hansen of the SID /Society for International Development/, Morten Stig Christensen, the leader of the national handball team, and Jan Oberg, a peace research worker, among others.

The Group of Friends of the Peace Foundation was established with an eye to "improving the chances of supporting work for peace and for an alternative security policy, which large numbers of people in Danish society find more and more necessary," the executive committee of the peace foundation has announced. Niels Munk Plum and Ritt Bjerregaard are members of the executive committee, among others.

The fact that Ritt Bjerregaard is a member of the new executive committee that finds an alternative security policy necessary will, in itself, attract political attention. And that is particularly the case in view of the most recent Social Democratic threats to create problems for the government in the area of defense and security policy.

President Ove Nathan of the University of Copenhagen told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, "I have associated myself with the Group of Friends of the Peace Foundation, like many of its members, because Ritt Bjerregaard is on the executive committee. I believe that that guarantees that the foundation's work will have political breadth."

"If political narrowness were a characteristic of the foundation," the leftist-oriented president of the University of Copenhagen said "I would not have supported it. But we who are willing to give our support to the newly-established foundation's work for peace--by collecting money, among other things--are a broad group.

"The danger of a war with nuclear weapons is great, and even if the peace movement perhaps is still dominated by the left wing, that does not make my concern regarding a nuclear war any less. I am not a member of any political organization myself. I only favor Denmark's having a credible defense program in a Western defensive alliance," Nathan said.

As early as 1981, Niels Munk Plum formed a peace foundation whose only purpose was to support the peace movement. That peace foundation was run by a group that emanated, for the most part, from the "No-to-Nuclear-Weapons" movement.

Niels Munk Plum has attracted attention in public life for many years, mostly as a result of the many financial contributions he has made, over the course of time, to various activities in that part of the Danish left wing that is aligned with the Left Socialist Party.

Niels Munk Plum was active in the resistance movement during World War II, and since the antinuclear campaign started in 1960 he has also been active in that field. Moreover, he was a cofounder of the POLITISK REVY newspaper and has been a member of the executive committee of the daily newspaper INFORMATION.

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EDITORIAL EYES CYPRIOT RELATIONS WITH U.S., USSR

Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 1 Feb 84 p 3

/Article by Titos Fanis/

/Text/ The entire history of the relations among Cyprus, the Soviet Union and the United States consists of a series of clear signs for the attitude of the two leading powers of the two worlds. In all the phases of the Cypriot problem from the beginning until today, both the US and the Soviet Union have had a steady, unchanging approach to it. What changed from time to time in the policies of these two powers toward Cyprus was the methodology followed by each one in its approach.

On its part the United States never saw favorably the struggle of the Cypriot people first for its independence and then, after 1974, for its salvation. Beyond that, the US, whether alone or with Britain, played a leading role in all the stages of the Cypriot drama. From the day the Cypriot Republic came into being, the US never stopped undermining the Cypriot state. It concocted one scheme after another to overthrow the legitimate government of Makarios. In 1974, the US organized, financed, and with its agents in Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey, executed their double crime against Cyprus and its people. Openly or behind the scenes, it torpedoed every effort for a peaceful, just, and viable solution to the Cypriot problem.

It encouraged and supported the Turkish junta, fed the intransigence of the chauvinist Turko-Cypriot leadership, seeking to perpetuate today's de facto situation, with a final target the consolidation of accomplished facts, and the finalization of partition and the end of the Cypriot Republic.

By contrast, the attitude of the Soviet Union, based on its declared foreign policy principles, always served as a serious obstacle to the destructive plans against Cyprus. A consistent and unselfish supporter of our struggle, the USSR always stood by as a sincere ally and gave every assistance we asked. With its political, economic, military and moral support, the USSR always appeared as a positive factor in the development around the Cypriot problem.

Unfortunately, the reaction of the Cypriot political circles with regard to the assessment of these realities is not identical.

AKEL, always placing the Cypriot problem on a sound basis, saw the problem in effect as a conflict between the entire Cypriot people and international imperialism headed by the American imperialism. From this fact, it is not difficult to identify our friends and enemies.

The extreme rightist political group always saw the solution of the Cypriot problem in the context of the West and specifically of NATO. They believe that such a solution will best serve their own political and economic interests.

The continuation of the tragedy of Cyprus has, to some extent, created illusions and self-deceptions even among circles of the democratic Right, which moved, especially after the declaration of the Denktash pseudostate, toward the wrong direction.

But here comes the recent Reagan report on the Cypriot problem and the cynical statement by Richard Haas, the special advisor to the State Department, to set the record straight. On the other hand we have the precise and telling message of the Soviet leadership to President Kyprianou.

While the US rushed, among the first, to condemn in words only the Denktash coup, here comes the Reagan report to place on the same level the "good will" proposals of Denktash with the Kyprianou framework, in an effort to help Turkey and the chauvinistic leadership of the Turk-Cypriots get out of their terrible impasse. And then the rude statement by Haas at the AHEPA conference speaks clearly of itself: "The US is not neutral in the Cypriot issue, but neither does it side with Turkey or Greece at the expense of the other allied country." In other words, for the US, in order to serve the American interests, victim and executioner are placed on an equal footing. There is no justice beyond the right of the "alliance".

In contrast to this hypocrisy and cynicism comes the important message of the Soviet leadership to President Kyprianou. Once again the USSR remains the steady, sincere, sure supporter of our struggle.

The Reagan report and the message of the Soviet leadership should influence, we believe, all those who are willing to see things correctly, without illusions or sentimentality. Of course, we do not address ourselves to those whose objective is to destroy Cyprus. We do not believe the reality will convince those whose political and economic interests are identified with the interests of the enemies of Cyprus. They were not convinced even by the events of 1974. We believe, however, that the recent signs will open the eyes of those who put credence in the crocodile tears of Reagan and Co. for Cyprus and its people.

They must change course for the salvation of Cyprus. This course is known. A solution only in the context of the UN, a peaceful solution on the basis of the UN resolutions. A solution based on the summit agreements of Makarios-Denktash. Together with democratic Greece, the powerful Soviet Union and the countries of the Socialist community and the nonaligned Movement. Away from the murderers of the people, including the Cypriot people.

KHRYSOSTOMOS DEMANDS END OF CONCESSIONS TO TURKS

Nicosia 0 AGON in Greek 20 Feb 84 p 12

/Text/ Archbishop Khrysostomos called on everyone to unite and mobilize to confront the Turkish invaders whose goal is to annex the entire island.

Speaking at the Deryneia Church, the Archbishop denounced the House of Representatives /Vouli/ for its decision to reduce to 0.5 percent the contribution for defense.

The Archbishop said, "it is a tremendous national mistake to make additional concessions at the expense of the rights of our people in the hope that we may achieve a tolerable solution."

The Archbishop also said the following in part: "To create the proper conditions for this struggle the Holy Synod proclaimed a fund-raising campaign to strengthen our national defense. We are sorry to note that the proclamation for this fund raising, instead of being welcomed by all the classes of our people, was opposed by the leaders of certain parties, on the pretext that this contribution for national defense should be arranged by special legislation. We enthusiastically greeted this view and suggested a 5 percent contribution on all net incomes. Following meetings between the government and mass organizations it was decided to limit it to 1 percent. Although this percentage was minimal, it was unfortunately reduced by the House of Representatives to 0.5 percent.

"At first they said the reduction was due to an error but it was finalized. This decision of the Vouli is unacceptable. It tries to avoid dealing with the problem and degrades and ridicules the overall effort for national defense. We have no alternative but to denounce the Vouli before the nation. It failed to grasp the critical nature of the times and to rise to the occasion.

"In any event we declare that the Holy Archdiocese, in addition to the hundred thousand pounds which we offered voluntarily to the fund raiser, will contribute 5 percent annually from its land incomes for national defense.

United

"My friends, we must realize that if we want to survive we must struggle. We must be ready to sacrifice. Neither one half nor one percent is a sacrifice. It is ridiculing our struggle. Let us not deceive ourselves. Let us not sleep like fools. If Turkey's presence in occupied Cyprus is solidified, and if we are not ready to sacrifice, we will lose everything. What we are building today will not be ours tomorrow. Our salvation will not depend on the foreigners but on our determination, our fighting spirit, our real actions and reactions, our willingness and readiness to fight and to sacrifice. We are very naive to expect the foreigners to fight for us when we have no desire to fight for ourselves, and face the dangers with the fatalism of sybarites.

End to the Concessions

"It is naive and a tremendous national error to make further territorial and other concessions at the expense of our people's rights in the hope of achieving a tolerable solution. Such views and actions show ignorance of Turkish history and mentality, but they also constitute a disastrous stupidity. No matter what we accept or offer will be wasted if the enemy realizes that we are acting out of weakness. For this reason we believe we must end any small or major offers on our part at the expense of our people's rights because they will be wasted with nothing in return."

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CSO: 3521/197

GEORGIOS IOANNIDIS ON CYPRUS PROBLEM

Nicosia 0 AGAON in Greece 11 Feb 84 p 3

/Interview with the former Interlocutor/

/Text/

QUESTION: How do you view the recent developments in the Cypriot issue?

ANSWER: The Cypriot problem has never been in a worse position. Never before were we closer to the partition of the island. This is the third month since the day Denktash declared the "Turkish-Cypriot state" and the total international condemnation of this separatist move has brought no results. I fear that in the climate of political tension which exists today in Cyprus in the ranks of our own community and in the overall climate of international tension, especially in the relations between Greece and Turkey, the prospects for a peaceful compromise and solution of the Cypriot issue are not bright. Time, as it is admitted by all those who support our struggle, is working against us.

The difficulties of this situation are understood by all those who have the responsibility for the survival of Cyprus and of our people. The first priority today is to heal the wounds of our fractured internal front. This depends entirely on us, on the country's political leadership, and on the patriotism of all of us.

This is the time when the country's responsible political leaders must talk less and do a lot more. They must avoid every action which divides our people and widens the gap. They must build bridges of unity and conciliation among the people.

If this unity becomes a reality, the road to peace will open because the cooperative spirit will lead to planning and common policy, strategy and tactics, and to common action. This is possible if the partisan extremisms are pushed aside and the partisan fever subsides.

I am afraid that if the prevailing sad condition inside Cyprus is allowed to continue it will hold back any initiative either by the UN secretary general or other circles to find a peaceful solution and at the same time encourage

the Turkish divisive policy. The only hope and the only course is to have such an initiative.

QUESTION: Why do you think we came to this point?

ANSWER: I don't think it is useful at this moment to assess responsibility for the handling of the Cypriot problem and in general to open up the past. No doubt the primary responsibility is borne by the president and the government and by those who deal with the Cypriot problem directly or indirectly.

I sincerely believe that the decisive factor which led Cyprus to the present weak position is the weakness of the domestic front, the lack of unity and cooperative spirit for making sound decisions at the critical moments and the pursuit of impossible goals. This is not wise under the present conditions. When I speak of impossible goals I refer to the goals which are outside the context of the two summit agreements.

QUESTION: What do you think should be done now?

ANSWER: The first priority is unity. All must work to create conditions of unity among the people and the political leadership for the salvation of Cyprus and the survival of our independence--by sacrificing their partisan interests and petty politics on the altar of our motherland.

The president of the Republic should be the first to stop his partisan activities and to announce his decision to devote all his strength to the service of our country, to inspire with his example self-confidence and faith among the people. The other political leaders should respond and should work for the same purpose. In this way the people will reassert themselves and mobilize in the struggle for salvation and survival.

We must promote everything that preserves the unity and the cooperative spirit--a government of national unity and reactivation of the National Council.

With unity and a cooperative spirit we will be able and ready to work in a coordinated fashion and methodically to promote a compromise solution in the context of the summit agreements and through the good offices of the UN secretary general.

This is the wisest course which will lead out of the current impasse.

QUESTION: For several years now you spoke and cultivated the concept of unity and the cooperative spirit. You are generally regarded as a man who believes sincerely and honestly in unity and you have worked hard to help the people grasp this truth. Do you think unity is possible under the current circumstances?

ANSWER: I will start with the fact that unity and the cooperative spirit, as

everyone agrees, are necessary, that is, they are the necessary foundation of our struggle for salvation.

If we all believe in the struggle for the salvation of our country, then unity is possible. It is up to us to make it a reality. It depends on our will and decisiveness, but if we struggle and care only for power then doubtless unity is impossible. I believe the people believe and work for unity. I believe the entire political leadership realizes that without unity the survival of our country becomes difficult.

No doubt there are ambitions, partisan conflicts, the egotisms which have a negative impact, but we are today at a critical crossroads and there must be no hesitation. Either all of us will be lost, or we all shall stand united to guard the gates and save the country from the danger of partition. There is no other choice.

We are in a labyrinth and we try to find a way out of the many impasses we face. The Turks are at the threshold of partitioning our island and we quarrel whether it is necessary to reactivate the National Council whose necessity should not be questioned. If we go on like this, if we don't end the quarreling, if unity and the cooperative spirit do not function today, Cyprus will have no future.

This is the moment for responsibility and unity by all; the moment for a common course for the salvation of Cyprus and the survival of our people.

QUESTION: What is your opinion concerning the differing views of President Kyprianou and Kliridis on the role of the National Council.

ANSWER: I do not wish to enter this controversy which is a by-product of the partisan conflict prevailing in our country.

For the National Council I see an advisory role as always, and I view this body as an institution which contributes to the unity of the people, which brings into contact the leaders of the political parties, tones down the differences, and creates the conditions for a well-intentioned discussion of the Cypriot problem, for an exchange of views, for a dialogue which inevitably will lead to conclusions and assessments and a common strategy and tactic. By its nature the National Council will play a primary and decisive role in the development of the Cypriot problem.

I believe that the present ad hoc meeting of the political leaders will prove constructive for the reactivation of the National Council.

QUESTION: What do you think about the Ozac declaration concerning a confederation?

ANSWER: The Ozac declaration reflects Turkey's goal which is the partition of the island. At the same time his declaration comes into conflict with the

summit agreements and the repeated statements from the Turk-Cypriot side both in the inter-communal talks and elsewhere that the solution they seek is a federation.

It is necessary to clarify the Ozac declaration. The confederation is a divisive solution and is entirely outside the context of the federation and therefore of the two summit agreements. I have the impression that the government has not paid proper attention to the Ozac declaration. If the policy and strategy of Turkey and the Turk-Cypriot community aim toward a confederation then there is no chance for a solution.

At this stage our efforts should aim at safeguarding, consolidating, and strengthening the two summit agreements which are the safest agreed step and framework to pursue a federal solution, especially since these two agreements were achieved in the context of the good offices and under the guidance of the UN secretary general.

It will be necessary to indicate to the UN secretary general that it is necessary to safeguard these two summit agreements and to hold both sides to the federal solution. This is a responsibility of the Cypriot government.

7520

CS0: 3521/197

INITIATIVES MOUNTED FOR FORMAL EOKA RECOGNITION

Appeals for Fighters' Unity

Nicosia | SIMERINI in Greek 3 Feb 84 p 3

/Text/ In a proclamation issued on the anniversary of the death of Gen. George Grivas-Digenis, the Panhellenic Union of EOKA Fighters invited all fighters to unite and called on the governments of Greece and Cyprus to recognize EOKA in theory and in practice as a National Liberation Organization.

The full text of the proclamation, which is signed by D. Filiastidis, chairman, and Dinos Kharalambous, secretary, is as follows:

"Fellow fighters of the 1955-59 struggle, we honor today with a religious memorial service the memory of one of the two great leaders whom we accepted without reservation to lead the noble struggle we launched on that glorious dawn of 1 April 1955. Our memory goes back to that day and from that high and bright outpost gazes over to the future that followed--and which has since become a distant past. How simple, true, enthusiastic, optimistic! How lush and bright the meadows of national abundance! Our 4-year struggle, in the epic majesty of the nation's struggles, always inspired by the vision of freedom. The semi-god heroes came back to life. Once again the toll of blood and the supreme sacrifice were given without protest. The national tradition once again became a reality.

"The majesty of the 1955-59 struggle is beyond doubt. Beyond doubt are the motives of fighters and leaders. Above all, beyond doubt is the unity of the entire Cypriot people for the common purpose. This marvelous unity led to the first triumphant victory, the end of the foreign yoke. But in the end the struggle was not fulfilled. The purpose was not accomplished. The memory encounters bitter moments--the bitter moments of discord among leaders, fighters, and people. We do not want these memories. Let our memories stop before that...

"Fellow fighters, the Panhellenic Union of 1955-59 EOKA Fighters was launched on this premise: We rejected the sterile discord, we denounced the national curse. We embraced the unity which was our companion during the struggle and we preach it now in every direction, to every leader, to every fighter, to the entire people.

"In this spirit we organized our Union in Greece. The fighters of EOKA 1955-59, enchanted with this spirit of unity, cognizant of the critical nature of these moments, aware of our own duty, but also of our right for active participation in all the efforts being made to save our island, fulfill our struggle and promote the happiness of our people, organized the Panhellenic Union of 1955-59 EOKA Fighters.

Principles, Goals, Targets

"Our basic statutory principles, goals and targets, which direct all our other activities, are:

1. Our Union does not belong to any political party, but its members may belong to any party reflecting their political-social and ideological views.
2. It tries to organize the EOKA Fighters in every country they may live today.
3. It tries to promote the unity of the EOKA Fighters throughout the world by organizing a world-wide federation to include all the organized groups of fighters.
4. It tries to enable the fighters of the 1955-59 epic to contribute decisively to the struggle of the nation for the salvation of our island and the justification of the sacrifices of our people for freedom.
5. To preserve the historical documents of the EOKA struggle.
6. To be recognized--in theory and in practice--by the governments of Cyprus and Greece as a National Liberation Organization.

"Fellow fighters, already we can bring you the message of the favorable--to refrain from using more ponderous words--reception of our initiative, both from our comrades in Cyprus and from those who are in the US and Britain. Our chairman went to Britain to inform our comrades there. They received our message and started to organize on their own responsibility and within their own potentialities.

"On the other hand, in Cyprus, with letters and personal contacts, we briefed almost all the section leaders and assistant/acting section leaders of EOKA 1955-59 and we are pleased to tell you they are becoming active.

"The fighters of every political-partisan and ideological preference, united around the generally accepted goals and aims of the Cypriot struggle, look forward with certainty to the fulfillment of this struggle.

Appeal for Unity

"Fellow fighters of the 1955-59 struggle, on this occasion we address ourselves

to you. To all the 'small and unknown' fighters, the section leaders, the local officials, the simple members of the 1955-59 EOKA, who at the historical moment inspired by the clarion call of our two great leaders pushed aside weaknesses and all kinds of differences and mobilized selflessly, with purity and enthusiasm, in the ranks of the EOKA to compose all of us together in the fire of battle the epos of 1955-59. Fellow fighters, show your presence. Unite around the common goals. Get organized either by yourselves or under your section leaders. This is certain to justify our first struggle and to complete the victory of Cyprus.

"On this occasion we express our standard thesis on the national question: The Panhellenic Union of EOKA Fighters believes and proposes the calling of a Pan-national Council of the Cypriot Struggle for the sound pursuit of the Cypriot struggle--the responsible charting of a common course and a common handling. It believes and proposes the calling of a Pan-national Council with representatives not only from the governments of Cyprus and Greece, but also from all the political and militant organizations from the Hellenism throughout the world.

"It must be fully understood that in our great national issues, such as the Cypriot issue, all Greeks must share responsibility. They have a right and a duty to express their responsible opinion and through the Pan-national Council they will be able to channel their views to the governments of Cyprus and Greece.

"We finally address ourselves to the members of the National Assembly, the deputies and leaders of the Cyprus political parties: Almost 30 years have passed since the launching of the heroic EOKA 1955-59 struggle. Yet the proposal for its formal recognition is still pending in the House of Representatives. This delay is for us unacceptable. The recognition of the 1955-59 EOKA struggle--formally as well as in practice--as a national struggle is a matter of honor for the Republic of Cyprus."

EOKA As a National Organization

Nicosia | SIMERINI in Greek 17 Feb 84 p 12

/Text/ The Democratic Rally, through its deputy Nikos Anastasiadis, yesterday demanded in the House of Representatives /Vouli/ that the government introduce a bill for the recognition of the National Organization of EOKA.

Anastasiadis presented his recommendation during the parliamentary debate on the regulation of military medals, which was approved yesterday by the Vouli. He said: "It is time, we believe, even though late, that our state should be given recognition to those who put the survival of the motherland above their life and personal happiness.

"While we agree fully with the regulations we demand and recommend that the government introduce at long last a bill to recognize the national

organization of EOKA which, with its action, brought freedom to the Cypriot people."

Anastasiadis added: "It is, I believe, a contradiction to feel necessary to reward morally--with great justification--those who defend the integrity and freedom of the state and on the other side ignore the fighters whose sacrifices gave birth and existence to this state. I cannot see how anyone can seriously argue that Cyprus should be the only country in the world which not only recognizes their organizations of national liberation but also honors the national fighters with a series of measures."

Anastasiadis suggested that the speaker at the Vouli (Mavronikolas) forward to the government the strong and urgent demand of this body that the government introduce as soon as possible the appropriate bill to recognize the national organization EOKA and its fighters with all the rights and benefits accorded similar organizations in other countries.

The United Democratic Union of the Center welcomed the Anastasiadis recommendation while AKEL did not take sides, but through its second Secretary General Fandis reserved its right to take a position in the Interior Parliamentary Committee if and when the government introduces the appropriate bill.

The Democratic Party, through its parliamentary representative Galanos, did not object to the recognition of EOKA as a national organization. Nevertheless, he expressed the view that the fighters do not need more recognition than the people's respect they already enjoy.

The Democratic Rally recommendation, as well as the other recommendations made for the award of military medals based on objective, impartial criteria, will be studied by the Interior Parliamentary Committee and will then be forwarded to the Executive.

7520

CSO: 3521/196

PROGRESSIVE PARTY IN ROUND OF NEW FEUDS WITH CHIEF IN JAIL

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 5 Mar 84 p 8

/Editorial: "Party in Dissolution"/

/Text/ So the Progressive Party is in trouble again. Again it is Mogens Glistrup in person who is in the center of the conflict which again and again has threatened to blow the party into pieces. Relaxers and intensifiers have become synonyms for fractured surfaces that not only can be found but only with great skill can be prevented from becoming deep rifts.

At the national congress in the fall there was no doubt that the relaxers won the election of party chairman. Even though Lene Glistrup was a candidate for the intensifiers in the campaign leader's absence, V A Jacobsen received support that was broad and significant. The congress majority therefore announced that Mogens Glistrup would not have the right to lead the party in his own way, but this same congress muddled the decision by simultaneously putting together an executive board which is a balance between the party's two wings and giving Glistrup a free rein on the first place on the party's list for the upcoming European Parliament elections.

With this, a new series of confrontations between the two wings has been started. After the poor and catastrophic results of the parliamentary elections in January, the two wings have had time to think things over. The time has not been used to establish peace between the two views but to scheme new ways to continue the battle. The parliamentary group has become so small that there is barely room enough for the usual bickering. Instead, the executive board and --especially--the press can be turned into battlefields. In recent days this has occurred to an almost violent extent--even when measured by the Progressive Party's yardstick. Kristen Poulsgaard wants to have the national chairman removed by an extraordinary national congress while V A Jacobsen's people want Poulsgaard to leave the party.

In other words, there is no end to it. There is no outlook for the two wings uniting in a joint and more politically fruitful effort. The fact is their relationship is such that they prefer the internal fighting

to an outward directed political effort. Also, their game is such that political principles and ideas must give way to spiteful attacks on the personal level.

No policies can be built on this basis. If this development that now has been started continues, it will end in a real collapse. Maybe it has already reached that. The party will have great difficulties in gathering sufficient support from the voters during the upcoming EC elections. And what will Mogens Glistrup then start doing? When he became a candidate his plan was not at all to get into parliament because he knows quite well that he will not get there. His plan was to create new commotion around himself. But the result might very well be that he eventually will fall into the oblivion in which his political activities should logically end.

9583

CSO: 3613/104

UNION BATTLE ON TIES TO SDP COULD HAVE WIDE IMPACT

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 28 Feb 84 p 10

/Editorial: "Power or Declining Power?"

/Text/ The dispute within HK /Retail and Clerical Workers' Union, the second-largest Danish trade union/ points to a showdown which politically is not unique but nonetheless it quite clearly reflects the difficulties trade unions in Denmark are involved in or are facing. On one side are the members who want to depoliticize trade unions. On the other side are members who want a broader base of operation for political activities than the traditional bond between the Social Democratic Party and LO /Danish Federation of Trade Unions.

There are good reasons why such a showdown must occur. Not only in HK but in a series of other amalgamations within our outside LO. In Denmark there is a tradition of trade organizations being able to display a very high level of organization. Our labor market system with organizations that have negotiating rights presupposes in any case that the organizations are representative and preferably also in control of their districts. There are examples where there is competition for members as is happening currently between HK and PROSA in the edb-district. But that is hardly the exception that proves the rule. This has resulted in trade unions, trade federations and executive organizations with great power and almost East European organization percentages.

This system has a fair and proper justification for existence as long as there is an equivalent element in the homogenous political system. The country had such a system until two years ago. With the political breakup in recent years in which new parties were formed and the tendency to wander back and forth between parties was increased, the labor unions have much greater difficulties in maneuvering. The old tie between the Social Democratic Party and LO is still there but it is weakening. The old ties in the underlying strata of the trade unions are also still there but they have become increasingly more difficult to maintain. The labor movement is no longer the unique concept many of their principal speakers indicate. There are many workers who vote for parties that do not call themselves labor parties. And there are many parties that call themselves labor parties without being that.

The consequences of the political breakup has not yet caused a breakup of the organizations. But it can easily do that. The HK case is therefore not only a question of who shall hold the power in HK nor about how the power will be used. It is to a great extent the first warning in the LO family that the broadly amalgamated organizations will encounter increased difficulties in sticking together if and when they want to show their political mark. That is to invite objections from both right and left when the classic harmony between the Social Democratic Party and LO goes overboard. Perhaps a /modus vivendi/ can be found within HK. Perhaps not. But viewed on a slightly longer term basis, the problem becomes a general problem. Some of the organizations outside LO--AC for example--should take heed.

9583

CSO: 3613/104

FAROES' PRIME MINISTER DAM FACING REVOLT IN OWN SDP

Copenhagen AKTUEL in Danish 24 Feb 84 p 15

/Article: "Split In the Faroese Party"/

Atli Dam, the Social Democratic Party man of long standing on the Faroe Islands is facing trouble in the party. He has been co-founder of an alternative party in Tvera on Sudero. Some fear that the case will develop into a crises for the Faroese party. It is about a long standing local strife in Sudero, where there has been disagreement between the local city council members. At a certain point in time four of the party's five city council members wanted the fifth member expelled.

The case could not be solved by a party vote. Instead, because of this a large group removed themselves from the local party and Monday they formed a new Social Democratic Party in Tvera. Atli Dam was among the co-founders of the Faroese party. "I have for a long time felt I was in an emergency situation," Atli Dam says. I had two choices. I felt I either had to withdraw from politics or I had to participate in starting a new party. I chose the latter one, because I feel that is best for the party."

"Do the groups in the party fear that will create a split?"

"The newly founded party is automatically affiliated with the Social Democratic Party. If that circumstance is going to change, the party must exclude us. So far, that is not going to happen. We are talking about a local and isolated problem. It would be unreasonable if the case would have other consequences than those which can be ascertained at the formation of the new party."

12550

CSO: 3613/101

PCF PRESS EMPIRE: EXTENT, OPERATION, PROBLEMS

Paris EST & OUEST in French Jan, Feb 84

[Two-part article by Claude Harmel: "The Marchais (Press) Empire"]

[Jan 84 pp 16-19]

[Text] "By restricting the power of the press groups, and hence the power of money, /and the power of the political parties/[in italics], this 'anti-trust' bill is right in line with the ideals of the French Resistance and the Liberation." (LE MONDE, 24 November 1983)

People speak of the "Hersant Empire." And the Hersant press group is no doubt formidable, at least in the eyes of some, since legislation is being specially directed against that group--a law to break it up--a law which may well go down in history named after either its author, and be known as the "Mauroy Law," or its victim, and be known as the "Hersant Law."

Why don't people also speak of the "Marchais Empire"? Perhaps the French Communist Party's press group has a smaller readership than does Mr Hersant's, although that is not to the liking of the former's bosses, who would like their newspapers to be more widely read. However, they lay down rules for their journalists which prevent the latter from putting out interesting newspapers. On the other hand, in terms of the number of publications the communist party's press group with its 400-odd is a great deal more extensive than the Hersant group. And it is a very much more likeminded group. If there is any press group whose newspapers don't enjoy any real independence vis-a-vis central management--in this instance, the party's political bureau--and whose journalists are forced to strictly adhere to a party line, it is definitely the Marchais Empire.

Sixteen Dailies in 1952

In the past the PCF's press empire was much larger in size and involved larger numbers of activities than it does today.

In 1952 the French Communist Party still had 16 daily newspapers--3 national dailies, since the LIBERATION of those days was quite different from today's in terms of its ties with the PCF and must be counted as a communist organ, and 13 regional dailies:

- | | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|
| 1. L'HUMANITE | (Paris) |
| 2. CE SOIR | (Paris) |
| 3. LIBERATION | (Paris) |
| 4. LA LIBERTE | (Lille) |
| 5. LES ALLOBROGES | (Grenoble) |
| 6. L'ECHO DU CENTRE | (Limoges) |
| 7. LA MARSEILLAISE | (Marseilles) |
| 8. LES NOUVELLES DU SUD-OUEST | (Bordeaux) |
| 9. OUEST-MATIN | (Rennes) |
| 10. LE PATRIOTE DE NICE | (Nice) |
| 11. LE PATRIOTE DE SAINT-ETIENNE | (Saint-Etienne) |
| 12. LE PATRIOTE DE TOULOUSE | (Toulouse) |
| 13. LE PATRIOTE-VALMY | (Moulins) |
| 14. LE PETIT VAROIS | (Toulon) |
| 15. LA REPUBLIQUE-LE PATRIOTE | (Lyons) |
| 16. LA VOIX DE LA PATRIE | (Montpellier) |

Many of these dailies presented themselves not as organs of the PCF but as "democratic newspapers." That ruse did not fool many people, and, besides, the communists didn't really deny that those so-called democratic papers belonged to their party's domain. There was ultimate evidence of that when one after another those newspapers disappeared for lack of readership; and most of them did live on for awhile in the form of one or two sheets published under their names and inserted in the copies of L'HUMANITE-DIMANCHE for the particular regions they had previously covered.

Hence, the ink had scarcely dried on the 26 August ruling when the communists were unscrupulously violating the letter and spirit of a text in which they claim today to see law and prophecy.

Government Assistance

We repeat: these newspapers, at least 12 of them, have vanished. Why? As a result of government repression? Certainly not. Were they victims of capitalistic concentration of industry? Not that either. The sole cause of their demise was being deserted by their readership. Being the richest

political party in France is of no avail; one can't keep loss-making papers going forever. Government assistance would have been necessary.

That government financial assistance is, moreover, what the communists are looking forward to most of all from the new law. Roland Leroy made no secret of that in his speech on the anniversary of one of the PCF's dailies, L'ECHO DU CENTRE:

"This law will be all the better and we will support it all the more firmly since, as the communist deputies have recently requested, it will open the way for measures to assist the national and regional press--direct assistance to newspapers in trouble--, for investment assistance enabling all newspapers to modernize and setting up long-term loans at subsidized rates of interest, for a revamping of preferential postal rates, and for an alteration in the VAT system--assistance regarding newsprint." (L'HUMANITE, 22 November 1983)

To financially rely in that fashion on the generosity of the government has never been regarded as the best way for a newspaper to maintain its independence. But the communists know from experience that they can take money from a bountiful government without giving it anything, not even a thank you, in return. They will claim that it was pressure from the masses which extracted those subsidies from the government, thereby demonstrating a weakness clearly showing that the days of that government's rule are numbered.

Four Dailies in 1983

Only four of the dailies are still in existence:

1. L'HUMANITE

Principal organ of the PCF

Address: 5, rue du Faubourg Poissonniere, Paris 8^e

2. L'ECHO DU CENTRE

Address: 10, rue Turgot, Limoges (Haute-Vienne)

Circulation: Haute-Vienne, Allier, Correze, Creuze, Dordogne, and Indre

3. LIBERTE

Address: 113, rue de Lannoy, Lille (Nord)

Circulation: Nord and Pas-de-Calais

4. LA MARSEILLAISE

Address: 17, rue d'Estienne d'Orves, Marseille (Bouches-du-Rhone)

Circulation: Bouches-du-Rhone, Var, Vaucluse, Alpes de Haute-Provence, Ardeche, Gard, Herault, Drome, Corse du Sud, and Haute-Corse

These newspapers are party newspapers, whatever they are from a legal standpoint, and they are indebted to the party for part of their financing--the part which allows them to make up operating deficits. Additional evidence for this is provided by the "appeal for contributions to the communist press" made by the PCF Central Committee on 21 September 1983:

"The workers need a revolutionary press. In return, that press needs their active support, needs new readers, and needs financial assistance.

So the Central Committee has decided to stress circulation efforts and to start a big drive for contributions. Within the next 3 months we must collect the following: 5 million francs for L'HUMANITE, 1.5 million francs for REVOLUTION, 2 million francs for LA Marseillaise, 1.2 million francs for L'ECHO DU CENTRE, and 1 million francs for LIBERTE." (L'HUMANITE, 22 September 1983)

The Weeklies

In 1952 the PCF controlled 82 (eighty-two) weeklies directly or indirectly.

We cannot say how large the number of weeklies under its control is today, although that number is certainly smaller than 82.

Let us mention only the ones which claim to have influence on a nationwide scale:

5. L'HUMANITE-DIMANCHE

Same address and editorial board as the daily L'HUMANITE
Editor-in-chief: Francois Hilsum

6. REVOLUTION

Address: 15, rue Montmartre, Paris 1^{er}
Political editor: Guy Hermier
(REVOLUTION took the place of FRANCE-NOUVELLE)

7. LA TERRE

Address: 29, rue des Recollets, Paris 10^e
Political editor: Andre Lajoinie

Under the heading of monthlies which take the form of magazines rather than journals, we will list the following:

8. AVANT-GARDE

Magazine of the Communist Youth Movement of France (MJC)
Address: 19, rue V. Hugo, Bagnolet (Seine-St-Denis)
Editor: Jacques Perreux
Editor-in-chief: Dominique Sanchez

9. LE NOUVEAU CLARTE

Magazine of the Association of Communist Students of France
Address: 19, rue V. Hugo, Bagnolet (Seine-St-Denis)
Political editor: Pierre Laurent
Editor-in-chief: Alexis Charansonet

10. L'ECOLE ET LA NATION

The PCF's monthly magazine
Address: 2, place du Colonel Fabien, Paris 19^e
Editor: Maurice Perche

11. L'ELU D'AUJOURD'HUI

Monthly publication of news and exchanges of views, serving elected representatives and communities--communes, departments, regions--in the cause of humane, socially-oriented, and democratic management
Address: 6, boulevard Poissoniere, Paris 9^e
Political editor: Marcel Rosette

One might add here the publications which are politically speaking part of the Marchais Empire but are further distanced from it from a legal standpoint. Most of these are monthly publications of the mass organizations most obviously under PCF control--the Association of French Women, the CGT¹, the Peace Movement (its bimonthly is COMBAT POUR LA PAIX), the France-USSR Association, etc.

The Journals

The French Communist Party publishes a considerable number of journals, and one wonders how they find enough readership, not only in order to be kept alive (the party does that) but in order to justify their publication and the expense that entails.

In addition to a specifically political journal,

12. CAHIERS DU COMMUNISME

Political and theoretical monthly journal of the Central Committee of the PCF
Address: 2, place du Colonel Fabien, Paris 19^e
Editor: Andre Vieuguet²

there are journals of a literary and scientific nature:

13. EUROPE³

Monthly literary review

Address: 146, rue du Faubourg Poissonniere, Paris 10^e

Board chairman: Pierre Camarra

Editor: Charles Dobzynski

14. ECONOMIE ET POLITIQUE

Marxist economic review

Address: 8, cite d'Hauteville, Paris 10^e

Political editor: Philippe Herzog

Five journals are published under the aegis of the Marxist Research Institute (IRM), formerly the Maurice Thorez Institute:

15. CAHIERS D'HISTOIRE

Marxist Research Institute (IRM) quarterly

Address: 64, boulevard Auguste-Blanqui, Paris 13^e

Publication editor: Paule Roussat

16. LA PENSEE

Bimonthly

Address: 64, boulevard Auguste-Blanqui, Paris 13^e

Editor: Antoine Casanova

17. SOCIETE FRANCAISE

Journals of the Marxist Research Institute
Quarterly

18. RECHERCHES INTERNATIONALES (IRM)

Quarterly

Address: 64, boulevard Auguste-Blanqui, Paris 13^e

Publication editor: P. Roussat⁴

19. ISSUES

Quarterly

Research journals of the magazine ECONOMIE ET POLITIQUE

Address: 8, cite d'Hauteville, Paris 10^e

Publication editor: J. Flavien

Retail and Sports Periodicals; Publishing; Distribution

The preceding information falls far short of listing the full extent of the Marchais Empire's political and intellectual sectors. And that empire extends over other areas:

- Children's Publications

The PCF has control over Editions de Vaillant (126, rue La Fayette, Paris 10^e), whose PDG [chairman and general manager] is Claude Compeyron, a member of the PCF Central Committee since 1979, and whose general manager is J.-Claude Le Meur.

VAILLANT used to be the communist newspaper for children (its name was cribbed from the name of the Catholic newspaper for a readership of the same age group, COEURS VAILLANTS, so as to create confusion). That newspaper disappeared and was replaced by a whole set of publications with a Pif the Dog theme, the one with the largest circulation--over 400,000--being PIF GADGET.

- Sports Periodicals

The counterpart to Editions de Vaillant in the sports area is Editions Miroir-Sprint (EMS) (10, rue des Pyramides, Paris 1^{er}). The latter is also associated with the former in the Vaillant-Miroir Sprint group, whose PDG is Claude Compeyron. Vaillant-Miroir Sprint publishes several sports newspapers: MIROIR DU FOOTBALL, MIROIR DU RUGBY, and MIROIR DU CYCLISME (which for cost reasons are printed in Belgium).

- Publishing

In addition to its official publishing house, Les Editions Sociales--Address: 146, rue du Faubourg Poissoniere, Paris 10^e; Chairman and General Manager: Joseph Pintus; Editor: Lucien Seve, member of the PCF Central Committee --, the French Communist Party controls, among other publishers, Editions de la Farandole, Editeurs Francais Reunis, Editions Hier et Demain, etc.

Lastly, the Marchais Empire includes:

- Distribution companies, in particular the Groupement d'interet economique du Livre et du Disque (GIELD), the Livre Club Diderot, Odeon Diffusion, etc.

- Bookstores--in June 1978, CAHIERS DU COMMUNISME published a list of friendly bookstores throughout the country, which included 37 names and addresses

- Printing companies, including Imprimerie Photogravure Poissoniere (5, rue du Faubourg Poissonniere, Paris 9^e) which prints L'HUMANITE, and Imprimerie Paris-Province Impression (PPI) (51, avenue Jean-Lolive in Bagnolet, Seine-St-Denis)
- Advertising agencies, the main one being Agence centrale de publicite (ACP) (6, boulevard Poissonniere, Paris 9^e) with Lucien Mathey as its chairman and managing director
- A press agency, distributing articles and studies--Union francaise d'Information (5, rue du Faubourg Poissonniere, Paris 9^e) (Editor: Pierre Calmette)

Unity Through Infiltration

Does the Marchais Empire--of which we have pointed out only the most important elements--constitute a group in the sense of that term intended by the bill?

The government has been anxious to reassure the communists on this score that the legislation is not aimed at their empire. In fact, Mr Georges Fillioud stated that /the fact of serving as a vehicle for the same ideology does not constitute a group/[in italics], just so long as the newspapers which serve as that vehicle are different companies (LE MONDE, 25 November 1983).

Most of the communist publications do legally belong in practice to their own particular company: thus there is the Societe Nouvelle du Journal L'HUMANITE, the Societe d'Edition de L'ECOLE ET LA NATION, the Societe d'Edition du Journal REVOLUTION, the SEPTRM [Marxist Research Institute Publications Publishing Company] which is responsible for the publications of the Marxist Research Institute, etc.

Furthermore, the French Communist Party would not be able to have direct ownership of those newspapers or even to figure as a shareholder in the companies which publish them because the party, similar in this respect to other political parties, /does not constitute a legal entity, since legally it is only a de facto organization/[in italics].

However, the communists have carried very far, further than anyone else, the art of maintaining a presence via third parties in all sorts of groups, organizations, unions, and companies, including publishing companies--the art of being "the leading core" of those organizations, as it says in the Soviet constitution, while an appearance of autonomy for those various entities is maintained. The example of the CGT and the confederal organizations is well known. Well, the communist press organs are under much tighter control by the PCF leadership than are the CGT union organizations.

Nobody who is aware allows himself to be taken in by grossly deceitful appearances any more. For many long years, however, such appearances have sufficed to provide the government and the courts the necessary excuse to justify their refusal to intervene and put an end to a situation which, whether one is talking about the press, unions, or mass organizations, is not just abnormal but is also hazardous for our freedoms, especially at a time when group activity is increasing.

In order to defend our freedoms where they are really endangered it is not the Hersant Empire, structured along standard and well-known lines, but rather the communist party which should be challenged--that "new type of party" created to take over the minds of men without their consent and to impel them to actions, the meaning and impact of which remain concealed from them.

No Freedoms for the Marchais Empire Newspapers

Whether legally speaking there does or does not exist a "group," the French Communist Party exercises sovereign power over its press empire, power the like of which no "press boss" of today enjoys any more. And the party rules that empire with a complete disregard for the freedom of its journalists and newspapers. It does not hesitate to use any and every means against them when they have deviated from the "party line" either to get them to knuckle under again or to annihilate them. That includes means of an economic and financial nature, and, according to the authors of the law now being proposed for our country, this law is aimed at making it impossible to use such economic and financial means.

The misfortunes of several newspapers allegedly independent of the PCF--ACTION, LIBERATION, LES LETTRES FRANCAISES--have produced evidence of PCF methods over the last 30 years.

In our next issue we will tell how those newspapers disappeared.

FOOTNOTES

1. Let us list here the main confederal organs of the CGT (though we may perhaps in the future do a study of them): LA VIE OUVRIERE (weekly; editor: Louis Viannet, confederal secretary, member of the PCF Political Bureau); LE PEUPLE (bimonthly; editor: J.-Claude Laroze); ANTOINETTE (monthly; editor: Jacqueline Leonard); LA REVUE DES COMITES D'ENTREPRISE (monthly; DROIT OUVRIER, LA REVUE PRATIQUE DE DROIT SOCIAL, LE DELEGUE DU PERSONNEL); etc.

2. Immediately after CAHIERS DU COMMUNISME on this list one could have added up until 1977 a number 12A, LA NOUVELLE REVUE INTERNATIONALE (NRI). This was a French-language edition of the international communist movement journal **PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM**, whose main offices are in Prague, which comes out in 37 languages, and which is distributed in 145 countries. NRI was printed in France under the aegis of the PCF.

In February of 1977, during the crisis in the relations between the PCF and the CPSU, NRI appeared with a notice at the top of the summary on the front page pointing out that the PCF disclaimed any responsibility for articles by foreign authors appearing in the journal.

Since January 1978 responsibility for NRI has been assumed by the Luxembourg Communist Party and it has been published in Luxembourg (cf. EST & OUEST, March 1980, No 638: Claude Harmel, "The Crisis in the Relations Between the French Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1974-1979").

3. Regarding EUROPE see "When the Communists Were Taking Over the Magazine EUROPE" in ETUDES SOCIALES ET SYNDICALES No 243, May-June 1976. The operation was carried out in 1936, with the--not very honorable--complicity of Romain Rolland.
4. No other name is given out.
5. Who in FRANCE NOUVELLE (8 December 1979) explained his children's magazine concept, a very committed one, in this way: "We fit into a framework with a secular orientation and a progressive ethic and morality. Someone who reads our newspaper (PIF) somewhat superficially and without paying close attention does not perhaps perceive the difference right away . . . We develop a philosophy of life and of relationships in life and society, based on brotherhood, friendship, and peace."
6. Since the beginning of December the make-up of the National Ethics Committee for Life and Health Sciences, created by a 23 February 1983 decree, has been publicly known. Five of its members represent the major philosophies and families of organized religion (although the members were not appointed by those groupings). Four serve on the committee on behalf of bodies of religious thought--Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, and Muslim.

In addition to those four is Mr Lucien Seve, member of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party, who is there as a representative of Marxist

philosophy, or at least that is what one assumes. There is good reason to be surprised to see only one school of political thought, that of Marx, figure in this learned assembly, and, furthermore, to see only the communist interpretation of it. Is it that the other schools of thought are regarded as unworthy of having their say with respect to morality in biology and medicine?

[Feb 84 pp 9-14]

[Text] How the PCF Stifles the Newspapers Which Deviate From the Party Line

In the first part of this article (published in EST & QUEST, No 2, January 1984) we listed in summary fashion the elements of the Marchais press empire--its dailies and other periodicals, its specialized journals, its publishing houses, its distribution organs, etc. Below we will see, with the help of a few revealing examples, how the PCF and the Soviet Union go about destroying publications, which appear to be autonomous of them but are secretly controlled by them, when those publications deviate from the party line.

How ACTION Folded

On 9 May 1952 issue number 397 of ACTION, which was its last issue, came out. On the front page there was a notice announcing that owing to financial difficulties the paper was ceasing publication.⁵ Reference was made to the "financial support" that "other newspapers of the democratic press" had contributed to ACTION but not having been sufficient.

Thus disappeared a weekly which for 9 years--it had been published clandestinely during the occupation--had brought communists and "fellow travellers" together under its masthead. And for a non-communist leftwing readership it had championed stances very close to those of the PCF and its satellites, the CGT and the Peace Movement. At times ACTION had even appeared to be the quasi-official organ of the Peace Movement.

Nothing was revealed about the real reasons for its folding at the time, but in 1956 Pierre Herve, editor-in-chief of ACTION (Yves Farge was political editor), related in his "Letter to Jean-Paul Sartre"⁶ how the decision was taken to do away with the weekly publication.

"In full sympathy with Yves Farge" (who in 1953 was to meet his death in the USSR in mysterious circumstances)⁷, Pierre Herve had tried in 1951 to expand the Peace Movement and with that in mind he was talking sympathetically about the "neutralist movements in Germany, Austria, Scandinavia, and in the Near East and Middle East."

However, at that time the French Communists had not yet been ordered to use the "neutralists." It was only after Stalin's death that his successors, indirectly inspired by Tito, undertook to use the "neutralists" to destabilize (although it wasn't yet put that way) the Western world and started--not without success--to circumvent and to infiltrate the neutralist movements and the governments that claimed to be "non-aligned."

Hence Pierre Herve and Yves Farge were pursuing a line different from that of the party (and Moscow). That in itself was serious, for it risked sowing confusion in the minds of party activists; moreover, it signified in the two men a spirit of independence and a lack of discipline which could have been dangerous.⁸

Pierre Herve wrote, "At the beginning of 1952 various rumors started to circulate in Paris journalism circles. It was being said that ACTION was coming out with policy conflicting with that of the party, especially regarding neutralism. Public criticism of ACTION's policy was put into the columns of the weekly FRANCE-NOUVELLE and the magazine LA NOUVELLE CRITIQUE. What was being fiercely criticized by certain communists was our favorable attitude toward neutralism, particularly Egyptian neutralism. One could foresee that ACTION's days were numbered although, curiously, there was never any specific indication provided of that." (op. cit. p. 20)

In order to try and ward off the blow, Herve published an article in ACTION on 24 January 1952. The article was taken from NEWS, an English-language Soviet magazine, and was relatively sympathetic toward German neutralists, toward Sweden's neutrality, and toward "the new content of the concept of neutrality in this day and age."⁹

Pierre Herve's move didn't save the paper.

In his writing Herve continued, "Shortly before ACTION was suppressed, and because of the alarming rumors going round, I had a plan drawn up for changing the paper so as to eliminate its deficit. The plan was written up and sent off (EST & OUEST note: to the PCF leadership), but no acknowledgment of its receipt reached me. Farge was in China. One day I was summoned to the offices of the Central Committee where I learned from Gosnat, the party's treasurer, that ACTION was to suspend publication as of the following week.

As I tried to argue, Gosnat told me that he was merely tasked with asking me for the list of the paper's contributing writers with a view to their possible reassignment. The decision had been made. /Even though I was the newspaper's editor-in-chief, I had not even been consulted./[in italics]

It was obviously a political measure, but it was no doubt given an administrative cast in order to conceal its true significance." (op. cit., p. 21-22)

Thus, this weekly, independent in theory, was only staying alive thanks to PCF subsidies, and the PCF forbade it from attempting to make up its deficit, a deficit which allowed the PCF to have a hold over it.

LIBERATION In Turn

The second example is that of LIBERATION.

It was a daily, the successor to LIBERATION-SUD, the first issue of which had been published clandestinely on 1 July 1941. For some 20 years it was something like the "fellow traveller" of L'HUMANITE. Its editor was Emmanuel d'Astier de la Vigerie who, in his capacity as "fellow traveller" offered the advantage of being a companion of the Liberation of France. What a fantastic cover! Under the reassuring protective shield of LIBERATION, the French Communist Party could advance its ideas within a whole segment of the Left and even further afield.

On 27 November 1964 LIBERATION appeared for the last time. An anonymous editorial announced that the government was to blame for refusing newspapers the right to freely set selling prices. Twenty-five writers and 23 members of the paper's administrative staff signed an appeal asking LIBERATION's readers to give their custom to L'HUMANITE.¹⁰ In a brief article d'Astier declared that LIBERATION was folding "abruptly and in special circumstances. We have washed up for financial reasons and also, undoubtedly, for political reasons."

D'Astier didn't say any more about the "political reasons" for his failure, which is to say the folding of his newspaper. But they were evident all the same.

The disagreements between LIBERATION's editor and the PCF leadership had been on the increase.

On 7 September 1961 in a LIBERATION article E. d'Astier asserted, not without courage, that "neither the situation in Berlin, nor even the refusal of the United States to honestly tackle the disarmament issue . . . (could) justify the resumption of nuclear tests (in the USSR)."

A few months prior to the "execution" of his newspaper, E. d'Astier had gone too far when on 29 May 1964 he had an article published in NOTRE REPUBLIQUE, the leftwing Gaullists' weekly, in which he asserted that the PCF leadership had waited until 21 June 1941 (and Hitler's attack on the USSR) to abandon "the wait-and-see, neutralist, and brotherly attitudes dictated to them by Stalin." He had even done it again by questioning the authenticity of "the appeal of 10 July"¹¹ in a letter which was made public (LE MONDE, 11 June 1964).

Was that the straw that broke the camel's back? It certainly does seem that d'Astier did not foresee that the day of reckoning would come so quickly. The editorial mentioned above told readers that there was the "intention to make a final appeal, a last call for contributions."

The newspaper wasn't given time to do so.

On 25 November 1964 d'Astier was summoned to the offices of the PCF Central Committee and was told of the decision which had been taken. No appeal was allowed. The usual financial support would not be continued. LIBERATION was to fold.

LIBERATION did in fact fold. It was not even given time to try and get its finances back on an even keel.

LES LETTRES FRANCAISES

Pierre Daix related in "J'ai cru au matin" [I Believed in Morning] (a very fine book)¹² how LES LETTRES FRANCAISES was sentenced and put to death for deviationism.

That newspaper--it also arose from the Resistance--had Louis Aragon as its editor; Pierre Daix had been its managing editor since 1947.

In 1968 Pierre Daix had taken sides in support of the "Prague Spring." He made use of the PCF communique which in an initial reaction had "condemned," and subsequently "disapproved of," the military intervention in Czechoslovakia, and he had protested against the invasion and the "normalization." In particular, he published a "Journal de Prague" [Prague Journal] at Julliard in October 1968, in which he didn't conceal his feelings at all.

Without receiving any criticism in direct fashion, Pierre Daix was in practice immediately ostracized. But it was from Moscow that the first attack came.

On 5 February 1969 the paper came out with a notice to readers signed "LES LETTRES FRANCAISES" which was written by Pierre Daix and contained the following:

"In early January, at the time when our last issue was coming off the press, our sales department found all the copies sent to the Soviet Union of our initial January issue returned to them. A telephone call informed us not to send any copies to sell in the Soviet Union any more."

Aragon had submitted the editorial's text to the Party Secretariat, which had insisted on only a few corrections (thus, instead of "the invasion" of Czechoslovakia the text was rewritten to read "the entry" into Czechoslovakia).

The PCF leadership's "liberalism" was not to extend any further. That leadership set out to eliminate the newspaper. Let's hear what Pierre Daix says:

"L'HUMANITE never said a word about either our being banned in the Soviet Union, which ban had already been extended to Bulgaria and Hungary, or about our response. /We were being deprived of 6,000 annual subscriptions to the paper./[in italics] Supposing that the party had wanted to help us, it would have been easy for it to get half of that number back /by asking municipal and company libraries with which it had pull to subscribe./[in italics] A campaign like that would, through its political impact, have even probably led to an expansion in our circulation, by permitting a wave of sympathy to be demonstrated.

Instead of that kind of solidarity, we very quickly learned that our paper was becoming impossible to find in a great number of the party's provincial bookstores, and that the federation leaderships, which were attacking intellectuals guilty of following our example in September 1968, were flat out advising people not to continue to read us and were preventing any /active circulation/[in italics] of the paper from occurring where it had existed before. Information to this effect kept accumulating--from Bordeaux, from Marseilles, from Rouen. In one place and another I, like Aragon and Garaudy, was being attacked by name." (op. cit., p. 422-424)¹³

On top of what this text tells us about the folding of LES LETTRES FRANCAISES, it is also interesting because it brings out some of the means the PCF has at its disposal, without seeming to (and using money not its own), for the purpose of financing newspapers it intends to support: the huge number of subscriptions from Eastern Europe; the subscriptions of communist municipal governments and works councils with CGT majorities; lastly, a "committed" circulation service whose motivation is not entirely commercial--the party's bookstores (not to mention sales by activists).

LES LETTRES FRANCAISES lasted 4 more years. No doubt it was not possible to act against Aragon in such an offhand manner as it was against Yves Farge or d'Astier de la Vigerie. There are men who have become "assets" for the party: tarnishing their image could have drawbacks. Besides, it was the time when the PCF leaders recognized that the "Moscow trials" and the expulsions had a "negative" aspect—they were creating martyrs. The PCF leaders were then judging it more effective to let their opponents leave the party on their own.

Finally in 1972 LES LETTRES FRANCAISES was kept from being sold in the Marxist publication world. "The party left it (LES LETTRES FRANCAISES) on its own, going so far as to put pressure on party activists so that their children who were students would stop buying our newspaper."

Pierre Daix continued, "My life in the L'HUMANITE building was becoming comical. The rank-and-file comrades, the drivers, the typists, the editors at LA TERRE kept up friendly relations with me. The L'HUMANITE journalists who were still talking to me had to hide it from their bosses." (op. cit., p. 437)

In order to break the rebellious editors without doing too much damage to the party, the former had to be isolated. That is a standard tactic. Isolating them from orthodox party members had already been done. So had isolating them from nonconformists within the party and outside it who sympathized with them and were continuing to buy the newspaper. Thus, Roland Leroy required Aragon to part company with a certain Emile Copferman, the excuse being that he was also working at Editions Maspero whose chief had formerly broken with the party. "He was producing magazines such as PARTISANS, which the party accused of being 'leftist,' and was expressing himself with complete freedom, including with respect to the party's cultural policy, in them." But in his contribution to LES LETTRES FRANCAISES, "he maintained all necessary caution."

The freedom of journalists contributing to a newspaper in the Marchais Empire is limited, even when they are exercising their talents outside the confines of that empire!

Getting rid of Copferman for the offense of "leftism" would have upset many of the newspaper's readers. Fortunately, Copferman left on his own. But other skirmishes followed. In the end Aragon, proving incapable of holding his own, had to yield.

A compromise was reached. Daix and those persons contributing pieces to the newspaper agreed "to regard the folding of LES LETTRES FRANCAISES as a consequence of economic circumstances. In return, the editorial staff would get the compensation due them legally and as union members, and the free-lance contributors would be treated generously." (op. cit., p. 440)

It was a sorry bargain, but Daix and the others had to give in and agree to it, for when it comes to the party's own employees (there are many well-known examples of this) the party has little regard for workers' rights (the slow recognition of which has been due to trade union action).

If a "capitalist" were to tell workers he was dismissing "Watch out! If you don't say thus and so, I'm not going to pay you the compensation you're entitled to", what wouldn't one hear people say?

The Soviets intervened initially by banning the sale of LES LETTRES FRANCAISES in the USSR. They intervened a second time, publicly, by decorating Aragon for shutting his mouth.¹⁴

One More Example

On 19 October 1968 L'HUMANITE published a bulletin announcing that DEMOCRATIE NOUVELLE, a party magazine reaching out in fairly broad fashion to fellow travellers, was suspending publication.

The magazine's editorial board, from which the bulletin was assumed to have issued, explained its decision by referring to the "serious financial difficulties the democratic press has, which shows the real margin of freedom allowed to press media which are independent of the forces of money."

What a fine application of the communist brainwashing rule which requires that a political meaning be given to every event!

In actual fact nobody at that time was unaware that there were political reasons, connected to the Czechoslovakia events, for the journal's folding. Paul Noirot, the deputy editor-in-chief of the magazine but in reality the man who did all the work, had prepared a special issue on the Czechoslovakia theme and used as support the famous 21 August 1968 Political Bureau statement. That issue could not have had the backing of the PCF leadership which, after its 21 August indiscretion, had no desire to have its position vis-a-vis Moscow be complicated any further.

Actually, the start of the conflict was at the time of the "May '68 Revolution," when Paul Noirot had openly taken a stand against the "Marchais line," the line set out in G. Marchais' article in the 3 May 1968 issue of L'HUMANITE concerning "the German anarchist Cohn-Bendit" and the pseudorevolutionaries who were playing at the barricades "before going to take over the running of their father's businesses and exploit the workers."

Moreover, the last issue of DEMOCRATIE NOUVELLE (June-July 1968) was devoted to the May events looked at with an attitude which was certainly not that of the party leadership.

The outcome was related by Paul Noirot in a very fine book, "La memoire ouverte" [The Opened-Up Memory]:¹⁵

"In the Central Committee, which assessed the May events, the party leadership very seriously condemned DEMOCRATIE NOUVELLE, demanded the resignation of Pierre Villon (EST & OUEST: Pierre Villon was the editor-in-chief, which was somewhat of a false title since Jacques Duclos was the political editor), who had shielded me to a great extent, and replaced him with Jacques Denis, a very petty individual whom I detest and who has always been regarded as having the closest ties to the Soviets. After having run Maurice Thorez' secretariat for a long period of time, he was Raymond Guyot's stand-in in the foreign policy section. Since then he has done wonderfully well, having become along with Kanapa one of the rulers of the PCF's foreign policy." (op. cit., p. 292)

Following his being repudiated, Noirot considered handing in his resignation, but he changed his mind after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. He would continue his efforts at the magazine, even with Jacques Denis, on the condition that he was allowed to devote the next issue to the Prague events.

"Duclos gave his consent to my doing so. From the beginning of September to the end of October I was to live through insane, Kafkaesque days, trying to produce, under the strict control of Jacques Denis, that issue, and I kept receiving documents from occupied Czechoslovakia pertaining to it. It was a constant struggle. My censor would want to suppress such-and-such an article, such-and-such paragraph, a line, a word, a comma, a photograph. I would refuse and we would both take ourselves straightaway to Duclos. And he, affectionate and playing conciliator, would look for a document in which the Russian tanks were a little less evident, in which a phrase was a little more veiled--one shouldn't be provocative--there was no point in being hard-headed--etc. Several times we nearly came to blows with Denis who was monitoring each file, each piece of paper I had, as if I were a thief or a spy, for fear that a line or a photograph would get by him that he hadn't seen.

Since I had the support of a large majority of the editorial board members, communists and noncommunists, and I was refusing to knuckle under to an increasingly normalization-type stance that was less and less critical of the occupying power and its troops in Czechoslovakia, at the end of October I was informed that the party leadership had decided to 'suspend' publication of DEMOCRATIE NOUVELLE. The upcoming issue was to remain in my possession, three-quarters of the copies already printed . . ." (op. cit., p. 296)

The party's leaders had settled the disagreement by cutting off the means of subsistence.

In the event, the "force of money" which was allowing DEMOCRATIE NOUVELLE and its editors only a small "real margin of freedom" was the communist party.¹⁶

Another Method of Pressure

Squeezing a publication by cutting off its means of subsistence is a classic method although it is difficult for people to carry it out who regard the publishing of a press organ as a business matter out of which they definitely intend to get a profit, a normal return on invested capital.

All press bosses are not able, like the PCF is, to put financial concerns second to the exigencies of politics.

The communists add yet another method to the classic one mentioned above: /intervention by publishing industry unions/[in italics] when the communists exercise decisive influence over them, which is the situation in France and was in Portugal in 1975.

The REPUBLICA Affair

In April and May of 1975 news arrived from Lisbon which alarmed French public opinion, including a portion of leftwing public opinion. The Portuguese Communists were blocking the publication of the Socialist daily REPUBLICA, one of the few Portuguese newspapers whose editorial staff had not yet been infiltrated by the Portuguese Communist Party.

The intent to deprive the Portuguese Socialists of any means of independent expression was obvious; and one realizes that emotion was running high in France among French Socialists and CFDT trade unionists who, ever since 1972 and the publication of the "Common Program" had been marching hand in hand with the communists with a view to winning power. In order to calm down this emotion the communists had Georges Seguy come forth, a member of the Political Bureau and also secretary general of the CGT, who was regarded among French Socialists and in "middle-class" public opinion--quite wrongly, by the way--as a "moderate."

On 27 May 1975 Seguy, back from a trip to Portugal, made a statement which was quite noteworthy for its very Stalinist method of perverting the facts:

"REPUBLICA is not the organ of the Portuguese Socialist Party but rather a supposedly independent paper which has consented during recent months to convey the declarations and stands of that Socialist Party.

Thus (EST & OUEST: This "thus" is a magnificent touch), REPUBLICA has become the newspaper in Portugal specializing in anticommunism and defaming, indeed slandering, the MFA [Armed Forces Movement].

Well, it must be clearly understood that in Portugal's present circumstances anything which tends to defame or slander the MFA is immediately to be suspected of ill will or hostility toward the liberators, suspected of opposition toward the soldiers and officers who had the courage to bring down fascism and colonialism.

In these circumstances, REPUBLICA suddenly lost nearly half of its readership and the reduction in its circulation put the job security of its working-class printers and its journalists in jeopardy.

A /classic labor conflict/[in italics] ensued which had its origins in a threat of collective dismissal.

The workers reacted sharply by stopping work, by occupying their company's premises, and by /taking the management of the company in hand/[in italics]. It is true that /they did appoint a new company head/[in italics] and that they published an issue of the paper expressing their feelings in terms of labor demands and /politics/[in italics]. One might argue with their method, but I have to say that I'm quite surprised that self-management fanatics could take offense at the reaction of those workers, which reaction was obviously of a self-management nature." (LE PEUPLE, 15-30 June 1975)

That reference to self-management is an ad hominem form of argument aimed at the Socialists and the CFTD, who were calling for self-management in economic enterprises whereas at that time the Communists were still rejecting that "hollow" (Seguy) and "reactionary" (Marchais) idea.

The Communists are for intervention by workers in company management only if that intervention is carried out by order of the party and under its control.

In another passage in Seguy's article he dismissed the accusation made against the Portuguese Communists that they had instigated the REPUBLICA affair, by his reliance on the fact that there were only 5 Communists among the company's 100 or so employees. What terrible hypocrisy! In his situation he certainly knew that even if a party cell in a company were small in terms of numbers, which it usually is, it is certainly in a position to manipulate 100 or so workers and impose its will on them when it is well disciplined, inspired, and supported from outside.

Paris, May 1968

One shouldn't go thinking that Seguy was saying things in his article that **fit** into an attempt to play down what he saw as disastrous consequences of premature action by the Portuguese Communists! He was in no way outraged at what had happened in Lisbon. And as a good Marxist-Leninist he himself had, several years earlier, in accordance with the instructions received by him, given the publishing industry workers who obey the CGT and the French Communist Party (or who are trained by them to the point of not being able to break their stranglehold) orders to censure newspapers at revolution time (and why not, then, at other times?) in order to let through only "good" news--news that they would judge sound and truthful.

One certainly imagines that the party cell will be there to help them choose between what is good, sound, and truthful and what is not.

It was in May 1968 that Seguy had occasion to speak that way to the publishing industry workers. He himself revealed the fact in a book published in 1972, by Editions Julliard, entitled "Le 'mai' de la CGT" [The CGT's 'May'].

Here is his text. Boldface emphasis is ours (EST & OUEST).

"At the 17 May 1968 meeting of the National Confederal Committee the question arose as to whether workers in the press industry should or should not go on strike.

We advised them that they should provide for publication of newspapers /while requiring that each paper maintain news objectivity particularly with regard to the strike./[in boldface]

That view was shared by our Publishing Industry Worker Federation.

Immediately after the 17 May meeting of the National Confederal Committee, the CGT Paris Publishing Industry Interunion Committee, aware of the situation developing throughout the country, reckoned that news should not fall solely within the domain of radio and television, which up to then had been under government control.

Therefore, the CGT Paris Publishing Industry Interunion Committee decided to allow the press to publish /to the extent that the latter objectively carried out the informing role which is its vocation to perform/[in boldface].

That was the view expressed by the CGT Publishing Industry activists among that body of workers.

In that corporate body of workers, in which a great tradition of solidarity exists, the idea of continuing to work at a time when most other occupational groups were starting to strike seemed at first glance to be somewhat paradoxical.

In several cases the leftists attempted to use the lack of understanding to combat the explanations of the Publishing Industry Federation; they did everything they could to stop newspapers from being published, but their efforts were in vain.

In the end, /our arguments prevailed/[in boldface] and the persuaded press industry workers organized their 'way of participating in the struggle' in praiseworthy fashion. That participation included in particular the organization of self-defense groups for defense against any attempt at external intervention, and /the verification of news in order to guard against any false news item, any attack on the striking workers, or any lack of objectivity/[in boldface].

Some press bosses who categorically refused to revise news which was judged to be inaccurate or misleading by their workers /were unable to have their newspaper published/[in boldface].

There were countless spontaneous initiatives aimed at requiring communiques and statements by trade union organizations to give the significance of events in progress its due.

On one day it was LE PARISIEN LIBERE which wasn't published. The reason: its editorial management had refused to change a headline which announced, contrary to fact and at a crucial point in the struggle, 'A General Trend Toward Going Back to Work' and then 'Back to Work in the Underground'.

The publication of LE MIDI LIBRE was suspended for several days due to various unresolved contentious issues relating to working conditions.

On another day the boss of the Nantes PRESSE-OCEAN found himself in conflict with the workforce in regard to an article distorting the meaning of the strike, and publication was stopped.

On learning the foregoing news, the management of OUEST-FRANCE tried to take advantage of it and send copies of its paper to Loire-Atlantique and the Vendee, but the vigilant workers at PRESSE-OCEAN stopped the convoy in the middle of the night and sent it back to Rennes, not without taking scrupulous care to inform the editor of OUEST-FRANCE at the stroke of 5 am.

Lastly, the workers in the Nantes Publishing Industry decided, in order to round out that night of struggle and to use their available time in the best interests of the workers, to print 20,000 copies of a CGT Departmental Association tract in the printing plant of PRESSE-OCEAN. People still talk about that exploit.

By acting in this fashion the workers in the press industry rendered distinguished service to the cause of all workers.

The news circulated by the press and through publication of written pieces coming from trade union organizations forced radio stations and television to come to much closer grips with the reality of events than they would have done if they had had a news monopoly.

Workers in the publishing industry handsomely deserved the congratulations expressed by Henri Krasucki to the Crete printing plant workers in Corbeil who while on strike decided to publish LA VIE OUVRIERE:

'The workers in daily newspaper businesses also consider themselves as strikers, and it is in a spirit of responsibility--I really want to emphasize this to you, you who are on strike--that the workers are, at the request of the Publishing Industry Federation and in agreement with the CGT Confederal Bureau, putting out daily newspapers in order to provide essential news and also, let's make it clear, in order to use their strength to be vigilant and force whatever comes out in the press to have honest news about the strike and in particular to have the major statements of trade unions with responsibility for making them.

We feel that this is the greatest service your comrades working in daily newspaper businesses can render at present to the entire movement, and in the name of the CGT I have congratulated them.'" (op. cit., p. 190-194)

Thus, in May 1968 everything was set up for press freedom to operate in communist fashion. The government would not even have needed to intervene, except to contain and suppress those people who would have wanted to oppose the seizure of printing plants by the workers and organizations. The party, through said organizations--themselves guided by communist "nuclei" and "factions"--, would have been enough for the job.

FOOTNOTES

5. The notice included an indirect acknowledgement of the existence of financial interdependence among the "Empire"'s various newspapers even when they portray themselves as independent: to compensate for the loss caused to subscribers by the folding of ACTION, they were invited to choose to be provided delivery of one among several newspapers; those newspapers were FRANCE-NOUVELLE, LES LETTRES FRANCAISES, TOUS LES ARTS, L'ECRAN FRANCAIS, AND RADIO-LIBERTE. Needless to say, those papers all belonged to the "Empire."
6. Pierre Herve, "Lettre a Jean-Paul Sartre et a quelques autres par la meme occasion", Paris, La Table ronde, 1956.
7. Everything leads us to believe that this Stalin peace prize-winner was the victim of an assassination disguised to look like an automobile accident (on the subject of this way of eliminating people, c. f. "In Regard to Automobile Accidents in Socialist Countries," EST & OUEST, No 671, February 1983.
8. Herve was expelled from the PCF (which he had joined in 1932) on 14 February 1956, barely 1 month after the appearance of his book, "La revolution et les fetiches" [Revolution and Objects of Hero-worship].
9. In passing let us emphasize the importance of this article, which enables us to determine the time when the Soviets inaugurated their policy of using "neutralists." The article seems to indicate that on this matter of policy, as in other matters, the "post-Stalin" era had started during Stalin's lifetime.
10. Summoned to PCF headquarters and asked to sign that appeal, Claude Estier refused. There was a similar refusal on the part of Madeleine Jacob.
11. On this subject see EST & OUEST, No 325, 16-31 July 1964, "L'Affaire de l'Appel du 10 Juillet" [The Appeal of 10 July Affair].
12. Pierre Daix, "J'ai cru au matin," Paris, Editions Robert Laffont, 1976.
13. Roland Leroy (the "liberal" Leroy!) had Daix asked through his secretariat for the names and addresses of activists who had written him--one can guess what purpose that was for. Of course P. Daix refused; already at that point he was no longer a communist.

14. As usual, Aragon displayed that Stalinist servility which had become second nature to him. "Once more he was prepared to defend the indefensible; they couldn't have Leroy, who had such difficulty in winning acceptance for his opinions, or Marchais, who had to establish his authority, do it. A few days later I was to hear Aragon tell me that he was accepting a Soviet decoration for his 75th birthday, precisely on 3 October as if in thanks to him for having gotten rid of LES LETTRES FRANCAISES, because it was really necessary to help Brezhnev. After all, Brezhnev wasn't the worst one; above all else one had to avoid annoying the Politburo diehards." (P. Daix, op. cit., p. 441)

One sees that the communists too like to give themselves a clear conscience by referring to political divisions, the ones within the Moscow and Paris Politburos.

15. Paul Noirot, "La memoire ouverte," Stock, Paris, 1976, 1 volume, 372 pages. We are indebted to this book for, among other things, reflections both courageous and humane, which is to say moderate, on the role of the communists in the German concentration camps. See especially pp. 52-54.
16. Let us add a final detail, invaluable for understanding "the party's mind-set." It is again Noirot who provides it: "One last time Duclos assembled the editorial board to announce to it that 'financial problems' had led the party to put an end to DEMOCRATIE NOUVELLE. But as clever as he was he had trouble explaining why, if money problems were causing such anxiety, at least the issue that had gone to press was not being published. 'Jacques' was embarrassed, the poor man; he was causing distress." (op. cit., p. 297)

Never tell the truth and stick to the official explanation, even among one another--that is the rule.

9631

CSO: 3519/212

POLL ON POPULARITY OF LEADING POLITICIANS

Amsterdam DE TIJD in Dutch 17 Feb 84 pp 16-19

[Article by Gerard Driehuis: "Thanks to Nijpels, the Lubbers Effect Increasingly Stronger"; passages enclosed in slantlines, printed in italics]

[Text] How popular is Lubbers? Why Ed Nijpels' panic and what do the voters think of the ministers? For years, political parties have been keeping track of the popularity of their leaders. Starting this month, DE TIJD/InterView will join the party strategists.* Current question: should those cruise missiles be deployed or not?

The political parties have known it for a long time: those who have a popular leader can win elections. Hence they constantly measure the popularity of their leaders in order to discover their potential support. Of course, the parties are also curious about the voting behavior of the voters, but the greatest gains are to be had among the voters who have few political preferences and who in those kinds of polls fall under the category of "don't know yet." Those voters in particular go by preference for individuals rather than for programs.

The PvdA [Labor Party] gains of 1977 could be explained to a not so small extent by the popularity then of Joop den Uyl ('Choose the prime minister"); the initial successes of the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] were due to Van Agt; the D'66 [Democrats '66] stood and fell with Van Mierlo and Terlouw; today's revival of the CDA is virtually completely due to the exploitation of Lubbers' popularity. Since the gradual introduction of television-democracy (with thanks to Hein Roethof for this terminology), the /men/ have been playing an ever greater role and /issues/ an ever smaller role.

Hence, the public relations divisions of the parties keep a close eye on the popularity of their leaders. In contrast to most other countries, Dutch advertising barely participates in this.

* DE TIJD/InterView Barometer will be conducted monthly among 1000 interviewees, in order to achieve a highly representative result. The survey was conducted during the week of 5 to 10 February. It should be noted that with regard to the question about the best or the worst minister, 75 percent of the respondents did not express any preference for or disapproval of any minister at all. The next barometer will be published in DE TIJD on 16 March.

Table 1. Popularity of the Administration.

		PvdA	CDA	VVD	No party choice <u>made yet</u>
	How do you rate the Lubbers administration? 5.75	4.88	7.14	6.97	5.67
	How do you rate the prime minister and the parliamentary party presidents of the four largest parties?				
6	Ruud Lubbers Every week the government information service measures the popularity of the prime minister. They act very secretively with the data. But it is true: Ruud Lubbers is the most popu- lar, especially within his own circle.	4.9	8.2	7.4	5.7
5.8	Joop den Uyl He was nearly written off 2 years ago, but he continues to score. His sup- port among voters who have not yet made a party choice will give the PvdA leaders food for thought. How about "I arrive in mid-term..."	7.6	4.5	4.6	6.0
5.4	Bert de Vries The intention was to find a parliamen- tary party president who did not have too much personal ambition. As a re- sult, unanimity among the CDA leaders is greater than ever. The repete and popularity of De Vries are in keeping with it...	4.8	6.8	6.2	5.0
5.3	Ed Nijpels Well yes... Nijpels is hated even more by PvdA voters than Den Uyl is by VVD voters. And the CDA (see article) is slowly but very surely beginning to see the advantages of Nijpels as a competitor.	4.2	6.6	7.6	5.2
5.2	Maarten Engwirda The score looks better than it is. Every voter seems to have an opinion about Lubbers, Den Uyl and Nijpels. De Vries scored 75 percent. For Engwirda, more than half of the res- pondents indicated that they were un- able to rate him.	5.3	5.6	5.4	5.1

Remarkable Results

Henceforth, DE TIJD will publish a monthly barometer of public opinion in cooperation with the InterView research office. The first survey is published this week. Because this is the first time, we lack the background which would develop from comparisons with previous surveys. The picture of this development in public favor will appear as of next month. But even this first time, a number of very remarkable results have been recorded. The main one is obviously Ruud Lubbers' position, a position which explains a great deal.

Because suddenly there it was again: the crisis atmosphere. Or rather: suddenly there /he/ was again: Ed Nijpels. For a couple of months he had been noticeably quiet. But last week, he not only grabbed a car thief by the collar, but he also spied /banana peels/ -- as he calls the sources of conflict within the coalition, so that the people in the country will also understand it -- everywhere.

Interviews appeared everywhere in which Nijpels spit out his bile about the CDA and expressed his bitter resentment about all the injustice the CDA has done him. To everyone's stupefaction, Nijpels conjured up all kinds of conflicts which supposedly exist between the VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] and the CDA.

The explanation for this sudden excitement is very simple. The VVD is increasingly beginning to feel the effects of the action being undertaken by the CDA to push the prime minister. Every other week the CDA nibbles off a seat from the expected loss, and all those seats are going at the expense of the VVD. If a couple months ago it still seemed as if the VVD would reach a level equal to that of the CDA, since then a serious gap has developed between the two government parties.

Pleasantly Surprised

The popularity figures offer a simple explanation for this. For a couple of months now the CDA has made it perfectly clear that this administration can count on its support without any reservations. Therefore, people in CDA circles are talking in bewilderment about the actions of Ed Nijpels over the last 2 weeks. And they are definitely pleasantly surprised about the inexplicable fulminations of the VVD leader.

At first it was not clear at all what all the excitement was really about. At first it seemed to involve the trauma of Specifications '81, then the untrustworthiness of Christian democrats in general, and only in the third instance did Nijpels mention the cruise missiles. Originally via a mysterious article in the NRC [NIEUWE ROTTERDAMSE COURANT], but afterwards also openly via the VOLKSKRANT. As a matter of fact, the first attack came via the ALGEMEEN DAGBLAD, in an interview which Nijpels himself had put in its final form.

The VVD leaders were no less surprised about the sudden attack on the CDA than people within the party itself were. The two grand old men of the party, Wiegel (more grand than old) and Geertsema, both explained in great detail

last week that Nijpels did exaggerate some. At the parliamentary party meeting, doubt was even /openly/ expressed as to the sense of those attacks on the CDA; and especially the open aspect of this is really not something that is customary there.

Great Popularity

Table 2. Rating of Ministers.

The best minister of the month...

1. Lubbers	26%
2. Brinkman	23%
3. Van den Broek	12%

The worst minister of the month...

1. Lubbers	28%
2. Deetman	19%
3. Brinkman	13%

What greatly surprises the CDA leaders is the distance between the VVD and the administration that Nijpels created. As a result, the CDA is able to cash in on the maximum profit of Ruud Lubbers' popularity.

This popularity seems to be very high among voters for the government parties. Lubbers' score among the VVD voters particularly will give the VVD leaders food for thought: it is barely smaller than that of their own top man. The trick for the CDA now is to be able to demonstrate maximum support of the party for the government policy at the next elections: Lubbers' personal support will then do its work as a matter of course.

However this is conditional upon the CDA being able to enter the campaign standing unanimously behind the administration. And this will certainly succeed unless the campaign focuses on cruise missiles. The division within the CDA camp on this point is obvious. A growing minority within the parliamentary party disagrees on the need to make a decision on deployment next June.

Table 3. No Cruise Missiles for Now.

A number of members of parliament feel that the decision on the deployment of cruise missiles should not be made this spring, but should be postponed. What is your opinion?

	All	PvdA	CDA	VVD	No party choice made yet
Agree	56	67	46	41	66
Neither yes nor no	16	8	24	7	17
Disagree	27	26	30	51	17

This minority appears to have the support of a majority of the Dutch people. And what is even more significant: a majority of the CDA electorate is not convinced of the necessity of making a deployment decision this spring. Six out of every 10 CDA voters who have an opinion on this subject are in favor of postponement. And if the minority within the parliamentary party which agrees with this becomes large enough, then the administration could fall in the spring with a divided CDA parliamentary party. At that moment, none of the calculations of the CDA strategists will come out right any longer.

But if the administration survives a deployment decision, then the future of the CDA will look a bit less somber for the time being than many people would have expected a few months ago: the /Lubbers effect/ is increasingly more effective.

8463

CSO: 3614/50

POLL INDICATES CONTINUED DECLINE FOR LABOR PARTY

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 24 Mar 84 p 3

[Article: "Gallup's Political Barometer; Labor Party Increase Invalidated"]

[Excerpts] The progress for the Labor Party which was presented in SCAN-FACT/VERDENS GANG's political barometer a week ago has been invalidated by Norges Markedsdata [Norwegian Market Data, Inc.]. There is nothing to indicate an increasing trend for the Labor Party; on the contrary, the steadily declining voter support is continuing.

An increase of 2 percent and voter support of 42 percent for the Labor Party was SCAN-FACT's result. But Norges Markedsdata's political barometer tells of support of 38.4 percent. After a peak in the months after the municipal and county board elections last fall the Labor Party's voter support has gone steadily down the last few months, while the Conservative Party has again been able to show at least as strong an increase.

In Markedsdata's study, conducted during the period of 20 February to 9 March, the Conservative Party has voter support of 28.9 percent. The Center Party has stagnated at just under 6 percent, while the Christian People's Party for a good many months has tottered at around 8 percent.

The Labor Party and Socialist Left Party in this poll have support of 44.9 percent, and the three government parties 42.9 percent.

Party	<u>Sep 77</u> <u>Storting</u> <u>election</u>	<u>Sep 79</u> <u>county</u> <u>board</u> <u>election</u>	<u>Sep 81</u> <u>Storting</u> <u>election</u>	<u>Sep 83</u> <u>county</u> <u>board</u> <u>election</u>	<u>Nov</u> <u>82</u>	<u>Jan</u> <u>83</u>	<u>Mar/</u> <u>Apr</u> <u>83</u>	<u>Jun</u> <u>83</u>	<u>Oct</u> <u>83</u>	<u>Jan</u> <u>84</u>	<u>Feb</u> <u>84</u>
Red											
Election											
Alliance	0.6	0.8	0.7	1.2	0.7	0.6	0.7	1.0	0.6	1.1	0.6
Labor	42.3	36.2	37.1	39.2	39.2	39.6	37.4	38.6	39.2	38.9	38.4
Communist	0.4	-	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.1

[Continued on following page]

Social- ist Left	4.2	4.4	5.0	5.3	5.6	5.6	5.2	5.0	5.8	5.9	6.5
	47.5	41.4	43.1	46.1	45.8	45.9	43.5	44.9	45.9	46.3	45.6
Pro- gress- ive	1.9	2.5	4.5	6.3	5.9	5.8	6.6	5.4	8.3	7.0	7.1
Liberal											
People's	1.4	1.2	0.6	0.7	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.2
Conserv- ative	24.8	29.7	31.8	26.2	28.8	30.4	31.4	30.4	26.8	28.7	28.9
Christ- ian											
People's	12.4	10.1	9.3	8.7	8.6	7.6	7.0	8.0	8.1	7.9	8.3
Center	8.6	8.6	6.6	7.3	6.0	6.0	6.7	6.6	6.2	5.7	5.7
Liberal	3.2	5.3	3.9	4.4	4.2	3.7	3.9	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
Others	0.2	0.6	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2
Totals	100	99.4	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100.1	100
Answers regarding party preference					1213		1081		1075		1029
						1136		1135		1177	
Total number interviewed					1487		1314		1265		1298
						1334		1320		1423	

Figures in percent. The barometer has been produced by weighing each party against the 1981 Storting election. Estimated statistical error limits can be of an order of magnitude of 3 percent for vote percentages near 50 percent, about 2 percent for vote percentages of 10 to 20 percent, and near 1 percent for lower vote percentages. The interview work was carried out in the period of 20 February to 9 March 1984.

Oslo, 23 March, 1984. Norges Markedsdata A/S.

8985

CSO: 3639/93

LIBERAL PARTY EXPECTED TO FORGE CLOSER TIES WITH SOCIALISTS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 24 Mar 84 p 3

[Commentary by Morten Malmø: "Liberal Party Chooses Sides; Clear Course Toward Coalition with Labor Party"]

[Text] That the Liberal Party is now starting a march in the direction of closer cooperation with the Labor Party in next year's Storting election is logical. The Labor Party and Liberal Party have in this Storting period had to a greater extent than previously merging points of view, and in the mayoral elections after last year's municipal elections the Liberal Party supported more Labor Party candidates than before. In addition is the fact that the Liberal Party now realizes that the dream of a government of "center parties" cannot be realized.

In addition to these factors, the Liberal Party needs to try to gain for itself real political influence in order to be able to survive as a party. A party which year after year must live in the "valley of the shadows," whether or not this has been self-chosen, is unhappy in meeting with its voters because it is not possible to beat one's breast a single time and say, *"We/ [in italics] accomplished this!"*

The Liberal Party's people had certainly actually thought of declaring their love for the Labor Party before all the people first at next year's national congress. But this process proceeded more quickly than imagined. Of course, there are divided opinions regarding this romance within the Liberal Party, but few will surely make stubborn resistance in order to deny the fact that the marriage has taken place--if a power shift takes place in Norwegian politics as a result of next year's election. Rapprochement with the Labor Party on the part of the Liberal Party in many ways will create a neater political picture. Although the party itself claims to defend the "third road" in Norwegian politics, this rapprochement will tie the Liberal Party more strongly to the Labor Party and also to the Socialist Left Party. The Liberal Party has landed on the other side of the line in Norwegian politics, although in different matters there are clear examples of the fact that even the Liberal Party can support the present government in causes, as was the situation when the Odelsting [Lower House] last Thursday voted to change the rules for compensation in expropriation.

Will the Liberal Party, then, enter an administration with the Labor Party--and the election result promises this--and get a seat at the king's table, or will the Liberal Party be content with being the "obedient dog" in the Storting, looking out for the majority for a possible future Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland? The Liberal Party must clarify this and any guaranteed answer can hardly be given today. Here at the Liberal Party's national congress in Ålesund people are viewing precisely this quite differently.

Decisive for the Liberal Party's election will, of course, be how large the party manages to become. Two seats in the Storting and 4 percent in the polls, which the Liberal Party got in today's poll, are not a strong playing hand. There certainly must be at least a doubling of the Liberal Party's Storting group in addition.

Will the Liberal Party gain, then, by a marriage with the Labor Party? This is of course hard to predict, but it is surely political gambling which is now being tried: You either win or lose. The problem for the Liberal Party is that there is very little to go before everything is lost, not only present political entrenchments, but also municipal and State funds for operation of a party apparatus. The experiences from the last municipal election in Oslo are not so good for the Liberal Party in this regard. Before the election, the Liberal Party declared its support for the Labor Party's Thorvald Stoltenberg and said no to Mayor Albert Nordengen. The voters in Oslo rewarded the Liberal Party by reducing the party's city council group from three to two.

8985

CSO: 3639/93

LABOR PARTY PROPOSES INCREASED AID TO NICARAGUA

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 23 Mar 84 p 5

[Article by Anne-Lise Hammer: "Labor Party Proposes Aid to Developing Countries by Region"]

[Text] Pakistan should cease being a major aid-receiving country, while Nicaragua should become a new one and thereby represent the opening of Central America as an aid-receiving region, a work group in the Labor Party emphasizes. Yesterday the party presented two reports on aid to developing countries and the new economic world order, developed in connection with platform work for the coming Storting period.

The report is intended to create a basis for a debate in the party, Labor Party International Committee Chairman Thorvald Stoltenberg commented.

When Pakistan and Nicaragua are mentioned it is as representative countries.

One of the conclusions is that Norway's direct aid should be directed toward regions in the Third World and be restricted to a lesser extent to major aid-receiving countries. In addition, sharing of the job between the Scandinavian countries within such regions is to be strived toward. Stoltenberg explained this by saying that in the future the quality of aid to developing countries should be looked at to a greater extent. "Norway is at the top as far as quantity is concerned, regardless of the government administration, but it must be asked whether the aid reaches those it is for--the poorest. If the desire is also to contribute to influencing development in a democratic direction this is easier to achieve in small countries," he said.

The Labor Party's aid group, which was led by Vesla Vetlesen, emphasizes also that Norway's aid should be given on a gift basis, and any lending arrangements should be additional. "A larger share of the aid should be channeled directly to organizations and movements which are representatives of the underprivileged population groups--including trade union movements, religious and social movements, liberation movements and others," it reads in the recommendation.

NORAD [Norwegian Directorate for Development Aid] should be strengthened and industry should be stimulated toward stronger involvement in development-promoting establishments in developing countries. At the same time, the

requirement for a development effect and social chain reactions must be toughened when favorable loans are to be given, it is stressed.

Valter Angell, a researcher at the Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute, led the work group which took up the new world economic order (NØV). "In spite of short-term economic stagnation, it must be possible to think in the long term, which is precisely what this group has done," Angell stressed.

For one thing, it was suggested that Norway must liberalize its import policy for developing countries. The non-duty trade impediments like quotas, seasonal import bans, brand stipulations and the like must be evaluated precisely with the aim of giving developing countries increased access to the market. Susceptible local communities which are hit by a more liberal import policy must receive compensation, for example, through a separate readjustment fund.

The Labor Party's platform committee issued recommendations regarding the new world economic order and Norwegian aid policy as part of extensive platform work for the next 4-year period. The various party levels are to express their opinions before the first of July, and the International Committee is aiming at discussing the recommendations for the second time by the fall, Stoltenberg reports.

8985

CSO: 3639/93

MADRID CHARGED WITH WEAKNESS IN FISHING BOAT INCIDENT

Madrid ABC in Spanish 11 Mar 84 p 19

[Editorial]

[Text] The party in power, which was so punctilious in its defense of national independence and dignity when it was the opposition, yesterday took sides with the French. Its acceptance was already established from the moment it neglected to cancel Mauroy's visit to Madrid. Mauroy's presence was not normal in the context of aggression. Nor was it normal that, despite the circumstances, Gonzalez invited him to lunch yesterday at Moncloa--for imported French fish, perhaps? The special understanding that may exist between socialists does not extend to others. Socialist reasoning has motives that the reason and hearts of the rest of the Spaniards do not share.

It was not normal for the visit not to be cancelled after it was known that the military solution to a regulatory matter had been authorized by the French Government, just as the Soviet Government authorized the shooting down of the South Korean jumbo jet that had violated regulations governing the air space controlled by the USSR. It was not normal to let pass the French prime minister's failure, in his statement yesterday, to explain or apologize to Spanish public opinion when he dismissed the incident with a vague allusion to a "chain of circumstances."

Naturally international law must be respected, just as the official French statement insists. However, the regulatory provisions of the EEC appropriation of waters that have historically been worked by our fishermen--Basques, Cantabrians, Asturians and Galicians--are as much international law as the principles of proportionality that must be observed by those who are so governed and the means they employ in the exercise of their guardianship. Taking the matter further, in regard to what was risked in the absurd machine-gunning and shelling of the fishermen, it must be said that the problem does not lie in the inability of the Spanish Government to force its fishermen to abide by the agreements with the EEC. Rather, the problem is the inability of the EEC to enforce its fishing regulations without the effective coercion of bloodshed. It is as difficult to dismantle the principle of the freedom of the seas--the core of international law in this area--as it is to put up gates in the countryside.

But beyond any other considerations, what is really out of line is the chauvinistic petulance of the French position. How can the French Government demand that the Spanish Government control its fishermen on the high seas when it says it is unable to control its farmers on the highways of France when they violate regulations governing the free passage of Spanish products? That is why it was distressing to listen yesterday to our prime minister accepting the excuses of the French head of government. It was distressing but necessary. The visit had not been cancelled, the French had been invited to dine at Moncloa. So the indignity had occurred and on top of that, the visitor's arguments had been accepted. At times, and quite recently, Felipe Gonzalez and one or another of his ministers, Barrionuevo for example, have been quite magnanimous. We have acknowledged this and applauded it. This time the head of our government had no other graceful choice except to refuse to receive Prime Minister Mauroy until he provided an explanation. It is a pity he has not done so.

12351

CSO: 3548/214

POLL SHOWS CONSERVATIVES STRONGEST AMONG FIRST-TIME VOTERS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 4 Mar 84 p 5

[Article by Dick Ljungberg: "IMU-Special: Conservatives Stronger Among First-Time Voters"]

[Text] The Conservatives have a strong position among the young people who will vote for the first time in 1985. The Liberal Party and the Center Party, on the other hand, draw their strength from the retired voters. This comes forth in a special survey IMU [the Institute for Market Research] conducted for DAGENS NYHETER.

The survey identifies the average of the party followers in 1983 and is based on a simultaneous operation of the seven voter barometers which IMU then conducted.

Three groups were surveyed: Potential first-time voters, that is to say people who did not vote in the 1982 parliamentary elections because they were under 18; the 15 to 24-year-old group--of which approximately half had not voted before--and the retired group, 65-74.

The result is shown in the accompanying table. It is based on a total of 6,649 interviews.

As can be seen, the Conservatives have a considerably stronger position among first-time voters and young people (31.5 percent and 30.5 percent respectively) than the national average shown in the IMU survey. Their position among retirees is, however, weaker (20.5 percent) than the average.

The Center Party, the Liberal Party and even the Christian Democratic Union have on the other hand a stronger following among the retirees at the cost of the Conservatives. But the middle parties have a hard time getting support among first-time voters and young people up to the age of 24.

The share of the Left Party Communists is also small among first-time voters but the Left Party Communists have a stronger position among slightly older segments of the young people. The Left Party Communists have difficulties among the retirees which also applies to the Environmental Party which is strong among the young.

	(1) TOTALT (6649)	(2) Förstagångs väljare (434)	(3) Ungdomar 15-24 år (1002)	(4) Pensionärer (1132)
	%	%	%	%
5) M	26.5	31.5	30.5	20.5
6) Fp	6.0	3.5	3.5	8.0
7) C	13.0	10.0	9.0	18.0
8) Kds	2.5	2.5	2.5	4.0
9) S	43.0	41.0	42.0	44.0
Vpk ¹⁰⁾	4.5	2.5	4.0	3.0
Mp ¹¹⁾	3.0	4.5	5.0	2.0
Annat parti ¹²⁾	1.5	4.5	3.5	0.5
Summa ¹³⁾	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Read the table as follows: The Liberal Party had 6.0 percent of party support on the national average in IMU's surveys during 1983. Among those who were first-time voters in 1985, the share was only 3.5 percent, while the share of the Liberal Party among retirees was 8 percent.

Key:

- | | |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1. Total | 8. Christian Democratic Union |
| 2. First-time voters | 9. Social Democratic Party |
| 3. Young people 15-24 years old | 10. Left Party Communists |
| 4. Retirees | 11. Environmental Party |
| 5. Conservative Party | 12. Other party |
| 6. Liberal Party | 13. Total |
| 7. Center Party | |

The Social Democratic Party is the party that shows the most balanced distribution across the different groups even if the support for the government party increases with age.

During the 1982 parliamentary elections, the Conservatives received 23.6 percent, the Liberal Party received 5.9 percent, the Center Party received 15.5 percent, the Christian Democratic Union received 1.9 percent, the Social Democratic Party received 45.6 percent, the Left Party Communists received 5.6 percent, the Environmental Party received 1.7 percent and other parties received 0.5 percent of the votes.

9583

CS0: 3650/141

SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S DEFENSE SPOKESMAN ATTACKS U.S. BASE PACT

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 25-26 Feb 84 p 2

[Article by Jorgen Dragsdahl: "Socialist People's Party: Military Base Pact With United States Violates the Constitution"]

[Text] The American Air Force is "authorized" to use Danish bases in times of crisis.

The pact negotiated between the Danish supreme commander and the U.S. air force commander in Europe does not give the Danish political authorities the right to determine when U.S. fighter planes can use Danish air bases and is therefore tantamount to a violation of the Constitution, according to the Socialist People's Party's defense policy spokesman Pelle Voigt.

Last Friday, Minister of Defense Hans Engell revealed the text to the initial base pact negotiated in 1976 between the then military chiefs. This has been a confidential document, but after a similar U.S.-Norwegian pact was publicized Engell, after consulting with the United States, decided that the U.S.-Danish pact should be made public as well.

Different Wording

However, the critical difference between the two pacts may lie in the wording of Article 1 of the U.S.-Danish pact. The first sentence reads: "The United States is hereby authorized to use designated air bases in Denmark (as host nation) during periods of international tension and armed conflict."

The corresponding sentence in the U.S.-Norwegian pact reads: "Certain designated air bases in Norway may be used by the U.S. air force during periods of tension and armed conflict."

Based on the debate that arose in Norway following the announcement, Voigt feels that the U.S.-Danish pact prevents the government and Parliament in Denmark from having any say about U.S. access to Danish air bases. In his opinion, this is in violation of the constitution, paragraph 19, which deals with giving up sovereignty.

Norwegian Debate

In Norway, now retired General J.K. Christie stated that Article 1 of the pact is unclear with respect to U.S. forces' access to Norwegian air bases. According to both pacts, U.S. fighter planes do have access when there is "mutual agreement" between the supreme commanders of the countries concerned and the U.S. Air Force in Europe.

Christie raised a number of questions he wished to have clarified. For example, he wanted to know whether the consent of the minister of defense, the government or Parliament would be necessary prior to the arrival of the air force reinforcements. He also wanted to know to what extent the United States has a solid claim to access.

Pelle Voigt feels that these questions are even more urgent as far as Denmark is concerned where there is clear authorization to use our bases.

Minister of Defense Hans Engell was unavailable for comments last Friday. The pact has never before been submitted to the members of Parliament.

8952

CSO: 3613/98

MINISTER ASKS QUICK AGREEMENT BY PARTIES ON CIVIL DEFENSE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 24 Feb 84 p 6

[Article by Michael Ehrenreich: "Aiming for Quick Agreement on Civil Defense"]

[Text] Minister of Interior Britta Schall Holberg (Liberal Party) has begun to negotiate a 5-year political agreement on civil defense and civil preparedness and hopes for a broad agreement before the summer recess.

"It is important to reach an agreement so as to provide the necessary climate to solve the big problems ahead of us in the years to come. So far, a broad political majority is supporting civil defense and this development must be pursued," said Holberg.

Former Minister of Interior Henning Rasmussen (Social Democratic Party) does not share Holberg's optimism about reaching a broad agreement before the summer recess.

"The minister wants an agreement within the present economic limits and we doubt that can be done if we are to maintain adequate civil preparedness. Also, there are many indications that the important warning system issue will not be solved soon enough to be included in the negotiations," said Rasmussen.

Last year, the Civil Defense administration issued a report pointing to a number of deficiencies in the area of civil protection. The report particularly recommended improvements in the warning system, in providing air raid shelters, civil preparedness and municipal civil defense.

The next political debate on civil defense is scheduled for mid-March.

8952

CSO: 3613/98

SOCIALIST, COMMUNIST POLICIES ON REGULAR ARMY BUILDUP

Bon DIE WELT in German 20 Feb 84 p 6

[Article by Count A. Kageneck: "Career Soldiers as the Nucleus of the French Army"]

[Excerpts] Paris--France wants to carry out what it promised its German partner in the framework of the new strategic coordination between the two governments: it wants to strengthen the conventional components of its armed forces substantially and provide a more rigid organization to allow for coordinated action in Europe and more rapid deployment abroad. To be sure, for this purpose the French Army will become trimmer in terms of personnel (as was announced in the 5-year defense plan for 1984-1988), but it will be provided with more firepower and above all made more "professional." Beginning in 1987, of the 160 army regiments, 40 will be fully or largely composed of career soldiers. This was announced over the weekend to the officers of the 35th Infantry Regiment in Belfort by Gen Rene Imbot, army general staff chief.

Thus the socialist government is carrying out something that it had vigorously opposed when it was in the opposition: the formation of elite troops from among long-serving career soldiers as the nucleus of an army of conscripts. What was previously branded as the germ cell of the reaction, as the rank and file of an overthrow attempt of the Right against a Left that had come into power legally, has--as so many other things in socialist theory--long since been shown to be utopian by the constraints of reality.

But here there is serious friction within the Socialist Party and in the coalition with the communists. The PCF has publicly announced its opposition to the current French military doctrine that is being established by President Mitterrand. It is against a European defense, against a strengthening of the conventional armed forces in the interest of a European partner (in this case the Germans) and against the return of France to the integrated alliance. But all recent developments point precisely in this direction.

Some time ago, President Mitterrand announced in the Council of Ministers his intention to strengthen substantially the conventional components of the army "as the best defense against a Soviet threat." With the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Troops for Europe, this has largely been accomplished, simultaneously carrying out a partial return to NATO. The PCF must take a position on both the clear designation of the enemy as well as the reintegration of a part of the armed forces into NATO.

REPORTER VISITS MILITARY AIR INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 26 Feb 84 p 6

[Article by Sune Olofson: "Technical Intelligence Service: Military System Studied with Photos and Computers"]

[Text] With the aid of intelligence computers, magazines and reconnaissance photos they rummage through foreign countries' military techniques. Twenty-four people in technical intelligence at the FMV [Defense Material Administration] will be the first to know about the secrets in the immediate vicinity.

Military systems are followed and studied in every minute detail. Minor changes in aircraft, ships and vehicles can give important information about the present and future picture of threat.

FMV has three intelligence sections for naval, army and aviation techniques. The sections are part of the total military intelligence service. SVENSKA DAGBLADET has visited with FMV's Air Intelligence Chief Jerk Fehling

The section consists of eight persons. Each one is an expert in his field. Together they will provide information about the warplanes and air defense system of the world around. With little resources in tight quarters at Banergatan 62 in Stockholm, they try to form an opinion about the aviation system of the Soviet Union and NATO.

Help for Swedish Aviation

"In conflict we must know what type of materiel the opponents have at their disposal, its performance and capacity. Our work consists of solving puzzles," says Jerk Fehling.

In the spring of 1965, FMV was able to verify that the Soviets were about to adopt a new aviation system.

"It was later identified as the MIG 25 Foxbat. By combining and calculating technical information in a military magazine, we were able to come up with important information.

"It is, for example, important for a Swedish fighter pilot to know the opponent's potential cruising range and the aircraft's capabilities and vulnerability in air combat. FMV's information technicians therefore find out about the characteristics, the radar type, the range, wind sensitivity, weaponry, countermeasures, wing surface, IR-radiation, etc.

"We can verify an abundance of information from the NATO side while there is extremely meager information from the Warsaw Pact," states Jerk Fehling.

Cannot Hide

Fehling thinks that nonetheless it is difficult to conceal a new aircraft system from the world. It must be airborne sometime.

"With the good radio intelligence possibilities we have, we are quickly able to form a good picture of the structure and capability of a system. Our judgement is that Sweden has a good grasp of other countries' aviation systems."

On the other hand, the naval intelligence has had certain difficulties in surveying which type of underwater craft the navy is now fighting against. Jerk Fehling is quick to give his opinion:

"If the naval intelligence agency had had the same scope the air intelligence has, it would not be so surprised today," says Fehling.

The task of FMV's air intelligence agency is also to produce a comparison diagram. The SEP-diagram is a sort of fingerprint of fighter plane performance. Curves in the diagram indicate the power capability of the aircraft at different altitudes and speed. By superimposing the diagrams of two fighter plans, it can be decided which design has the greatest possibilities of winning an air combat.

Most of the information is obtained from open sources. The military intelligence agency has a series of channels to obtain information; radio intelligence through the Radio Institute of the Armed Forces; reconnaissance photography over the Baltic; attaches abroad and various agents who work for the defense staff division for special procurement, the SSI [Swedish Society for Information Processing] (the new IB).

"All military materiel and activities in the immediate vicinity must be studied and examined. We do this in order to be informed in advance," says Jerk Fehling.

9583

CSO: 3650/141

PALME GOVERNMENT ATTACKED FOR FAILURES IN DEFENSE POLICY

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 11 Mar 84 p 2

[Commentary by Mats Svegfors]

[Text] Part of the liturgy in the defense debate is the principle of national unity. Here at the editorial office we receive newspapers every day in which this principle is confirmed in column after column.

At the risk of excluding myself and SVENSKA DAGBLADET from this fundamental understanding, I must say that it is becoming more and more difficult each day to agree with this demand for unity.

In Thursday's SVENSKA DAGBLADET Ulf Larsson, undersecretary to the prime minister and according to past experience an especially authoritative spokesman for the prime minister, said there was little enthusiasm within the Social Democratic Party for spending more money on our defense while cuts were being made in other areas.

If I understand Larsson correctly, our defense is one of many equally important activities we spend our tax money on. There is nothing special about defense that would justify special attention to this part of the public sector during times of austerity.

Confronted with such thinking, I began to realize that, in a way, I have much more in common with the peace movement than with the political establishment that is trying to reach agreement on our defense policy.

To me, our defense is something special. I am forced to realize that every day when I turn on the TV news and hear my two little girls ask with fear in their voices if war will come to Sweden. I hear this question, regardless of whether the bulletins read on the TV news are about the submarine hunt in Karlskrona or street fighting in Beirut.

I am asked to answer this question again and again. Of course, the question is repeated because I cannot give a convincing answer indicating that war will not come.

It is not just the naivete of a child that gives rise to these questions, but

a highly rational fear that the same things that are now occurring in Beirut could also happen in the Vasastan section of Stockholm.

It is possible that I am naive and ignorant because I do not understand why it is obvious that we must strive for unity with Ulf Larsson and those who share his opinions. But I fail to understand why funds for our defense are no more important than funds for ABF (Workers' Educational Association) study circles, subsidies for a Swedish microelectronics program, or appropriations for public housing companies.

In fact, of course, even Ulf Larsson as a private individual believes that defense should be given a higher priority than other activities. But this was not the person who spoke with SVENSKA DAGBLADET on Thursday. Instead, it was undersecretary Ulf Larsson who spoke--a keeper of the political machine whose primary task is to make sure that the established political apparatus works as friction-free as possible.

This smooth functioning is threatened when a crisis arises. For nothing causes change as readily as a crisis. New demands are legitimated and gain support. People's view of reality and ideas of right and wrong are changed.

A fundamental uncertainty toward the established power and views arises. Suddenly, differing views and the demand for new policies threaten the existing order.

The established apparatus responds with a call for unity. This silences the demand for change and, despite the crisis, the established power survives.

As a result, the call for unity behind our defense policy is not surprising. After all, our defense policy is in a serious crisis.

Even the most recent defense plan, developed in 1982, contained the seeds of this crisis. The funds allocated for defense simply did not correspond to what the politicians hoped to get for this money.

Since then, the government has reduced these appropriations additionally in various ways. The strength of the dollar and other factors have reduced these allocations even more. As a result, we now need an additional 5 billion kronor (not 2.5 and certainly not 1.5 billion) to carry out the defense resolution of 1982.

In the midst of all this, the submarine intrusions have continued and even increased.

In few cases has it been more clear that a change of policy was justified. Consequently, the political establishment answered by formulating the demand for unity--unity behind a continuation of the previous policies, of course. The debate must be cut short, for how in the world could a continuation of the present policies be justified if there were a public debate over money, the defense, and the submarine intrusions?

As often is the case, it is the press itself that is cutting short the debate.

EXPRESSEN has led the way. In an editorial in which it was obvious that the writer understood only the most trivial propaganda about defense policy, it was explained that anything other than a call for unity was an expression of party tactics. In a priceless statement, the newspaper stated that, in a difficult situation, the government and the opposition were acting in a manner "contrary to what the public has a right to demand," by making defense the subject of a tug-of-war between the parties. This was said when the parties began an open debate before that same public.

Apparently, according to EXPRESSEN, democracy is something for marginal and unimportant matters. As soon as an important issue arises, if we are to draw the conclusions of EXPRESSEN's reasoning, the parties must join together in a kind of broad parliamentary front.

And DAGENS NYHETER, with its pinpoint accuracy, was swift to take an erroneous position. According to DAGENS NYHETER, anyone who advocates spending more on defense is betraying the country's interests. In some strange way, the demand for higher defense allocations leads to disarmament!

When I try to follow the reasoning of other newspapers and the politicians on defense issues, unity, and party tactics, I feel a growing affinity to the peace movement.

When it comes to matters of war and peace, it is only natural to be uncompromising. This is especially true since the purpose of most compromises is to leave the political interests and the public-sector establishment alone and not disturb corporate Sweden.

9336

CSO: 3650/154

MILITARY MATERIEL INSPECTOR ON DROP IN ARMS EXPORTS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 12 Mar 84 p 6

[Article by Axel Odelberg]

[Text] The value of Swedish arms exports has dropped sharply over the past 4 years. According to military materiel inspector Carl Fredrik Algernon, stiffer competition on the world arms market is responsible for the drop.

Admiral Algernon has now been military materiel inspector for 3 years. During that time the value of Swedish arms exports has dropped by 30 to 40 percent in fixed currency values. The reduction in arms exports is even more significant if it is compared to Sweden's total exports during the same period.

In 1980 military materiel comprised 1.6 percent of our total export value. The figure had dropped to 1.17 percent 1 year later. The following year it was 0.95 percent and, according to still incomplete calculations, the figure dropped to 0.9 percent in 1983.

According to popular wisdom, changes in the economic and political direction of a country are among the factors that influence the size of its arms exports. But this assertion is denied by Admiral Algernon. While he has been military materiel inspector, there have been three different governments: the three-party coalition, the middle-party coalition, and now the Social Democrats.

"According to my experience, there is broad political unity concerning arms exports. The regulations are the same and their application has not varied," he said.

"The reduction in exports has occurred because military budgets around the world are being reduced and there are more and more competitors. At the same time, arms deals have become more complicated because of demands for compensatory purchases and credits. In the past, arms deals were often in the form of cash purchases.

Exceptions

Carl Fredrik Algernon believes that the present trend will continue. He believes, in any case, that the percentage of Swedish exports resulting from arms sales will not increase.

It will continue to be under, rather than over, the 1-percent mark, according to him.

In principle, the export of military materiel from Sweden is prohibited, but the government can allow exceptions to this principle. The exceptions are the export of defensive weapons to countries that are not involved in external or internal conflict. An exception to the regulation on external or internal conflict can be made for the sale of spare parts to countries that previously purchased materiel.

The military materiel inspector handles arms exports for the government. The government then makes the final decision. Judging from the magnitude of Swedish arms exports, Swedish legislation in this area appears to be stricter than that of other countries. But this is not the case. Most countries have regulations similar to the Swedish ones. This is true, for example, of the largest weapons exporting country after the superpowers--France.

Like Sweden, France justifies its arms exports on the basis of its security policy. Without a certain level of exports, France could not afford to provide its own military with sufficient domestically produced weapons to create a credible security and defense policy.

The military materiel inspector, who is a cautious man, would not speculate as to why Sweden, despite its similar regulations, exports so much less than France.

Broad Leeway

A representative of the Swedish arms industry, which would like to increase its exports, said that the laws provided extremely broad leeway. The volume of arms exports is determined by the application, rather than the letter, of the law.

One task of the military materiel inspector is to classify military materiel. One regulation describes in detail exactly what military materiel encompasses.

Combat boots for soldiers--a topic of current interest, since a shoe factory in Jamtland received a large order from the Soviet Red Army--are not considered military materiel. The same is true of trucks, even if they are painted with camouflage paint. Trucks become military materiel only if they are provided with gun mounts.

"Arms export regulations are written in such a way as not to create problems for normal commercial exports," Carl Fredrik Algernon said.

Despite the relatively detailed classification guidelines and the fact that they were written as recently as 1982, application of the guidelines has become so difficult that there are now plans to appoint a special scientific and technical council to assist the military materiel inspector in this area, according to Carl Fredrik Algernon.

"The gray area has become larger, especially because of the increased use of electronic systems and products used for both civilian and military purposes," Admiral Algernon said.

'Found Proof'

Much of the inspector's time in recent months has been spent classifying such products. This is due, in part, to the confiscation of advanced electronic equipment from the United States by Swedish customs authorities. It is believed that this equipment is military materiel that was being smuggled to the Eastern bloc.

9336

CSO: 3650/154

NUMBERS, TRENDS IN UNEMPLOYMENT FIGURES

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 22 Feb 84 p 42

[Article by Chris de Stoop: "There Are 86,000 More"]

[Text] The bleeding has been stopped, the administration keeps on saying. But is that really the case? Exactly how many unemployed are there?

The blood-letting of jobs has been halted, says Minister of Employment Michel Hansenne, and that whoop of victory he supports with a neat file filled with elegant graphs, all of which show a nicely decreasing curve. The curve does of course not refer to total unemployment, but to the decreasing rate of increase of that unemployment. That jubilation must be perceived as rather sinister by the half a million of unemployed, who now have to sign the unemployment register every day.

In the second place, it should be considered with a lot of suspicion, because it only refers to one single category of unemployed, which easily lends itself to all kinds of camouflaging maneuvers. The attention is always drawn to that magical number of a half a million unemployed, but in reality, this is roughly only one-half of the true number of people looking for work.

Labor Minister Hansenne caused some uproar already earlier, because of his hopeless bungling with the third labor circuit. The most reliable statistic to measure whether the bleeding has indeed been stopped is not that of the fully unemployed who are entitled to benefits, which Hansenne is flourishing, but it is that of effective employment. Those statistics are only to be had from the RSZ (National Social Security Service) with a delay of one year, but the latest numbers, for March, 1983 (2.867 million jobs) at that time showed a decrease of 50,000 jobs compared to the level of March, 1982--and this while the administration had promised to stabilize employment at that level. It cannot be confirmed that that trend would suddenly have changed since, but the staff of former Labor Minister Roger de Wulf does not believe a word of it. They estimate that since the start of Martens' fifth cabinet, at the end of 1981, roughly some 250,000 additional people have started looking for work.

The statistics of the RVA (National Employment Service) naturally do not cover the entire unemployment: there are more and more women who return to home-making, or who content themselves with a shared part-time job; young people who no longer want to stand in line at the unemployment register for a month in return for a measly 5,000 francs; there are high school students who are back at school because of the extension of compulsory school attendance. Also in other ways, government decisions stimulated disguised unemployment, but that cannot be expressed in numbers.

Those disguised unemployed do not even lead a statistical life, a privilege that does fall to the lot of their official fellow sufferers. The number of fully unemployed who are entitled to benefits is only one single category, however--that number which is announced to us in the bulletins of the RVA, which are now suddenly issued only once a month, while they always used to appear bi-weekly. At the end of January, that category contained 523,000 unemployed, to which number some 10,000 young people will still be added in February, because the influx was so overwhelming that the RVA has not been able to process them yet. Of the approximately 50,000 school-leavers, hardly one in every two has found a job after a six-month waiting period. Once all school-leavers will have been registered, next week that first category will number some 530,000 unemployed, an absolute record that is about 30,000 units higher than one year ago.

Next to that, there is, however, still a second category, which is defined by the RVA as other job-seekers, and in which there are people who have been registered, but who do not draw benefits, because they did not work the sufficient number of days, because they have been excluded, because they were employed part-time, and so forth. Those people are also unemployed, it is not because someone was struck from the unemployment tables on the basis of the notorious article 144, that in so doing, unemployment would have decreased. That group is at present as large as 134,000, which is over 18,000 more than one year ago. A third category of the RVA are people who for economic reasons get to sign the unemployment register only partially: the daily average of this amounted to 51,000 units, or another 3,000 more than the year before.

A final category consists of people who benefit from the measures of the plan to absorb unemployment. That covers, on the one hand, the passive programs: the statutory and conventional bridging pensions, the bridging rest pensions, all kinds of systems in which now already 122,000 employees have been dropped, who for the sake of problems in business are released early. These also number 20,000 more than in 1982.

The on training programs BTK [Special Temporary Cadre], TWV [expansion unknown], DAC [expansion unknown], practical periods...absorb 99,000 unemployed at the moment, or 15,000 more (in very precarious, mainly part-time positions) than one year ago. When we add all this up, this results in a surplus of 86,000 job-seekers as compared to one year ago, on a total of 936,000 job-seekers, a balance which should tend to one million if disguised unemployment also could be calculated.

Seen in that light, the jubilation from the side of the government can only be perceived as cynical. That the increase is decreasing is a cute formula, but to the hundreds of thousands of unemployed who now have to manage with less and less money, it is not even a band-aid on a wooden leg. Moreover, almost half of the unemployed who are entitled to benefits have had to make ends meet with their humble benefits for more than two years, and for them in particular, the situation does not offer any prospects for improvement. Nevertheless, there are plenty of plans being launched, such as that miracle cure that recently was made public by a university team from Antwerp, the so-called rovac formula: rotating vacations, or one month vacation after every three months of work. A plan which is not popular in its country of origin, but which does make a bit of a hit abroad.

12568

CSO: 3614/61

PAPER COMMENTS ON IMPLICATIONS OF MOUNTING FOREIGN DEBT

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 20 Feb 84 p 8

[Editorial: "Denmark's Burden"]

[Text] Denmark's net foreign debts amounted to 185 billion kroner by the end of 1983. This means that the total debts rose approximately 30 billion kroner compared with net debts at the end of 1982. This increase in our debts is partially due to the current balance of payments deficit of approximately 11 billion kroner; and partially due to changes in the exchange rate, particularly an increase in the exchange rate of the dollar.

Denmark's foreign debts have reached formidable proportions, to put it plainly. Also, from an international point of view, there has been talk that our debt level has been attracting some attention. Denmark's credit rating, on the other hand, continues to be considered quite good. Our country has a high level of production, is deeply rooted in the European cooperative economic system, and, by international standards, we have a relatively stable political situation here. But it will be noticed on the international economic scene that the deficit in our current balance of payments will be rising again in 1984 in comparison with the previous year. It is absolutely necessary for us to reverse this trend, to eliminate entirely the balance of payments deficit in the coming year.

Denmark's international credit rating is not the only thing at stake here. Foreign debts impose, above everything else, a very heavy burden on the Danish economy. This is due to the fact that interest payments to foreign nations this year are estimated to amount to over 20 billion kroner. This is an amount of the same order of magnitude as, for example, government expenses for unemployment compensation, and it will be sent abroad, regardless to say, without the Danish social system getting any good out of it or being able to recover any of its resources by taxation. It is also interesting to take note of the fact that interest payments have by far exceeded the magnitude of the current balance of payments deficit anticipated for this year, amounting to 12 billion kroner. If we had not behaved in an economically irresponsible way in the past, thereby accumulating this enormous foreign debt, Denmark would now be in a comparatively comfortable situation as regards balance of payments.

But we need to change a lot, before things can really improve. Even though the balance of payments deficit can be said to be currently due to interest payments to foreign countries, the constant deficit in turn leads to a continued increase in our foreign debts which, all other things being equal, results in even higher interest payments. The parameters for domestic consumption and welfare are thereby diminished, little by little. This also results in the most significant long-term threat against our economy.

To use an expression from the political arena, we can say that the balance of payments deficit is "an enemy of the workers." Any feasible economic policy simply must predetermine that the balance of payments deficit be done away with.

9584

CS0: 3613/105

IRAN DEMONSTRATING INTEREST IN INCREASED IMPORTS FROM DENMARK

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 24 Feb 84 Sect III p 1

[Article by Michael Rastrup Smith: "Promising Prospects in Iran"]

[Text] A 29-man Danish trade delegation is returning home today from Iran. The delegation was invited by the Iranians, who are very much interested in buying technology for fisheries and agriculture.

It is quite possible that trade between Denmark and Iran will be increasing dramatically in the near future.

A 29-man delegation, including representatives from industry and various unions, will be coming back from Tehran this evening after almost a week of uninterrupted negotiations with Iranian ministers and officials. "We have received a memorandum from Tehran," said Foreign Ministry Administrative Assistant Soren Kragholm. "It shows that our Danish delegation has conducted a number of very successful negotiations. Our communications from Tehran do not say anything about war, so we can assume that all is well."

The Danish delegation, the first to go to Iran in many years, was invited by the Iranians, who are very interested in Danish fisheries and agricultural technology, as well as food products.

The Danish group includes representatives from 20 Danish businesses, in addition to delegates from the Industrial Council, the Agricultural Council, the Grocers' Society, the Entrepreneurs' Union, the Bankers' Union, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Foreign Ministry.

9584

CSO: 3613/105

EC REPORT: INVESTMENT GROWTH IS STRONGEST IN COMMUNITY

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 23 Feb 84 Sect III p 3

[Article by Svend Bie: "Danish Industrial Investment Rises Most"]

[Text] Denmark experienced the most growth of all the nations in the European Economic Community and of all the Nordic nations. Denmark rose to the top position in 1983 and presumably will keep it in 1984.


Denmark rose to the forefront in 1983 as the nation both in the European Economic Community and in the Nordic area in which industrial investment rose the most. And Danish industry will probably keep the top position in 1984, according to a study conducted by the Council of Industry based on figures from the EC Commission and the Industrial League of the Nordic Nations.

Undersecretary Jorgen Hansen of the Industries Council told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE that industrial investments in Denmark up through 1982 showed poorer growth rates than in the other nations.

"But costs have stabilized now, and interest rates have gone down, making it possible for industrial investments to take a big leap forward," said Jorgen Hansen.

The Industries Council anticipates that investment in industry will rise 42 percent from 1982 to 1984, compared with 33 percent in the Netherlands, 22 percent in France, 17 percent in England, 6 percent in Italy, 4 percent in West Germany and 3 percent in Belgium. Greece and Ireland anticipate lower investment levels in 1984 than in 1982.

Among the Nordic countries, Finland anticipates an increase of 18 percent from 1982 to 1984; the same figure is anticipated in Sweden, whereas Norway expects a 14 percent decline.



Denmark is clearly the leader among the nations in Europe and in the Nordic area which will invest the most in 1984. Graph shows percentages (1982 = 100 percent).

Key:

1. Denmark
2. Finland
- Sweden
3. Norway

9584

CS0: 3613/105

UNEMPLOYMENT DROPS FOR FIRST TIME IN 6 MONTHS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 22 Feb 84 p 2

[Article by Frank Dahlgaard: "Unemployment Now Dropping"]

[Text] Seasonally corrected unemployment figures dropped by 6,500 from October to December, indicating that Prime Minister Poul Schluter's campaign prognostications concerning unemployment were right on the mark.

Unemployment figures have finally started to drop.

After a 6-month stagnation period in the seasonally corrected unemployment figures, the trend has started to go down.

The Danish Board of Statistics indicates that unemployment since October has risen less sharply than has been normal for that time of year, causing the seasonally corrected unemployment figures to drop in both November and December.

Unemployment figures for December have been calculated at 275,100--a drop of 2,400 persons compared with November's figures, and a drop of 6,500 compared with October.

The latest releases from the Danish Board of Statistics repudiate the claims made by the Social Democrats during the electoral campaign that unemployment would rise. Prime Minister Poul Schluter's electoral prognosis for December unemployment, on the other hand, has turned out to be right on the mark.


Unemployment figures peaked in April of last year, with 283,400 registered unemployed persons, corresponding to a 10.8 percent unemployment figure. From that time up to October, the unemployment level remained virtually unchanged, eventually dropping to 275,100 in December. The latter figure corresponds to a 10.5 percent unemployment figure, compared with 10.6 percent in November and 10.7 percent in October.

Because of the drastic increases in unemployment from January to April last year, the seasonally corrected unemployment figures for December 1983 were still 9,000 higher than the figures for unemployment in December 1982. Among

young people under 25, however, unemployment is already a little lower than it was 1 year ago. Things are heading in the right direction in youth unemployment, in any case.

In the nation's largest union, the Danish Semi-Skilled Workers Union, unemployment is currently 5 percent lower than it was 1 year ago; in the construction workers' unions, unemployment is 21 percent lower.

Male unemployment is 4 percent lower than it was in December 1982, while the number of unemployed women, on the other hand, is 11 percent higher.



Unemployment Trends in the 1980's

9584

CSO: 3613/105

PRESIDENT APPOINTS NEW SOVIET TRADE COMMISSION

Five-Year Plan Talks Starting

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 18 Mar 84 p 41

[Article: "Soviet Trade Negotiators Appointed"]

[Text] The delegation for the 1986-1990 trade and payment agreement negotiations between Finland and the Soviet Union was appointed during the president's Friday presentation. Negotiations on the agreement will begin at delegation level in Helsinki during the first half of May.

They plan to sign the new agreement next fall. The authorization to sign for Finland was given to Foreign Trade Minister Jermu Laine (Social Democrat) during the president's presentation. Undersecretary of State Ake Wihtol will conduct vice chairman-level negotiations for Finland in May and Deputy Foreign Trade Minister A.N. Manzhulo for the Soviet Union. These negotiations will be based on official-level discussions within the next few days.

It has in principle been agreed that in trade between the two countries they will in future as well retain the clearing payment system. They also intend to maintain Finnish exports at the same levels as before in terms of their chief structural features. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, they will try to increase imports and diversify during the years 1986-1990, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said.

Increased Imports Envisioned

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 18 Mar 84 p 41

[Text] Balancing Finnish-Soviet trade during the new general agreement 5-year period at the present level of Finnish exports would lead to an overall trade figure of 25 or 26 billion rubles. Since both sides want to balance trade in their own ways during the new general agreement period, Finnish imports from the Soviet Union would have to increase in value by about 10 percent.

This is the opinion expressed by Undersecretary of State for Trade Policy Ake Wihtol in the Foreign Affairs Ministry magazine KAUPPAPOLITIIKKA. According to him, the means available to protect the value of imports will, however, only help to a limited extent in the face of this and next year's problems.

"We still have to look for exceptional solutions, which in part postpone problems, to the exceptional problems that largely exist during the general agreement period that is in progress," Wihtol asserted.

According to Wihtol, such solutions have been a so-called special account, sporadically increasing the amount of the balance, commission sales of products, changes in the method of payment and paying for some export shipments in exchangeable foreign currency.

They were able to agree on allowing this year's trade to continue at the 5-billion-ruble level.

In Wihtol's opinion, however, next year is shaping up to be more problematic than before because, in addition to abridging the special account, there will be the burden of final payments for projects already begun and initial payments for the next general agreement period.

"When Finnish exports increase during the economic upswing that has started, we'll have all we can do to develop our Soviet trade at the same rate. I would not, however, see any cause for concern at all in the event that our recently relatively sharply increased share of the Soviet trade should decrease a bit within a few years time," Wihtol said.

According to Wihtol, the strongpoint of Finland's trade with the Soviet Union is its long-term character and continuity. On the other hand, we must be able to prevent reduction of the absolute trade figures.

Chemicals Testing With USSR

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 19 Mar 84 p 24

[Article: "Kemira and USSR Continue Fertilizer Test"]

[Text] Moscow (STT)—On Tuesday the Soviet Ministry of Agriculture, the Vegetable Ministry and Kemira Oy signed an agreement whereby the testing of Finnish fertilizers and pesticides, begun last year, as well as of Finnish cultivation techniques will be continued at the Lenin State Farm located near Moscow.

On the experimental farm they will determine the suitability of Finnish fertilizers, pesticides and cultivation techniques to Soviet conditions. On the basis of last year's tests, Finnish cultivation techniques showed themselves to be better than Soviet techniques, but only longer-term tests will confirm the results.

The experimental farm to be cultivated will consist of 70 hectares this year too, but more land will be devoted to vegetables and fruit than last year. Deputy Minister Tatarshuk of the Ministry of Agriculture, Deputy Minister Efremov of the Vegetable Ministry and trade advisor Iisakkila of Kemira signed the agreement.

The agreement is part of Kemira's internationalization program. Exports accounted for 40 percent of Kemira's sales volume last year.

RADICAL LEFT MOVEMENT PRESIDENT ON INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY

Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French 19 Mar 84 p 63

/Article by Jean-Michel Baylet: "For the Industrial Offensive"/

/Text/ Austerity in the management of the national economy should not lead to either retrenchment or recession. The austerity program must be accompanied by a real industrial recovery program which would consist of emergency measures formulated around a program to free-up initiatives, complemented by reorientation of fiscal policy.

The need for emergency measures has been perceived by the government, which is developing a specific plan of action for the regions most affected by industrial realignments.

Emergency measures which are useful as stopgap devices cannot assure our economic recovery.

What is now required is that we move on to a real industrial offensive. And, in order to do so, we must implement a package of measures designed to free-up economic initiatives.

In this regard and with a view to making preparations for the future, there is good reason to define a certain number of priority fields of economic action to which the package of new rights and responsibilities for enterprises set forth in a code of industrial investments would be applied.

The beneficiary sectors should be those that generate innovations; for example, those sectors covered by mobilization programs of the Ministry of Industry (Biotechnology, Robotics, etc.) which are not now receiving significant support. Enterprises in a priority economic action sector will enjoy the benefit of the provisions of the industrial investment code which is to define the new rights and responsibilities of priority industrial enterprises. Their responsibilities will consist in making commitments in the initially subscribed areas of investment, employment, research or export.

In return, these enterprises will benefit from specific substantial advantages: long-term reduction in business taxes; removal of controls /desencadrement/, accompanied by greater financial support from the national banks; the possibility of receiving growth contracts, limited to a term of 3 years, which are designed to be transformed into definitive hiring contracts, if the economic objectives initially set are attained.

At the same time, general measures on behalf of the PME-PMI /small and medium-size businesses-small and medium-size industries/ should supplement the effort needed to free-up initiatives: reduction of the professional tax burden, calculation of business costs on the basis of value added, reduction of taxes in cases of self-financing effort, assistance in the setting up of their own funds, extension of the tax-exempt period of new industrial enterprises to 5 years...

These measures are very generous to the enterprises and are justifiable during the period required for industrial recovery. In return, these measures will encompass the requirement for a faithful application of social progress measures which should accompany the economic reconstruction effort (Auroux laws, reduction of hours of work).

The proposal to free-up initiatives should be extended to private parties, who are now affected by a discouraging personal tax system. The changes which have taken place during the last few years in the income tax sector (establishment of a 65 percent tax bracket, a surtax, substitution of tax credit mechanisms for reductions in taxable income) have often had the effect of increasing progressiveness. Progressiveness is only fair if applied to a fair tax. In the absence thereof, progressiveness aggravates tax inequities.

A tax break, a more equitable distribution of the tax burden, stronger support of the tax system for savings will permit the French as a whole to better identify with the economic offensive strategy which our country should implement and thus will ensure the conditions of its success.

8143

CSO: 3519/267

IMMIGRATION OFFICIAL FIRM ON LIMITING FOREIGN WORKER POPULATION

Paris LES ECHOS in French 24 Feb 84 p 6

[Text] "I do not want to aggravate the unemployment in France by leaving the door open to foreign workers," said Mrs Georgina Dufoix, the state secretary for family affairs, population and immigrant workers, in an announcement yesterday in Paris. Mrs Dufoix's statement came while she was announcing the political meeting which the Council of Europe is holding on 20-21 March in Strasbourg on the subject: "Foreigners in Europe--Threat or Asset?" Hailing this initiative of the "Europe of the 21,"* which is a forum that brings together a number of immigrant sending as well as receiving countries, she said she was pleased that this "confrontation" will be "a rational rather than an emotional one."

Despite that fact, Mrs Dufoix asserted, on the question of immigration, that "the French Government will be very firm: France can no longer welcome foreign workers," she said. As to the modalities of returning immigrants to their own countries of origin, Mrs Dufoix laid down two principles: monetary payment for voluntary early departure, and reintegration, in conjunction with the development of the economies of the countries concerned.

It is on the basis of these principles, she added, that bilateral negotiations are currently under way: with Algeria (the French Government wants to amend the accord signed in 1968); with Tunisia (a repatriation fund is expected to be established); with Morocco (contacts are just now being made); with Senegal (the repatriation agreement will be concluded in late March or early April); with Mali (which Mrs Dufoix visited 2 weeks ago and which is currently having big problems, including drought and plans to reduce the personnel strength of the civil service); with Portugal (the existing agreement will be supplemented by a vocational training package); and, finally, with Turkey (initial talks have not yet begun).

*Founded in 1949, the Council of Europe consists of 21 countries (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Spain, France, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, Netherlands, Portugal, West Germany, United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey, and remains one of the biggest European political institutions. It works in close collaboration with the UN, the ECC, and the OECD.

Meanwhile, Mrs Dufoix confirmed her plans to institute a 10-year residence card for immigrant workers living in France and to modify the law against racism by allowing interest groups to bring suit against alleged violators. There should be an announcement concerning these measures in the Council of Ministers meeting in March.

Mr Claude Dejardin, a Belgian Socialist deputy and president of the Migration Committee of the Council of Europe, noted the recommendation and directive of 1983 adopted by the European body concerning xenophobic attitudes and movements aimed at migrant workers in the countries concerned.

He remarked on the slow and gradual rise of an attitude of hostility toward the presence of foreigners almost everywhere in Europe. In his view, the growing unemployment in recent years is partly responsible for this development, to which the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe cannot remain indifferent.

Thus the meeting in Strasbourg, which will be attended by several ministers, including Mrs Dufoix. The closing day of that meeting will coincide with the global Day of Struggle Against Racism.

9516

CSO: 3519/252

BRIEFS

INDUSTRIALISTS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT FUNDING--INSEE [National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies] has just published a detailed report on the funding situation of industry in 1983. According to the heads of enterprise, the funding situation has improved, following 3 years of slow decline, and has now come back up to the 1980 level. While the improvement has affected all sectors, especially major industries, the most notable improvement can be seen in the intermediate goods sector. Specifically, the funding situation has returned to normal in the petroleum, chemical, cardboard paper and plastic materials industries. The improvement relates in large part to the decline in industrial demand for short-term bank credits. Thus, the percentage of heads of enterprise that asked for an extension of their credit authorization was the lowest recorded in the last 4 years, and in overall terms the growth of short-term bank credit has clearly decelerated over the last year. All the same, this trend is not by any means monolithic: indeed, enterprises with fewer than 100 employees showed growth both in demand for and utilization of short-term credit. INSEE also notes that enterprises, in order to finance their investments, have gone after medium- and long-term financial assistance, even if they have reduced their short-term indebtedness. But, unlike the tendency observed with respect to short-term credits, it is the big enterprises that have increased their indebtedness in this category. According to the information supplied by the heads of enterprise, it seems that operating profits improved in competitive industries during the second half of last year. However, because of the rigidity in sales prices and the weakness of demand, these same industrialists do not foresee continuation of this improvement during the first half of 1984. More particularly, profits will once again be eroded in the small industries and in sectors such as agro-food, professional equipment and consumer goods. This pessimism concerning operating profits pervades all predictions about the financial situation of the enterprises in the first 6 months of 1984. [Text]
[Paris LES ECHOS in French 24 Feb 84 p 67] 9516

CS0: 3519/252

STUDY ON PROPOSED GUARANTEED MINIMUM WAGE SYSTEM

Rome POLITICA ED ECONOMIA in Italian Dec 83 pp 23-29

[Article by Aviana Bulgarelli and Marinella Giovine, researchers for ISFOL [Institute for Studies on the Labor Market], and Alessandro Cantaloni, a researcher for ECOTER [Rome Institute for Studies in Economic Planning]: "The SMIG in Italy: the First Concrete Proposal"; passages in slantlines are emphasized in the text]

[Text] 1. /Premise./ The option to confront the issue of supporting the income of the unemployed is based on an assumption, namely, that the present high levels of unemployment are structural in nature and that it is therefore necessary to find ways of living with unemployment by redistributing the costs on the basis of social equity. Thus, it becomes increasingly necessary to distinguish active employment policies from labor-market policies. Employment policies are understood as being action taken to create additional demand, while action in the labor market is intended to optimize the qualitative and quantitative encounter between labor supply and demand and to redistribute labor among the various sources of supply.

The proposal to set up a guaranteed minimum wage system (SMIG) for those who cannot find work is part of labor-market policy. However, distinguishing between the various categories of action does not mean opting for only one policy; rather, the conviction is that any action in the labor market loses its effectiveness unless policies are adopted to increase demand at the same time.

Unemployment insurance became a part of the social security system as early as the first decades of the 20th century, as did income support for people seeking a first job and for the economically disadvantaged part of the population. The principle of social justice was applied through income redistribution and preventing the individuals' risking loss of income because of involuntary loss of work as the basis for the initial development of the social insurance system.

In Italy, unemployment benefits for people looking for work were not formed as such explicitly but followed diverse channels laid down by historic and economic conditions; they achieved objectives different from those for which they were designed. Invalids' pensions, for example, did, among other things, protect families, especially in the South, that had too little or no income. However, "camouflaging" the type of protection (invalid status) and the ways of ascertaining the conditions for qualifying for it put the individual in the position of not exercising an obvious right to guaranteed income. Rather, it brought into play meta-institutional social behavior based on equivocation and dissimulation that did harm to society and, in the long run, caused economic distortions.

Presently existing forms of support, whether direct or indirect, overt or masked, that are provided to the unemployed part of the labor force absorb a volume of resources estimated at more than 5 trillion lire a year (in 1982 prices), and that certainly cannot be overlooked. We think that this volume of resources constitutes a /more than adequate basis/ for an attempt to devise a system that is obvious, equitable and active for income support to all unemployed people. In particular, as will be explained below, such a system not only would cost less than the amount of resources being used but would also introduce into the field of social protection elements of functional rationality and a general reorganization of expenditures. It would actually involve a considerable /savings of resources/, which may be cautiously estimated at 1-1.5 trillion lire a year.

2. /The reason for SMIG reform./ Before going into the merits of the proposal and its ramifications, we should explain its significance for the links it establishes between equity and social justice and, more generally, with the functioning of the economy in general.

/The SMIG as an instrument of social equalization./ Given the present system of social security, unemployment is not a condition identical for all who experience it. As concerns income support, the gamut runs from the young person looking for his first job and who receives nothing, to the worker who resigns or is laid off and who receives 800 lire a day, to the worker who is actually unemployed but nominally on wage supplement who receives indefinitely 80 percent of his gross wages. The impact on employment status, the search for work, and the acceptance of a possible job offer are thus affected and vary according to the income available at the moment.

Compared to the present practice of differential treatment according to individual circumstances and/or social and regional groupings, the possibility that the whole unemployed labor force might receive a minimum income represents a step toward social equalization and redistributive balance.

/The SMIG as an instrument of support for aggregate demand./ The redistribution of income effected by unemployment benefits has the effect of sustaining aggregate demand. It is now a generally recognized fact that investment is not determined by the availability of savings but by the decisions that businessmen make concerning the profitable use of savings. These decisions are based on expectations of demand. Variations in the level of demand for goods and services thus influence investment choices more than do increases in savings achieved through tax reductions. The unemployed worker is also a consumer. If he receives income support, he is a consumer who, within the limits of the support granted, maintains a demand for goods and services even in an unfavorable economic climate.

In this sense, the SMIG acts as an automatic governor of the system by performing traditional anticyclical functions: to maintain domestic demand levels and thereby indirectly support employment.

/The SMIG as an instrument of stimulating labor mobility./ By acting as a cushion for the unemployed, the SMIG may induce individuals to be more flexible concerning the labor market. Among other things, it may induce people to be more disposed to take short-term, unstable jobs exposed to cyclic trends. For the person seeking work, then, access to forms of support is the equivalent of an increase in expected pay. Jobs are thus made more attractive even though they are more varied in nature and symptomatic of phases of stagnation in labor demand.

Unlike other industrialized countries, Italy has very limited mobility between jobs. While this situation can be ascribed mainly to the trend of labor demand, the impact of regulations and institutions should not be underestimated. In a context where the concept of labor is identified with job stability and where job stability is itself a condition for guaranteeing income and access to the social security system, whoever has a stable job tends to keep it, and whoever is unemployed tends to seek a stable job. When the economy goes sour, this situation tends to become more pronounced: while mobility needs to be increased in order to attenuate the effects of unemployment, an increase in unemployment has the opposite effect of blocking mobility; the blockage of mobility widens the gap between the person who has a job and income and the person who has neither job nor income.

From this viewpoint, introducing the SMIG may increase individuals' /propensity to take risks/: the unemployed could seek and accept jobs not offering the security of permanence; and industrial and tertiary companies could develop new or ancillary activities (whether goods or services) that may lack normal requisites of continuity or stability because these activities would be scheduled only for a limited period of time, limited objectives or for specific projects.

Numerous studies of labor demand have made it clear that in Italy employment in the above-ground or normal economy adapts very slowly to real demand; these studies have also established that in this situation employers faced with increased demand tend to react in three ways: first, by hiring black-market or cash labor; second, by giving their present employees more work to do; and third, by waiting for the expansion phase to cool off and thereby forgoing possible but uncertain increases in production.

Many small businesses in the "underground" sector grew in the 1970's because they had the capacity to increase specialized, small-scale production that was highly adaptable to cyclical variations. This enabled them to carve out their own slice of the market and at the same time reduce their dependency on big business. Whatever one may think about this area of the economy, there can be no doubt that the process has been made possible by flexible use of the labor force both in allocation of working time and in quick turnover.

The tendency to "legalize" the underground activities of recruitment and use of labor has set in motion a process of bringing the underground economy above ground. This tendency started with the agreement on the cost of labor in January 1983 (nominal assumptions of 50 percent for manual laborers and also for training contracts and short-term labor for youth aged 15-29). Introduction of the SMIG would strengthen this tendency even more, since it would obviously work to the advantage not only of businesses but also of (1) workers facing the prospect of becoming unemployed; they would have at least some guaranteed income without having to resort to underpaid extralegal labor, as often happens in the weakest areas of job supply; (2) the state, which links the SMIG (for previously-employed unemployed workers) to prior contributions and thus guarantees itself greater tax revenues. Indeed, it can be predicted that contribution payments will be respected by business, which will normalize labor relations because of the greater flexibility provided by the SMIG.

The propensity to mobility would be achieved especially among the youth because of both cultural attitudes and lack of accustomed jobs; they could accept flexible or modular forms of work, periods of working in the job market tied to periods of not working in the market, and mobility between companies and various trades. The guaranteed minimum wage would create a mix of income, training and orientation; it would therefore work especially well in bridging the gap between jobs.

Completing the transition between intermittent and steady work might also be a possible but not a necessary prerequisite. It would be possible to the extent that the process is useful in planning and preparing for one's working career: achieving a long-range job could be the result of an optimal confluence of labor supply and demand. It would not be necessary to the extent that youth's availability for short-term employment can be linked to non-traditional requirements for the organization of time and the desire to develop one's existence without personal rewards directly connected with the labor market.

If the outlook is that an ever smaller labor force will be needed to produce goods and services, the priority issues then become either that labor is redistributed (in terms of time) among more workers or that unemployment time is evaluated differently. As the minimum wage affects non-working time through production it thus becomes a basic instrument for achieving a general reduction in per-capita labor time (through the alternation of working and non-working, part-year, etc.) and for a productive and socially beneficial use of non-working time for the production of goods, etc.

3. /The proposed institutional model./ The proposal is based on the assumption that the labor market is neither homogeneous nor unitary. The probability of finding work at a given time varies according to the individuals looking for work, not only as a function of their territorial and economic context but also as a function of their individual training and preparation. This leads to a structure that divides the people looking for work into five groups according to the variables of age, prior work experience, schooling, qualifications, and length of time unemployed.

In this sense, the minimum-wage system, which was originally conceived as primarily monetary support, is transformed into a proposal for a mixed type of intervention according to the sector of the labor force affected and couples monetary loans to social services for literacy, training and retraining.

Speaking more in detail, the plan is divided into five areas of action (see Table I): (1) pre-wage earners and trainees; (2) qualified youth; (3) unemployed; (4) vocational updating and retraining; (5) adults looking for a first job.

At the 2nd and 3rd levels, the minimum wage is merely a transfer of money, while at the 1st, 4th and 5th levels it is a mix of money and services.

Support for youth looking for work begins at age 16. The plan being advanced considers that reform of the school system will raise the school-leaving age to 16. This reform is widely supported as a fitting conclusion to the educational process and to the vocational training of youth.

(a) /The area of pre-wage earners and training./ In this area are grouped all youth seeking a first job who do not possess the requisite educational background (illiterate and/or without a school diploma) and basic vocational training to enter the job market except at a disadvantage.

It is well known that one of the main reasons business discriminates against young workers is that it costs more than it is worth to business to initiate and train them. There is thus a need to take action in this area in order to remove this obstacle; less-prepared young people need to be able to get experience in the workplace.

The objective of the minimum wage is precisely to take action along these lines by providing incentives in the form of a preliminary wage to young people so that they will take literacy classes and finish their schooling and vocational training.

(b) /The area of skilled youth labor./ This is the category of all youth seeking a first job who are relatively well off because of their education (high school and university) and vocational training (former apprentices and journeymen). For their purposes, the guaranteed minimum wage smooths the way for their entry into the employed workforce by providing monetary support. If one or more youth want to start their own business, the minimum wage could be taken as seed capital.

In any event, young people could qualify for the minimum wage on the condition that they promise to be available for socially useful work. A principle of exchange has to be established: as the state is launching a program for young people who have never been employed, the young people must devote some of their non-working time to society. This does not propose to rewrite the socially useful work under law 285, which, as is known, simply assumed for an indefinite time those who had participated under it. Rather, the idea is now for government to be able to call upon people receiving the guaranteed minimum wage for the pursuit of all beneficial tasks linked to the completion of specific projects and tasks that do not involve producing goods and services for commerce. For this purpose, youth qualifying for the guaranteed minimum wage would be registered in appropriate communities (available to both provinces and regions).

Moreover, when youth perform socially useful labor, they can receive a wage supplement in addition to the guaranteed minimum wage (this supplement can be set at about 10 percent of the minimum wage itself); the costs would be borne by the administration availing itself of their services. Since this kind of work is effectively paid, any refusal to work would entail losing minimum wage benefits. The control thus introduced is another, indirect check on underground labor.

(c) /The category of the unemployed./ In this category are classified all those who are unemployed and who worked at least 150 days in the year preceding application for the minimum wage. For these people, the minimum wage serves the purpose of substituting for income lost when the job was lost; it therefore accompanies the processes of expulsion and redistribution of the employed labor force.

The condition of paying contributions is not only connected to a hypothetical insurance-type model (the insurance model is not applicable to the SMIG anyway because the minimum wage is available to people who have not yet been employed), it is also tied to the objective of bringing the cash economy above ground and normalizing job positions. Indeed, it may be surmised that the deterrent introduced by the guaranteed minimum wage into the supply and demand relationships of labor has given both parties an interest in normalizing labor relationships.

Contributions need not be calculated on the basis of 5 continuous and/or distributed monthly wages and an 8-hour day, because all short-term work and/or distributions made on a more flexible schedule must also count; this is due to the guaranteed minimum wage's being considered as a means of redistributing labor demand (in terms of hours) among more individuals.

In order to promote mobility and flexibility, the guaranteed minimum wage will be available even to those who voluntarily quit work. The SMIG's monetary yield, all things being equal, is less than that of unemployment benefits. This is the result of a policy choice that opts to redistribute income over the entire unemployed population rather than concentrate on a few social groups.

It is also logical that companies that lay off workers would be required to contribute to supporting the guaranteed minimum wage out of consideration for the social impact of involuntary unemployment. In this case, too, it is a matter of establishing a fundamental principle of trade-offs: as the state gives aid to companies that temporarily employ excess labor, business will be required to repay this service, at least in part.

(d) /Category of vocational updating and retraining./ In this category fall all the unemployed who have been looking for work for more than 12 months. This is a small portion of the labor force for whom merely extending monetary payments would not help the situation. Income support is thus made a function of vocational updating and retraining intended to help the recipients better meet the needs of the workplace.

Specific action parallel to the SMIG could be devised for those people and, at least, for adults seeking a first job (5th level); this action would be directed toward an intensive search for work and toward the creation of short-term jobs producing socially useful services. The latter type of work could also develop the function of moving people in from the margins of society and promoting entry and reentry into the labor market.

(e) /Adults seeking a first job./ In this category fall all adults aged between 30 and 49 who are seeking a first job. This is a very narrow but not insignificant segment of the labor force, one that includes very different kinds of people: they range, for example from the medical specialist to the domestic who leaves a familiar household and decides to get a job.

In this case, the guaranteed minimum wage is intended for people with particular training needs; as such, it may be considered a monetary incentive for training, preparation for entry into the work force and, if necessary, literacy training.

As can be seen, adults over 50 looking for a first job do not qualify for the guaranteed minimum wage. It is unrealistic to plan ways to bring people more than 50 years of age into the labor market. In this case, either jobs are created ad hoc or quotas are established, because it is hard to conceive of the labor force absorbing these people spontaneously; in any case, the problem concerns extending the social insurance system to people in economic need.

4. /The scope of action./ Thus formulated, the institutional model proposed covers a large section of the labor force in search of work.

The area of potential intervention by the guaranteed minimum wage reform:
--coincides almost completely with the supply of unemployed labor and with the set of people looking for a first job;
--discriminates as a bloc only against that component of the labor supply that somehow includes all people in a non-vocational condition, whom ISTAT [Central Statistics Institute] classifies as "other people looking for work" (domestics, students, retirees, etc.).

If the area thus demarcated is to be measured for size, ISTAT's 1982 statistics on the labor force show the intended beneficiaries of the guaranteed minimum wage reform as corresponding to about 99 percent of the unemployed, 85 percent of people looking for a first job and, therefore, to 88 percent approximately of people able to work (see Table 1). In absolute terms, this is equivalent to a population (still 1982) of about 1.3 million units, 600,000 of which are concentrated in the South.

The potential beneficiaries do not coincide, in any case, with those who are theoretically qualified for guaranteed minimum wage support. Not all meet the requirements to qualify for the various categories of aid. Still with reference to 1982, the categories introduced, which are expressed statistically by the crossing of the two fundamental characteristics of registration on the employment list and the length of time job-seeking (for youth and adults in search of a first job), reduce the field of application by about 1.27 million potential units from Table 1 to 960,000 units, theoretically, in Table 2.

The proportion of people qualifying for guaranteed minimum wage support out of all the people in the essential segments (youth in search of a first job, unemployed and adults in search of a first job) in the area of potential impact puts the theoretical level of coverage at an average national threshold of 76 percent. The extent of coverage will be significantly different according to territory and type of coverage.

Youth in search of a first job remain far and away the most numerous theoretical beneficiaries of the guaranteed minimum wage reform. This component numbered about 640,000 units in 1982 (half of whom were concentrated in the South) and thus accounts for about 67 percent of those qualifying for the guaranteed minimum wage.

Theoretical application of the SMIG sets the South apart as an area in which the proposed reform would have a concentrated impact: 48.5 percent of the theoretical beneficiaries of the guaranteed minimum wage are located in the South.

5. /Grants and financial needs of the guaranteed minimum wage reform./
The cost of the proposed reform breaks down essentially into two kinds of expenditure:
--the first involves direct monetary grants;
--the second involves a mix of additional expenditures (or cost rebates) connected to the general costs of managing the hypothetical reform. This refers particularly to expenditures for literacy training, vocational training and retraining financed by the guaranteed minimum wage and to the administrative fees themselves for the support system.

The financial evaluation that follows leaves this last aspect out of account because of the conceptual and empirical difficulty in a calculation involving the system of social protection in all its components directly and indirectly exposed to the impact of the proposed reform. But this simplification does not negate our estimate of financial costs; on the contrary, we think it ultimately favors the economic convenience of the guaranteed minimum wage proposal. Indeed, there can be no doubt that an insurance system finally liberated from the "necessity" of filling in an "institutional vacuum" by artificially forcing the forms of aid available to the unemployed can make convenient cost-saving reorganizations in the existing structures.

The cost of the guaranteed minimum wage is a function of the number of people qualifying for support, the length of time they receive the support, and the unit rates adopted. Specifically:

--the physical basis of financial calculations remains at the number of theoretical minimum-wage recipients estimated for 1982 (see Table 2);
--the support periods are those set forth in Prospectus 1. They are organized according to two hypotheses centering on two alternatives, one being a criterion of territorial uniformity and the other, emphasis on the South;
--the unit rates distinguish three levels of support, which are directly correlated to the severity of the specific conditions of unemployment and, inversely, to the public cost of training services associated with each area of support.

On this basis, the cost (in 1982 terms) falls between 2.626 trillion lire under plan "A" and 3.515 trillion under plan "B" (see Table 3).

Additional training costs are zero in the two areas of unemployed youth and workers unemployed for fewer than 12 months; in these cases the proposed system provides only for a monetary grant from the guaranteed minimum wage.

In the other areas, costs are a function of additional use, the length of the courses and the additional unit costs per user:

- additional use corresponds to that not absorbable by existing structures. It varies according to the type of user, corresponding to 100 percent of those qualifying for the guaranteed minimum wage in the categories of adults seeking a first job and persons unemployed for more than 12 months;
- the average length of service varies from 80 hours of courses of the "information-socialization" type for adults seeking a first job to 1,200 hours of courses for "reschooling, orientation and prequalification" for young people who have not graduated from high school or who have graduated only from elementary school;
- the unit costs are set at 3,000-3,500 lire per student hour according to the course level.

In general, additional training expenses can be estimated at 561 billion lire, using 1982 as the base year (see Table 4).

The general cost of the reform thus comes to 3.19 or 4.075 trillion lire depending on the plan considered; it will obviously be larger if a guaranteed minimum wage reform is chosen that gives special emphasis to the South.

In the same year, the volume of resources absorbed by the present system of support (explicit and hidden) for the incomes of unemployed workers is estimated at 5.2 trillion lire approximately. The estimate is based on a 1982 updating of the amount of money intended for that purpose in 1980; it is the result of an ad hoc study of general social protection expenditures. The study analyzes all the functions of the social insurance system and dwells on the economics of expenditures for indirect forms of unemployment benefits, where the type and conditions of the grants made them seem especially suspect of "distracting" from the purposes officially attributed to them. As can be seen from Table 5, the resource package identified is made up more than 80 percent by "resources distracted" from invalids, families, survivors and wage supplements.

As an alternative to this package, the guaranteed minimum wage reform includes a /missing expenditure/ varying between 2.045 and 1.16 trillion lire in plans "A" and "B." This is, of course, a /savings/, which can certainly not be achieved in the immediate future but is by no means of negligible significance. Even if one wishes to project higher levels of participation in the "institutional" labor market caused by minimum wage expectations, the savings would be reduced 20-25 percent, so that the "missing expenditure" would vary between 1-1.5 trillion lire.

Table 1: The impact area of the guaranteed minimum wage reform in the context of job-seekers classified by age and occupational status in the Center-North (CN), the South (S) and Italy as a whole (1982 averages in thousands of units)

Tabella 1 - L'area di intervento della riforma smig nel quadro delle persone in cerca di occupazione per classi di età e condizione professionale a livello Italia, Centro-Nord e Mezzogiorno (media 1982, in migliaia di unità)

age	Unemployed (I)			Seeking 1st Job			Totals (I & II)			Others (III)			Totals (I, II, III)		
	CN	S	It.	CN	S	It.	CN	S	It.	CN	S	It.	CN	S	It.
14-15	2	1	3	102	57	159	104	58	162	13	14	27	117	72	189
16-19	18	4	22	197	129	326	197	129	326	65	60	125	262	189	451
20-24	41	24	65	259	248	508	259	248	508	64	76	140	324	324	648
25-29	26	24	50	97	114	211	97	114	211	37	41	78	134	155	289
16-29	85	56	141	553	491	1,045	553	491	1,045	166	177	343	720	668	1,388
30-39	34	26	60	65	59	124	65	59	124	30	32	62	115	91	206
40-49	18	13	31	36	32	68	36	32	68	17	17	34	53	48	101
50-59	11	8	19	26	16	42	26	16	42	15	15	30	41	32	73
60-64	1	1	2	2	1	3	2	1	3	8	8	16	13	9	22
65-70	1	1	2	129	108	237	129	108	237	72	72	144	254	180	434
71 e oltre	1	1	2	1	1	2	9	9	18	13	9	22
65 e oltre	2	2	4	2	2	4	20	12	32	22	13	35
Totale	163	120	283	626	539	1,166	789	659	1,449	334	284	618	1,126	942	2,068
Area smig	161	119	280	512	477	990	673	596	1,270	—	—	—	673	596	1,270
% su tot.	(98,8)	(99,2)	(98,9)	(81,8)	(88,5)	(84,9)	(85,2)	(90,4)	(87,6)	(—)	(—)	(—)	(59,8)	(63,5)	(61,4)

Fonte: Nostra elaborazione su dati Istat, Rilevazione delle forze di lavoro, media 1982, nn. 2/3.

Legenda: CN = Centro-nord; M = Mezzogiorno.

— — — — — Limite dell'area interessata alla riforma smig.

Shaded numbers:		(1) 71 and over		(2) 65 and over	
16-19	18	8	26	179	121
20-24	41	24	65	218	224
25-29	26	24	50	71	90
16-29	85	56	141	468	435
30-39	34	26	60	31	33
40-49	23	23	40	13	9
50-59	18	13	31	—	—
60-64	1	1	2	—	—
30-64	76	61	139	—	—

- (1) 71 and over
- (3) Totals
- (5) percent of the total
- (6) Our treatment of ISTAT data, "The Shape of the Labor Force," 1982 averages, notes 2-3.

The shaded area is that impacted by the guaranteed minimum wage reform

Tabella 2 - Le persone in cerca di occupazione ammissibili alla riforma smig distinte per aree di intervento a livello Italia, centro-nord e Mezzogiorno: media 1982

Table 2: Job-seekers qualifying for the guaranteed minimum wage reform classified by educational and employment status for Italy, the Center North and the South; 1982 averages

Territory	age 16-29 seeking first job		total	less than 12 mos.		more than 12 mos.	age 30-49 seeking 1st job		Total
	(1)	(2)		(3) Migliaia	(4)				
Centro-nord	185	125	310	120	36	156	23	489	
Mezzogiorno	170	148	318	91	26	117	26	461	
Italia	355	273	628	211	62	273	49	950	
(4) Composizione per area di intervento									
Centro-nord	37,4	26,5	63,9	24,2	7,3	31,5	4,6	100,0	
Mezzogiorno	36,3	33,1	69,4	19,4	5,6	25,0	5,6	100,0	
Italia	37,9	29,7	66,6	21,9	6,4	28,3	5,1	100,0	
(5) Composizione per ambito territoriale									
Centro-nord	52,1	45,8	49,2	56,9	58,1	57,1	46,9	51,5	
Mezzogiorno	47,9	54,2	50,8	43,1	41,9	42,9	53,1	48,5	
Italia	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	
(6) * Grado di copertura (*)									
Centro-nord	39,5	28,0	67,5	74,5	22,4	96,9	52,3	73,5	
Mezzogiorno	39,1	35,6	74,7	76,5	21,8	98,3	61,9	78,5	
Italia	39,3	31,6	70,9	75,4	22,1	97,5	57,0	75,8	

Fonte: Nostra elaborazione su dati Istat, op. cit.

(*) Il grado di copertura della riforma smig è calcolato sul tot. delle persone in cerca di occ. corrispondente a ciascuna area di intervento.

Key is on next page

KEY TO TABLE 2

(1) with diploma or skilled	"Centro-Nord" - 'Center and North'
(2) without diploma or skill	"Mezzogiorno" - 'South'
	"Italia" - 'Italy'
(3) in thousands	
(4) percentage by category	"Fonte:..." - 'Source: our treatment of ISTAT data, op. cit.'
(5) percentage by region	
(6) rate of coverage (\$)	"(\$)... " - 'The rate of coverage of the SMIG reform is calculated on number of people seeking jobs corresponding to each

Tabella 3 - Sima al 1982 del fabbisogno finanziario connesso alle prestazioni dirette in denaro della riforma smig a favore delle persone in cerca di occupazione distinte per aree di intervento e ripartizioni geografiche: ipotesi « A » e « B » (miliardi di lire 1982)

Table 3: 1982 estimate of financial cost of direct money grants under the SMIG to people looking for jobs by individual category and geographical distribution: plans "A" and "B" (in billions of 1982 lire)

Region	age 16-29 seeking first job			unemployed			age 30-49 seeking a 1st job	
	(1)	(2)	total	(3)	(4)	total	(5)	total
Ipotesi « A »								
Centro-nord	444	314	758	468	86	554	55	1367
Mezzogiorno	408	372	780	355	62	417	62	1259
Italia	852	686	1538	823	148	971	117	2626
Ipotesi « B »								
Centro-nord	444	314	758	468	86	554	55	1367
Mezzogiorno	816	372	1188	710	125	835	125	2148
Italia	1260	686	1946	1178	211	1389	180	3515

Legenda: Ipotesi « A » - riforma smig uniforme nell'intero territorio nazionale.
Ipotesi « B » - riforma smig di impronta meridionalistica.

- (1) with diploma or skill (3) not more than 12 months
(2) without diploma or skill (4) more than 12 months

"Centro-nord" - 'Center and North'; "Mezzogiorno" - 'South'; "Italia" - 'Italy'
"Legenda..." - 'Plan "A": the guaranteed minimum wage reform is applied uniformly throughout the country.
Plan "B": the SMIG reform emphasizes the South.'

Tabella 4 - Stima per il 1982 degli utenti e della spesa aggiuntiva dei servizi di alfabetizzazione/formazione/riqualificazione connessi alla riforma smig

Tipologia	Utenti Addizionali (000)	Spesa aggiuntiva (miliardi '82)	Spesa pro-utente (L. 106)
(5) P.C.O. x 1 ^a occupaz. (1)	(2) 245	(3) 485	(4) 2,0
(6) P.C.O. 16-29 anni	196	473	2,4
(7) — S.T./L.E.	30	125	4,2
(8) — S.M.I.	166	348	2,1
(9) P.C.O. 30-49 anni	49	12	0,2
(10) Disoccupati	62	76	1,2
(11) Totale	307	561	1,8

P.C.O. = persone in cerca di occupazione; S.T. = senza titolo di studio; L.E. = licenza elementare; S.M.I. = licenza media inferiore.

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Table 4: 1982 estimate of users and additional expenditures for services for literacy classes, training and retraining connected with the guaranteed minimum wage reform

(1) categories	(2) additional users (in thousands)	(3) additional expenditures (in billions of lire 1982)	(4) expenditure per user (lire x 10 ⁶)
(5) individuals looking for a first job			
(6) job-seekers aged 16-29			
(7) no school certificate or having finished elementary school			
(8) intermediate school certificate			
(9) job-seekers aged 30-49			
(10) unemployed			
(11) total			

KEY TO TABLE 5 (continued from preceding page)

- (2) 1980 resources devoted to the unemployed
- (3-4) percentage change in value 1980-82
- (3) general for function and form
- (4) specific for function and form
- (5) 1982 resources devoted to the unemployed
- (6-7) 1982 SMIG
- (6) Plan A
- (7) Plan B

"Fonte..." - 'Source: our treatment of data from ISTAT, the Treasury and Budget ministries'

Prospectus 1: Outline of the institutional model on the basis of the proposed guaranteed minimum wage

Category of preliminary wage earners and training

Users: Young people between the ages of 16 and 29 who are seeking a first job, who have been on the unemployment rolls for more than 3 months, and who have no high-school diploma or vocational training.

Forms of aid:

A. Preliminary wage for taking literacy courses and meeting academic requirements for young people who have not completed various levels of schooling.

B. Preliminary wage for vocational training courses for young people who have finished intermediate school.

Time limit:

One year of preliminary wage, which will be extended for a second year in the case of 2-year training courses.

Grant: 200 lire a day

Conditions:

Required attendance at classes or forfeiture of preliminary wage.

Category of young skilled workers

Users: Young people between the ages of 16 and 29 who are seeking a first job, who have been on the unemployment rolls for more than 3 months, and who have a vocational skill or a high-school diploma.

Forms of aid:

Income support

Time limit:

A. 6 months of guaranteed minimum wage (plan "B" extendable to 12 months in the South).

B. 6 months at a single rate for young people wishing to start their own businesses with or without associates.

Grant: 400 lire a day

Conditions:

A. Registry on communal guaranteed minimum wage rolls, which constitutes a declaration of availability to perform public service work as needed.

B. Acceptance of work offered.

(Category of young skilled workers, cont'd)

(Conditions):

- C. Abstention from any paid work except as provided under Condition A and except for public service work paying more than 200,000 lire a month.
- D. No other income above the guaranteed minimum wage level.

Category of unemployed

Users: Unemployed persons aged 16-64 who have made contributions corresponding to at least 150 days in the year preceding the application for support. No distinction is made concerning the type of work time applied; time put in under different employers may be counted. Contributions made by self-employed workers count according to the total amount paid. Workers are registered at the employment office.

Forms of aid:

Income support.

Time limit:

- A. 6 months of guaranteed minimum wage (plan "B" extendable to 12 months in the South).
- B. 6 months at a single rate for unemployed workers wishing to start their own businesses with or without associates.

Grant: 650 lire a day

Conditions:

- A. Registry on communal guaranteed minimum wage rolls, which constitutes a declaration of availability to perform public service work as needed.
- B. Acceptance of work offered provided the worker is qualified for it, the working conditions are not unsafe, and the place of work is located no farther than 1 hour or 50 kilometers from the worker's residence. The first refusal of work entails loss of 20 percent of the guaranteed minimum wage; the second refusal entails loss of all benefits.
- C. Abstention from any paid work except as provided under Condition A and except for public service work paying more than 200,000 lire a month.
- D. No other income above the guaranteed minimum wage level.
- E. Incompatible with CIG grants, special unemployment subsidies, etc.

Category of vocational updating and retraining

Users: Unemployed persons aged 16-64 who have been looking for work for more than 12 months and who thereby no longer qualify for the 3rd-level guaranteed minimum wage.

Forms of aid:

Assignment to vocational updating and retraining.

Time limit:

A. 6 months assignment (plan "B": extendable to 12 months in the South).

Grant: 400 lire a day

Conditions:

Attendance at classes or forfeiture of benefits.

Category of adults seeking a first job

Users: Adults aged 30-49 who are looking for a first job and who have been on the employment office rolls for at least 3 months.

Forms of aid:

Assignment to classes in literacy, vocational training and socialization.

Time limit:

A. 6 months assignment (plan "B": extendable to 12 months in the South).

Grant: 400 lire a day

Conditions:

A. Attendance at classes or forfeiture of benefits.

B. User may not move from the 1st or 2nd level to the 5th level solely because of age.

Note: The category of unemployed persons also includes those who are returning to the labor market after military service or maternity leave. They must be registered at the employment office.

8782

CSO: 3528/58

INCREASED INVESTMENTS, ECONOMIC UPTURN SEEN

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG/BLICK DURCH DIE WIRTSCHAFT in German 16
Feb 84 p 2

[Text] The Hague, 15 February--The most positive comments on the development of the economic situation in the Netherlands come from Netherlands Central Bank President Dr Wim Duisenberg. "The Dutch economy is at a turning point," he said a short time ago in addressing the Belgian-Dutch Association in Antwerp. "This is not only a consequence of the economic upturn, which has begun in the United States and which is now becoming clear throughout the entire industrialized world. It also emerges in the light of the fact that the competitive capacity has basically become stronger and that opportunities, offered by this boost, are being exploited."

Of course, according to Duisenberg, it took a long time before the therapy was started for Holland, the patient. But it was continued with growing intensity and persistence over the past year and a half. At this time there are reportedly indications that the patient has passed his crisis and that the healing process has set in. According to data supplied by the bank president, the following was also a positive factor: The wage unit costs in Dutch industry dropped 15 percent between 1977 and 1983 compared to the average level of wage costs in competing foreign countries, in spite of the fact that the guilder was revalued upward by 7 percent. Under the influence of the relative export price decline, the Dutch share of the world market (excluding energy) grew by about 7 percent since 1979. All political undertakings--according to Duisenberg--must now be examined--also regarding working hours--to determine whether they do not hinder the economy's growth in structural terms or, better still, whether they will boost it.

In the middle of January, almost at the same moment as Minister Stoltenberg, Finance Minister Ruding surprised the Dutch television audience with the happy news that the Dutch government deficit had increased less powerfully last year than had still been expected several months earlier. Instead of a shortfall of 12.4 percent (of the GNP), it now came to 11.6 percent according to preliminary calculations. It did not become clear just how 3 billion guilders were saved. Clearest of all is the explanation that public expenditures were kept better under control and that the budget at the same time was not overdrawn in its various parts. A similar development took place also in 1982--at that time, the deficit had been 10 percent instead of the

originally estimated 11.4 percent. Minister Ruding was unable to say whether the year 1984 would also bring happy news in this respect. This cannot be ruled out because the favorable development of the past 2 years does contain a structural component.

Duisenberg again commented on investments in the corporate sector during a symposium of the National Investeringsbank in Scheveningen. As he said, the improvement in enterprise profits will lead to a revival in investments only with a very much longer delay than had been the case in the past. Many enterprises used their profits to boost their asset position and furthermore made use of the "attractive possibility of investing their assets in the risk-avoiding sector" (government obligations).

According to a survey conducted by Investeringsbank, about 43 percent of the enterprises questioned want to invest more this year than in 1983; 53 percent of the enterprises with more than 25 employees believe that sales will improve in 1984. Only 21 percent expect an improvement in the labor market situation. It is above all those enterprises which invested less in 1980-1983 which want to make more investments. In the opinion of Investeringsbank member of the board of the directors Professor Dr A. van der Zwan, this is one reason for being able to speak in terms of a genuine breakthrough. Looking at investments, we are dealing above all here with replacement investments which are intended to reduce production costs. Only the strong and successful enterprises dare make investments which are aimed at increasing the output.

Forecasts on investments this year also come from the Central Statistics Bureau in The Hague. According to a survey conducted in October among 3,000 enterprises, investments in Dutch industry (at current prices) will increase by a total of 26 percent after they had risen 6 percent in 1983. During both years, the increase was to be credited above all to the petroleum industry. In 1984, of course, the increase is also a consequence of the investment expectations of the heavy-engineering and electrical-engineering industry (up 22 percent) and the chemical industry (up 34 percent). The essential and nonessential foods industry of course will invest 1 percent less than 1983 and the construction industry and the wiring installation enterprises will invest 3 percent less.

The premature announcement of some statistics from the medium-term forecasts (until 1987) of the government's Central Planning Bureau caused some commotion in The Hague. After several newspaper reports had been published, in which the future of the Dutch economy was estimated to be much less positive by the Planning Bureau, as would have been expected according to all of the positive notes of recent times, Economy Minister Van Aardenne refused to submit the figures to parliament. Work on the 1985 budget however has become politically more difficult for him. The Planning Bureau statistics which were leaked have been described as "finger exercise" for top-level officials who advise the cabinet.

Until 1987, the notes from the Planning Bureau assume an increase in the number of unemployed to a figure of more than 1.1 million. According to them, enterprises will hardly be able to invest in spite of the tax reduction

granted by the government in the amount of 1.5 billion guilders; their profits will go up but there will be no improvement in the employment situation. The Planning Bureau's statistics constitute a rather poor report card for the policy of the present cabinet.

New Factory Orders

More and more entrepreneurs describe the demand for their products as being satisfactory and less and less of them believe that the capacity of the production plant is too big. According to an economy situation survey by the Central Statistics Bureau (excluding the essential and nonessential food industry), 28 percent of the entrepreneurs questioned at the end of December believed that the demand was insufficient as against 35 percent in June 1983; for 22 percent of them (June 1983, 28 percent) the output capacity was too big. The inventory of new factory orders was judged better than in June 1983: For 24 percent of those questioned, it was too small, compared to 29 percent half a year earlier. The new factory order inventory index (September 1982=100) rose from 97 in June to 100 at the end of the year.

Output

The Central Statistics Bureau did not comment on industrial output in the last economic situation survey. It only announced that the general development of business transactions is being judged better by the enterprises since the start of 1983. Until the middle of 1983, the improvement took place above all in the sector of intermediate goods (for further use in the production sector). During the second half of the year, the capital goods sector developed more favorably and the same is true, although to a lesser degree, also of the consumer goods sector. At the end of December 1983, production facilities were being utilized as well as they had been in June (80 percent).

Labor Market

During the second half of 1983, the employment situation in Holland deteriorated less seriously than during the first half of the year. During the last 2 months of the year, the increase in the number of unemployed was above all a consequence of seasonal factors. At the end of December, the unemployment offices had registered 855,601 unemployed, compared to 836,974 at the end of November. This corresponds to an unemployment rate of 18.3 (17.9) percent. After seasonal corrections, the unemployment situation declined slightly from 830,190 to 829,230 persons. The unemployment rate here was 17.7 percent.

The number of available jobs in December dropped from 9,917 to 9,390 and, after seasonal correction from 10,531 to 10,483.

Wages and Prices

Between the middle of November and the middle of December 1983, the price rise did not continue further in the Netherlands: 33 percent of the goods and services registered by the Central Statistics Bureau became more expensive while a price decline was recorded for 38 percent. Fresh fruit, among other

things, went up in price during the period covered by the report. Hospital care rates also went up. Ladies' clothing, potatoes, and gasoline became cheaper.

Foreign Trade:

In November 1983, the Netherlands imported goods worth 15.7 billion guilders, compared to 15.4 billion guilders in November 1982. Exports achieved a value of 17.6 billion guilders, compared to 15.5 billion guilders the year before. Between January and November 1983, inclusive, imports went up almost 5 percent to a figure of 159.5 billion guilders, compared to the corresponding period of time the year before. Exports showed the same rise to a figure of 170.1 billion guilders. The trade surplus came to 10.6 billion guilders during the first 11 months of 1983, compared to 9.4 billion guilders during the same span of time in 1982.

Compared to November 1982, exports to the FRG went up by 22 percent to a figure of 5.2 billion guilders in November 1983; the increase came above all in mineral fuels, organic chemical products, and machines. During the first 11 months of 1983, exports to the most important trade partner came to 52.0 billion guilders, compared to 47.7 billion guilders from January until November 1982. Exports to the United States in November 1983 came to almost 800 million guilders or about 30 percent more than in November 1982. Above all more machines and optical instruments were exported to that country. During the first 11 months of 1983, exports to the United States came to 7.3 billion guilders, compared to 5.2 billion guilders during the corresponding period in 1982.

5058

CSO: 3620/226

EXPORTS OF VOLVO TRUCKS TO IRAN EXPECTED TO INCREASE

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 13 Mar 84 p IX

[Article by Nils-Erik Lindell]

[Text] Goteborg--Last year Volvo delivered almost 4,000 complete or ready-to-assemble trucks to Iran and is now negotiating additional major sales.

Volvo's own truck plant in Iran was nationalized when Khomeyni came to power. For a time the plant was shut down completely. Production was resumed 2 years ago and has now reached 100 vehicles per month. This rate is continuing to grow steadily.

Previously Volvo was forced to accept oil in exchange for vehicles, but Iran's ability to pay has improved and now Volvo is negotiating cash payments.

"Until we receive a letter of intent, I cannot say how many vehicles we will deliver this year. We are not talking about a specific order, but ongoing deliveries."

Major Order

Sten Langenius said, however, that a large number of vehicles are involved and that the total probably will be about the same as last year.

It is time-consuming work to negotiate with a centrally controlled country. For this reason, Volvo has had legal experts in Tehran.

The competition is also stiff. Scania recently received an order for 1,000 trucks, thereby opening a practically new market for the second Swedish manufacturer. Another strong competitor is Mercedes which, like Volvo, has its own production facilities in Iran. The country's need for trucks is considerably higher than the domestic production, however.

9336

CSO: 3650/154

COUNTRY LESS VULNERABLE TO MIDEAST OIL EMBARGO THAN IN 1973

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 29 Feb 84 p 5

/Article by Erik Bendt Rasmussen: "Oil in Our Storage for Several Months"/

/Text/ Denmark's oil supply is to a small degree dependent on the Hormuz strait. The big oil fields in the North Sea place Denmark in a better position than during the oil crisis in 1973.

A temporary closing of the oil gate, the Hormuz strait, will not have any great influence on Denmark's supply of fuel oil, diesel oil and petroleum. Denmark is dependent on the Hormuz strait for about 14-15 percent of its oil import. During the oil crises ten years ago 60 percent of Denmark's supply was dependent on the Middle East. But since then the oil fields in the North Sea have come into full production. Besides today we have at our disposal domestic reserves for several months.

In the compulsory reserves there is according to the Energy Administration presently petroleum for 139 days normal usage, gas and diesel oil for 128 days and heavy fuel oil for 120 days normal usage. The petroleum for fuel supply can even be stretched to last longer, since spring is coming.

Besides the electric companies are under special obligations to keep extra reserves. In addition to the compulsory reserves, the oil companies have very large work storage.

The North Sea Is of Great Importance

Today only a third of the crude oil import comes from OPEC, 18 percent of which from Kuwait and 5 percent from Saudi Arabia. Of the imported crude oil 45 percent comes from British and Norwegian oil fields in the North Sea, and the Danish oil fields supply us with 19 percent of the need for crude oil. The rest comes from other resources. Half of the finished oil products come from Sweden, which for refining buys among other things British, Norwegian and Russian oil.

"The North Sea has become an important supplier as compared to the period of the oil crises in 1973-74 when there hardly was any production, so overall today we are in a better situation than ten years ago when we had to ration," Knud Jensen, director of Oil Division Cooperative Representation says.

"Besides there is enough oil in the world. Large amounts are stored in tankers. But, of course, one shall not disregard the fact that other countries to a greater extent depend on being able to navigate the Hormuz strait."

12550

CS0: 3613/101

OVERVIEW OF GROWING CRISIS IN FRENCH COAL INDUSTRY

Increased Financial Deterioration

Paris LES ECHOS in French 9 Feb 84 p 2

[Text] On every ton of coal extracted last year the [French] Coal Board [CDF] was losing 195 francs. In 1982 that loss had already reached the 166 francs.

This change in the economic performance--before adding the state subsidy of course--accounts for the austerity plan now being worked out.

Another cause of concern in the CDF figures for this last fiscal year is the fact that, for the first time ever, its indebtedness (14.5 billion francs) exceeds its sales volume (12.6 billion francs). This negative performance follows a cutback in the operation of coal-burning power plants and increasing debts due to the need for further investments which in 1983 amounted to nearly 3 billion francs. For the same reasons financing costs went up by 15 percent to 1.7 billion francs.

All things considered, last year the CDF had a deficit of 750 million francs, a figure five times higher than that of the previous year.

Confronted with this serious financial downturn, the government has decided to consolidate production in those mines which are more economical to run.

On 15 February of this year, Pierre Mauroy and the labor unions will make a joint effort to decide the rate at which that reorganization can be carried out and 48 hours later the Board of Directors of EDF [French Electric Company] will endorse the policy.

Jobs Cut By Half

Paris LES ECHOS in French 5 Mar 84 p 5

[Article by Didier Duruy]

[Excerpts] A reorganization of the national coal industry can finally be implemented. Political considerations are taking a back seat while pragmatism prevails once more by

supporting competitiveness rather than subsidy-chasing. How much time lost and how many hopes destroyed!

Today the French Coal Board [CDF] knows where it stands. The board can rely on a budget still largely supplemented by state subsidies and it has been assured, at least by the EDF, that it will have substantial and well-paid market outlets. Responsibility and solidarity have won the day.

But the reality is harsh: in the mines, one out of every two jobs will be eliminated between now and the end of 1988.

"A day I have long waited for." At the end of last week and after a meeting of the CDF Board of Directors, CDF Director Michel Hug did not hide his satisfaction at being back in the driver's seat to deal with a situation which for more than a year had been beyond his control. The final obstacle was eliminated that same morning at the last minute when a 5-year contract was signed with EDF.

Although a program for 1984 has been drawn up, the CDF management has refrained from setting out a plan covering the 5 years. It will only give some broad outlines. Between now and mid-March the collieries will submit proposals to select the mines where modernization is warranted and those which must be closed down.

Priority to Lorraine and the Central Region at the Expense of the North.

Although the selection is only a pointer it reveals the direction of the strategy followed: priority is given to the coalfields of Lorraine and the open-pit mines of central and southern France at the expense of the North and Pas-de-Calais region.

CDF plans to eliminate 6,000 jobs in 1984. This figure represents an average between the reduction in personnel due to natural causes (3,452) and the 8,000 jobs which management had originally planned to eliminate. However, 2,548 miners will have to be "retrained." For 1,000 of them jobs will be available under the terms of the accord signed with EDF. The electric company has offered to employ 1,000 miners each year until 1988. As for the rest, CDF is counting on voluntary resignations, early retirements and industrial retraining.

With that reduction in personnel, this year's production will be cut back from 18.5 million tons to 17.37 million tons, that is to say by 430,000 tons in the central and southern region, by 400,000 tons in the north and Pas-de-Calais region and by 300,000 tons in Lorraine. As to what will happen in the following years, Michel Hug only said that "a similar kind of effort will be required." The retraining and reduction of personnel by attrition will affect a total of 12,000 workers for the duration of the Ninth Plan. All these factors tend to confirm the fact that between now and 1988, the labor force employed by CDF (currently 57,000 people) will be roughly cut down by half and that production will drop to between 11 and 13.4 million tons.

These sacrifices will only yield results gradually. This year the company will continue to show a deficit of 365 million francs. Michel Hug doubts that it can break even much before 1985. But EDF will not spare its support.

An EDF Dowry of 2.5 Billion

Besides the social measures, the accord between the two companies also contains provisions for a transfer of risks from CDF to its partner and for financial aid. In the matter of coal, EDF is willing to pay a 10 percent surcharge representing an additional cost of 150 million francs a year. The arrangement is more complicated in the case of the electricity generated by the mines' power plants purchased by EDF. Marcel Boiteux has agreed to a gradual cutback of 37 billion kilowatt/hour between 1984 and 1988. That part of the contract is a package deal: for instance this year it will involve 10.75 billion kilowatt/hour representing 4 billion francs.

In addition to that cutback, EDF must purchase all additional electricity that CDF may wish to sell to it. If these sales force EDF to close down a nuclear power plant the financial loss will be less than if it had to use CDF electricity instead of that generated by coal-burning power plants of the electric company.

The system seems to have been worked out in such a way that it will be more costly for the EDF if its overall earnings increase and vice versa. At this point it is difficult to figure out the exact amount of EDF's support. It could be in the region of 500 million francs over a period of 5 years. The fact that the agreement is based on the principle of degression also indicates that it will now be renewed under its present terms in 1989.

Now CDF is in a position to meet its responsibilities. Political considerations have been set aside. Relations with EDF are clear-cut. During the next 5 years CDF must show that it can operate on a sound basis. The battle is not over because younger workers are the most suitable for retraining and because Lorraine now becomes the focus of CDF and the coal extracted in that area is exclusively used to generate electricity. The state will continue to provide aid. It is already committed to give a steady yearly subsidy of 6.8 billion francs until 1988.

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CSO: 3519/245

SUMMARY OF FRENCH OIL INDUSTRY ANNUAL REPORT

Paris SEMAINE DE L'ENERGIE in French No 267, 22 Feb 84 pp 6, 7

[Excerpts] The 1983 oil industry report, a reference document which is due around this time of the year, has come out. This report, prepared by the Union of the Oil Industry Trade Union Chambers (UCSIP), presents the main facts and figures for the past year.

With regard to French supplies, it shows that in 1983 our imports of crude oil amounted to 59.1 million tons, a cutback of 12.4 percent compared to the 1982 figures. If one adds the distillation products to be processed in refineries, our total imports of raw materials amounted to 65.1 million tons, down by 12.7 percent compared to 1982. But the 1983 decline in purchases, which was higher than the decline in sales, was compensated by withdrawals from the stocks of crude oil and processed products.

As for our crude oil supplies, the UCSIP report shows a continued effort to reestablish a more balanced diversification. The share of imports from the Middle East was 43.1 percent, a very substantial reduction compared to 1982 when that share was 57.9 percent, with the most significant decrease occurring in supplies from Saudi Arabia. This reduction was compensated by an increase in supplies from oil producing countries of the North Sea--now France's second biggest suppliers--and of Africa, Nigeria in particular.

As far as refined products, the upward trend of 1982 levelled off at 22.5 million tons, down by 0.9 million tons compared to 1982. Total imports to meet French requirements, therefore excluding conversion processes but including imports of finished products, net of exports, amounted to some 76 million tons, 7 percent less than in 1982. This reduction which exceeds the domestic market drop in demand (1.7 percent), is explained by the release of stocks of crude oil and finished products which continued in 1983. The cost of our oil bill for 1983 was in the region of 134 GF [billion]. It was more or less the same as our bill for 1982 since the decline of our requirements was cancelled out by a slight increase in the cost of oil imports in terms of francs.

The drop in domestic consumption registered in 1983, compared to 1982, applies mostly to heavy fuels where sales went down by 3.3 million tons in 1983. The breaking down of that figure is 1 million tons less in sales to industry (down by 10.2 percent) and 2.3 million tons less in sales to power plants (6.5

percent). At the same time there was in 1983 a slight increase in the consumption of car fuels which went up by 1.4 percent. That percentage represents a 3.5 percent drop in the demand for gasoline and a 2.3 percent increase in the demand for super gasoline which amounted to almost 85 percent of the overall demand.

Imports	1982		1983		1983/1982
	Million tons	Percentage	Million tons	Percentage	
a) Crude Oil	67.5	100	59.1	100	-12.4
-Near and Middle East	39.1	57.9	25.5	43.1	-14.8
-Africa	13.8	20.4	15.6	26.4	+ 6
-Europe	9.9	14.7	14.3	24.2	+ 9.5
-Others	4.7	7	3.7	6.3	- 0.7
d) Distillation Products	7.1	10.3	6	9.2	- 0.7
Total	74.6		65.1		-12.7

Among products where sales dropped the report mentions:

-Asphalt consumption which is dependent on public credits for roads and which decreased by more than 200,000 tons or 9.1 percent.

-The market of fuel for French vessels, down by 175,000 tons or by 12.2 percent.

Increased sales were registered, on the one hand, in the trading of petroleum-based chemical products where there was an increase of around 14.5 percent in the consumption of chemical products and, on the other hand, in the spectacular increase of petroleum coke imports from the United States with consumption rising by 1 million tons in 1983, an 87 percent increase. This was mainly due to the fact that the price of that product dropped at the end of 1982 making it more desirable than coal. The report devotes a lengthy chapter to the prices of oil products and recalls that these prices were adjusted on a monthly basis in accordance with the system set out in the price formula. The report stresses the fact that during the second half of the year the main parameters of that formula were drastically changed affecting the price movements.

As for developments in the French oil industry, the authors of the report point out that financial investments made by oil companies in the spheres of exploration and development amounted to 2.245 GF in 1983, a 12.5 percent increase in current value compared to 1982. Exploration accounts for 1.3 GF while expansion and development work represents 0.945 GF.

It must be pointed out that there was a significant decline in exploration activities compared to 1982 and also compared to 1981 and 1980. These activities only involved land exploration licenses. Exploration drillings were also clearly down. But even if less wells were drilled their average

depth was greater than in 1982. Despite the slowdown in exploration work two oil finds were made in the Paris basin at Chaunoy and at Saint-Just-Sauvage.

In 1983 domestic oil production remained at the 1982 level (1.6 million tons) with the Paris basin accounting for 20 percent of that output. In connection with refining activities, the report notes that refining operations continued to decline in 1983: the total amount of tons processed in the refineries, including the conversion process, was 76 million tons, down by 8 percent compared to 1982. In the conversion processes (5.7 million tons) there was a 16.3 percent increase over 1982 (4.9 million tons).

The utilization rate was 64.2 percent which is 6 percent higher than in 1982 (58 percent), an improvement explained by a reduction in the surplus production capacity of refining plants (the refineries of Gargenville and Bordeaux were closed down).

As for the petrochemical sector, the UCSIP report notes that activity in the basic organic chemistry sector shows improvement in 1983 after going through 3 years of significant decline (20 percent) compared to the 1979 activity level.

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PAPER COMMENTS ON DECISION TO CUT OIL EMERGENCY RESERVES

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 29 Feb 84 p 2

[Editorial: "Oil Up and Down"]

[Text] Much about oil can be puzzling. Yesterday the Swedish government decided to drastically cut back the oil reserves--the fuel oil supply will now last beyond 1 year with normal consumption but the gasoline supply, however, is too small--and this despite the fact that some oil prices are now being pushed up by speculations about a third "oil crunch," after the 1974 and 1979 crunches, because of the war between Iran and Iraq.

But this is not as strange as it may seem. Oil company directors and other experts do not believe in any new oil crisis. The world stock is overloaded, the prices are dropping and the Mideast oil has now lost its effective role.

Especially in Sweden, savings and alternative fuel has reduced the importance of oil. The consumption of fuel oil by the public utility works in Sweden has been reduced by half from its peak level in the seventies. The gasoline consumption has, however, increased and accounts for almost 40 percent or more of the total oil consumption. And as the combustion in the cars is so poor, the gasoline is undoubtedly responsible for more nitric oxide emissions than the fuel oil which is perhaps the greatest domestic acid enemy.

At the Nordic Council, Olof Palme launched a justifiable attack against a British investigation proposal for "generally speaking" not to do anything more about acid discharge of sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxides, etc., for 5 years except for research. He received warm support from, among others, the Danish Minister of Environment Christian Christensen.

But when the Joint Nordic Energy Exchange Nordel 20 celebrated its anniversary in the same parliamentary building a few hours later, it came forth that all of England is responsible for 10 percent of the sulphur discharge over Sweden and little Denmark is responsible for 6 percent. The domestic Swedish contribution is 20 percent, and the natural or unknown is 34 percent. Not only Sweden but also Denmark should clean up as well as possible inside their own doorstep.

Fortunately, the English commission's foolish proposal for passiveness will probably not have a chance of passing. Even Great Britain will be tied down by the intensified discharge regulations that will soon be adopted within EC.

NEW FISHING QUOTA PACT WITH EC RATIFIED

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 9 Feb 84 p 21

[Article by Michael Ehrenreich: "New EC Ocean Pact Ratified in Parliament"]

[Text] Minister of Fisheries Henning Grove yesterday finally reported that Denmark would support last week's distribution of EC fishing quotas for 1984 after the fishing pact was ratified by the parliamentary Market Committee.

This means that fishermen for the first time can begin to fish early in the year in accordance with a real pact instead of the so-called roll-over system--i.e. transfer of quotas from the previous year because of the inability to agree on a fishing pact.

"A new pact this early in 1984 will have a tremendous impact on industrial and consumer fishing," said Grove.

Since its ratification last week, the fishing pact has been criticized by the Social Democratic Party, but yesterday the party decided to approve the pact due to Greenlandic discussions about withdrawing from the EC.

"The pact is not good enough as far as Denmark is concerned, but the quota negotiations have been linked to discussions of withdrawal, and the home rule government on Greenland has made strong appeals to the Social Democratic Party not to block the fishing pact," said former minister of fisheries Karl Hjortnas.

Hjortnas said the pact means lower cod quotas in the North Sea together with a smaller share of western mackerel, compared to the fishing pact of 25 January 1983. "The exclusion of consumer fishing and secondary catch problems will not be solved either," said Hjortnas.

Grove dismissed the criticism saying that, overall, the pact means improved quotas for Denmark and that arrangements concerning exclusion and secondary catches remain unchanged.

Lauritz Tornas, Liberal Party, earlier rejected the pact and Conservative Kent Kirk unofficially repudiated the EC pact as unacceptable to Danish fishermen. Kent Kirk did not attend the Market Committee meeting yesterday due to negotiations in London.

ENVIRONMENT MINISTER READYING NEW LAW ON SULPHUR EMISSIONS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 10 Feb 84 p 6

[Text] Next month Minister of Environment Christian Christensen will recommend that Parliament approve a new law limiting sulphur dioxide emissions from power plants. The minister has already asked the Environmental Board to draft the new legislative proposal. "The problems are so serious that we should not wait to enact a law," said Christensen.

"Therefore, I have chosen to ready the new legislative proposal--without first submitting the problems to Parliament."

The minister made his decision based on the Acid Pollution Committee's new report entitled "Environment and Energy." In this report, the committee recommends that sulphur dioxide pollution be reduced by 30 percent, or in actual figures from 440,000 tons in 1980 to 300,000 tons in 1995. The committee specifically points to reducing the sulphur content in fuel oils.

The Acid Pollution Committee was established in 1982. It has so far determined that problems associated with so-called "acid rain" are not so serious in Denmark.

Lime in Danish Soil

That is because the Danish soil contains a large amount of lime which neutralizes sulphur compounds. But sulphur emitted from Danish chimneys is also carried to other countries. Sweden, for example, is the recipient of 20 percent of the sulphur dioxide emissions from Danish power plants. And, in Sweden, acid pollution has already led to the destruction of forests and lakes in several places.

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MINISTER PLEDGES ACTION TO REDUCE SULFUR EMISSIONS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 23 Mar 84 p 48

[Article by Ingrid Furseth: "Norway Will Toughen Sulfur Emission Rules"]

[Text] "Norway considers the situation so important that we will advocate a stipulation of a 50-percent reduction in sulfur emissions over the next 10 years as an international goal." Environment Minister Rakel Surlien said this according to a news report in her speech at an environment ministers' meeting in Ottawa on Thursday, where environment ministers from nine Western European countries and Canada are discussing what can be done in order to reduce air pollution in Europe and North America.

The pollution is due especially to sulfur emissions from power plants and industry, but emissions from automobiles, etc., play a large role. The nine Western European countries represented at the Ottawa meeting are those countries which have declared that they will reduce their sulfur emissions by at least 30 percent as soon as possible and before 1993 at the latest, with 1980 as the reference point.

"We for our part hope that this meeting will result in a binding commitment to reduce national sulfur emissions by at least 30 percent before 1993. At the same time, in the near future we will aim at carrying out measures to reduce nitrogen oxide emissions," Cabinet Minister Surlien said. She pointed out further that Norway is afraid of an equivalent development like in Central Europe, where a sudden and dramatic worsening of forest damage has been experienced. Such damage has already begun to appear in Sweden. In Norway it is especially the acidification of rivers and waters which has hit the hardest for the time being, and acid rain is our biggest pollution problem. This problem is due in all essentials to other countries' emissions, for we estimate that close to 90 percent of the acid rain in Norway comes from sources beyond our borders, Cabinet Minister Surlien said in her speech.

Rakel Surlien After the Ottawa Conference: "We Want to Include the British"

"The British environment authorities' last move must be taken as a reaction to our Ottawa conference and to the letter of protest from the Scandinavian Council. The reaction is not unexpected, but now we are nine European countries together with Canada who certainly believe that danger lies ahead and want to

limit our national sulfur emissions by 30 percent as quickly as possible and before 1993 at the latest," Environment Minister Rakel Surlien tells AFTENPOSTEN. Yesterday she came home from a 3-day international ministers' conference in Ottawa in Canada.

"We would of course like to have more countries, including Great Britain, agree to our declaration from the conference. When the Netherlands, too, with its pollution problems joined the conference at the last moment, more countries should be able to do the same," Rakel Surlien believes.

"The meeting in Ottawa between the 10 countries was in many ways historical, because we all stood united regarding the objective: The participating countries were to be urged to support the so-called Acid Rain Convention. When we 10 have now agreed, together we represent 35 countries who are making an appeal that more countries fulfill the objective of reducing their national annual sulfur emissions by 30 percent."

The declaration maintains also that a further reduction is necessary. A changeover to lead-free gasoline will gradually become important and it reads in the declaration in addition that the countries via internal cooperation are to reduce the annual emissions of nitrogen oxides both from stationary and mobile sources as soon as possible--and before 1993.

"Each individual country must work on the problems on its own terms. But there was a clear attitude during the conference that sufficient research has been done to do something now," Surlien says. "All countries appeared well prepared for the conference and the Scandinavian countries especially have worked on these problems for a number of years. We did not criticize England during the conference but on the other hand did have hopes of having the country join the struggle against acid rain," the cabinet minister tells AFTENPOSTEN.

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